Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities

Prepared by:
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

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Director
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Chicago, Illinois
I. Summary of Results

In response to an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) initiated a study to evaluate the potential for residual radioactive and beryllium contamination at facilities that processed these materials in support of nuclear weapons production. The evaluation was to be completed in two phases which included a progress report and a final report. This final report provides the findings of the December 2002 progress report (available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas/ocasawe.html#recont) combined with additional information that has been compiled since that report was completed.

This report includes evaluations of all facilities indicated for inclusion by Department of Energy (DOE) in the EEOICPA program, including those facilities for which a determination could not originally be made in the progress report due to insufficient information. It also contains initial reviews of facilities which had been added by DOE to the list of covered facilities after April 19, 2002. This evaluation involved reviewing additional information that was identified in an attempt to finalize the findings from the progress report regarding those facilities. The final report findings are based on the information posted on the DOE Office of Worker Advocacy (OWA) website as of April 30, 2003 and the additional information reviewed. Changes made after that date are not reflected in the final report.

The following results represent all facilities, as listed on the OWA website on April 30, 2003, evaluated for residual radioactive contamination:

- 89 (40.6%) of 219 atomic weapons employer (AWE) facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred as published on the OWA website as of April 30, 2003.
- 96 (43.8%) facilities identified have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
- 34 (15.5%) facilities have insufficient information to make a determination.

The following results include all sites reviewed for residual beryllium contamination:

- 3 (4.2%) of 72 beryllium vendor facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
- 57 (79.2%) facilities identified have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
- 12 (16.7%) facilities had insufficient information to make a determination.
II. Background and Purpose

The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7384-7385, established a program to compensate individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities and at certain facilities in which radioactive materials or beryllium was processed. DOE was directed by Executive Order 13179 to publish in the Federal Register a list of facilities covered by the Act. On January 17, 2001, DOE published a list of atomic weapons employers (AWE), DOE facilities, and beryllium (BE) vendors, in the Federal Register; the list was revised on December 27, 2002, Vol. 67, No. 249 (FR Doc. 02-32690).

The OWA website (www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy) provides a synopsis of the work performed at each facility, including a listing of time periods during which DOE believes, based on current information, that weapons-related processing was conducted. In determining these time periods, DOE has applied the definitions in EEOICPA to the known facts about the time and conditions of weapons-related processing at each facility. DOE changes the entries on its database as further information is obtained. These periods are referred to in this report as “Periods in which weapons-related production occurred.” It must be noted that DOL is responsible for determining actual periods of covered employment based upon DOE’s findings as well as information from claimants and other sources.

In December 2001, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (P.L. 107-107) required NIOSH to carry out a study to investigate the following issues:

(A) Whether or not significant contamination remained in any atomic weapons employer facility or facility of a beryllium vendor after such facility discontinued activities relating to the production of nuclear weapons.

(B) If so, whether or not such contamination could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer or a covered beryllium illness, as the case may be.

NIOSH was required to provide a progress report to Congress within 6 months of the date of enactment. The first 6 months of this study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents pertaining to AWEs compiled by OWA. The documentation reviewed included thousands of pages of site-specific information collected by OWA from various sources. The quantity and quality of the information available for each site varied significantly. Examples of documents reviewed included radiological surveys, descriptions of production operations, contractual agreements, and interoffice correspondence.

NIOSH believes that contamination levels at designated facilities in excess of those indicated in 10 C.F.R. Part 835 Appendix D (Occupational Radiation Protection, Surface Contamination Values) indicate that there is “significant contamination” remaining in those facilities. Congress further directed that NIOSH determine whether or not the contamination “could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer.” For the purposes of
In this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having “significant contamination” had quantities of radioactive material that “could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer.”

Since neither EEOICPA nor the statute that calls for this study provide a definition of “significant contamination,” NIOSH determined that if the contamination or radiation levels at each location exceed the levels set by 10 C.F.R. Part 835 (a generally accepted set of radiation protection standards), then these facilities were considered to have had “significant contamination.” Documentation for each facility was reviewed, as available, to determine if there was an indication that residual radioactive contamination was present outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. Those levels then were compared to current radiation protection limits as listed in 10 C.F.R. Part 835, to determine if there was “significant contamination.” If there was no documentation or limited documentation on radiation levels at specified facilities, NIOSH made a professional judgment as to the residual contamination. If NIOSH determined there was “the potential for significant contamination” at a designated facility, then NIOSH determined, pursuant to the statute that directed that this study be conducted, that such contamination “could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer.” Such a determination is not a determination under the standard for compensation set forth in EEOICPA, which requires that the cancer was “at least as likely as not related to the employment” of the covered employee for compensation purposes.

In the case of beryllium contamination, if there was no documented evidence that the beryllium areas had been decontaminated, it was determined that this material could have caused or substantially contributed to the beryllium illness of an employee. Because beryllium sensitization can occur at very low levels of exposure, the level of residual beryllium contamination remaining was not included in the determination.

This final report includes evaluations of all facilities, including those facilities for which a determination could not originally be made due to insufficient information as indicated in the progress report. It also contains initial reviews of facilities which had been added by DOE to the list of covered facilities after April 19, 2002. This evaluation involved reviewing additional information that was identified in an attempt to finalize the findings from the progress report regarding those facilities. The final report findings are based on the information posted on the OWA website as of April 30, 2003 and the additional information reviewed. Changes made after that date are not reflected in the final report. The classification of one facility, Energy Technology Engineering Center, was changed on the DOE OWA website such that it is no longer classified as an Atomic Weapons Employer or a Beryllium vendor. This facility was therefore not included in this report.

Because the investigation involved evaluating potential radioactive contamination and beryllium contamination, the study was divided so that the required expertise could be devoted to the radiological facilities and the beryllium facilities. Appendices A-1 and B-1 provide a synopsis of the findings that changed between the progress and final reports. Appendix A-1 applies to facilities evaluated for residual radioactive contamination while Appendix B-1 applies to facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination. Appendices A-2 and B-2 provide final
evaluations for each facility. Appendix A-2 applies to facilities evaluated for residual radioactive contamination, while Appendix B-2 applies to facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination. Appendices A-3 and B-3 provide descriptions of each facility, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

Periods of Residual Contamination

The evaluations performed in developing the final report were focused on determining whether or not the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. These determinations were based, in many cases, on the fact that no records of decontamination were found or that surveys performed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred indicated the existence of significant residual contamination. However, some of the documentation reviewed provided indications of dates that would more accurately describe the time period in which the potential for significant residual contamination was present. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an indication of a more accurate period was available, this time period was provided.

In many cases, a gap in the period in which weapons-related production occurred existed between the end of an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)/DOE contract and the beginning of remediation efforts. Records of surveys or decontamination efforts were not typically available for these periods. Many such gaps were found to be periods in which the potential for significant residual contamination existed.

Some sites performed work with radioactive material and/or beryllium for commercial purposes, in addition to what they did for the AEC/DOE. When it was impossible to distinguish residual contamination resulting from AEC/DOE activities from that of commercial purposes, this was so stated.

Dates were provided for some sites where documentation indicated the presence of significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

III. Residual Radioactive Contamination Evaluation

The primary sources of information used to evaluate each site were the individual facility files compiled by OWA (EH-8). These files, organized by state and individual facility name, consisted of more than 30,000 pages. Insufficient information was available to determine if the potential for residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred for many sites. The final report focuses on those sites and additional sites that had been added to the list of covered facilities.

The final report consists of a review of the previous data for those sites, as well as additional documentation supplied by the DOE Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program.
(FUSRAP) (EM-30). The additional documentation supplied consisted of more than 30,000 pages, including some actual survey data.

In all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available information. As in the progress report, the finding on any single site was based on the quantity and completeness of the information available regarding that site and expert judgment as necessary.

During the re-evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the progress report, the following factors were considered:

1) The radionuclides involved;
2) The quantity of radioactive material processed;
3) The physical form of the radioactive material processed (i.e., solid, liquid, or gas);
4) The operations performed and their potential for radiation/radioactivity exposure;
5) Documented radiological control and monitoring programs that were in place during operations; and
6) Documented decontamination of facilities.

These factors were used to estimate the potential for radiation exposure both during operations and after production/processing had ceased. For example, a facility for which a thorough decontamination survey was documented was classified as having little potential for residual contamination after the date of decontamination; a facility with a high potential for residual contamination during operations and no documented decontamination data was classified as having a potential for residual contamination after operations had ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of three categories:

1. **Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.**
   A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for a facility included one or more of the following characteristics:
   a) Documentation indicating that the facility was decontaminated within the periods in which weapons-related production occurred,
   b) The facility had very little potential for residual contamination during actual operations, or
   c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed as “present.”

2. **Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.**
   A site was assigned to this category if there was documentation indicating that radioactive material:
   a) was present in quantities or forms which could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee, and
   b) was processed or present outside of the dates as listed on the OWA website.
This type of documentation often included FUSRAP surveys, conducted after Manhattan Engineering District (MED)/AEC operations were complete, which indicated the presence of residual radioactive contamination that could be attributed to AEC/MED activities. This category included the largest percentage of the re-evaluated sites.

3. Insufficient information.
   A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for review was insufficient to determine if a facility had a reasonable potential for significant contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. Many of the available files lacked sufficient information to make a reasonable determination as to the presence of residual radioactive contamination. This does not imply that the listed dates are incorrect.

The final report includes evaluations of 117 sites listed in the progress report as requiring additional information, 2 sites which were added to the listed facilities after the publication of the progress report, and 1 site for which a change in the listed date resulted in a change in the evaluation finding.

The results of this study indicate that there are atomic weapons employer facilities for which the potential for significant residual radiological contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred as listed on the OWA website. The facilities for which a change in evaluation occurred as a result of this final report are listed in appendix A-1.

The evaluation findings of eighty-eight facilities have changed since the progress report. The types of changes are categorized below:

- 70 facilities categorized as “This site warrants further investigation” in the progress report are now categorized as “Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred”
- 15 facilities categorized as “This site warrants further investigation” in the progress report are now categorized as “Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred”
- 1 facility categorized as “Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred” is now categorized as “Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred”
- 1 facility that was added to the DOE OWA website since the time the progress report was issued is categorized as “Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred”
In some cases, the facilities processed radioactive material for commercial, non-DOE, contracts in addition to that processed for nuclear weapons production. Sometimes the quantity of material processed for nuclear weapons production was only a small fraction of the total material processed at a given facility, making the residual contamination from DOE production indistinguishable from that resulting from material processed for commercial purposes. Wherever residual radioactive contamination due to DOE operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases, the findings were that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. The actual dates for which the potential existed, however, could not be estimated in many cases due to the inability to distinguish residual radioactive contamination due to commercial operations from that due to nuclear weapons production.
### Final Results of All Facilities Evaluated for Residual Radioactive Contamination

The following table summarizes results of all of the facilities evaluated as a part of either the progress report or the final report, including progress report findings that changed as a result of re-evaluation discussed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residual Radioactive Contamination</th>
<th>Little Potential</th>
<th>Significant Potential</th>
<th>Insufficient Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progress Report</td>
<td>74 (33.9%)</td>
<td>27 (12.4%)</td>
<td>117 (53.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Report</td>
<td>89 (40.6%)</td>
<td>96 (43.8%)</td>
<td>34 (15.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix A-1 lists each facility for which the finding for potential residual radioactive contamination differs from that in the progress report.

Appendix A-2 lists all facilities and the findings for potential residual radioactive contamination.
The following results represent all facilities, as listed on the OWA website on April 30, 2003, evaluated for residual radioactive contamination:

- 89 (40.6%) of 219 AWE facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred as published on the OWA website as of April 30, 2003.

- 96 (43.8%) facilities identified have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

- 34 (15.5%) facilities have insufficient information to make a determination.

Appendix A-3 provides descriptions of each facility evaluated for residual radioactive contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

IV. Residual Beryllium Contamination Evaluation

The primary sources of information used to evaluate each site were the individual facility files compiled by OWA (EH-8). These files, organized by state and individual facility name, represented more than 10,000 pages of information. The information for any given facility was variable. Some of the files were voluminous (containing more than 1,000 pages), while others contained only a single entry.

In all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available information. As in the progress report, the finding on any single site was based on the quantity and completeness of the information available regarding that site and expert judgment as necessary.

During the evaluation of residual beryllium contamination, the following factors were considered:

1) If beryllium was actually handled at the site.
2) If there was documented evidence of decontamination of the facility.

These factors were used to estimate the potential for beryllium exposure both during operations and after production/processing had ceased. For example, a facility for which a thorough decontamination survey was documented was classified as having little potential for residual beryllium contamination after the decontamination date; a facility without a documented decontamination was classified as having a potential for residual beryllium contamination after operations had ceased.

Each site was assigned to one of three categories:

1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for a facility included one or more of the following characteristics:

a) A documented decontamination and beryllium contamination survey data.

b) The facility had very little potential for residual contamination during actual operations.

c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed as “present.”

2. **Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.**

   A site was assigned to this category if either of the following conditions existed

   a) Documentation was available indicating that beryllium was processed or present outside of the dates listed on the OWA website that could have caused or substantially contributed to the beryllium illness of a covered employee.

   b) There was no documentation of a decontamination of the facility or area where beryllium was processed.

3. **Insufficient information.**

   A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available for review was insufficient to determine if a facility had a reasonable potential for significant contamination. Many of the available files lacked sufficiently complete information to make a reasonable determination as to the presence of residual beryllium contamination.

The final report contains 37 facility evaluations which include the 8 sites in the progress report listed as requiring additional information plus 29 sites which were added to the listed facilities after the publication of the progress report. One site, the Kansas City Plant, was removed from the Beryllium Vendor list.

The findings of the evaluations of the 37 facilities re-evaluated for residual beryllium contamination are shown below:

- 0 (0%) have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred,

- 25 (67.6%) have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, and

- 12 (32.4%) have insufficient information to make an accurate determination.

**Final Results of All Facilities Evaluated for Residual Beryllium Contamination**

The following table summarizes results of all of the facilities evaluated as a part of either the progress report or the final report, including progress report findings that changed as a result of re-evaluation discussed above.
### Residual Beryllium Contamination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Little Potential</th>
<th>Significant Potential</th>
<th>Insufficient Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Progress Report</strong></td>
<td>5 (11.1%)</td>
<td>32 (71.1%)</td>
<td>8 (17.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final Report</strong></td>
<td>3 (4.2%)</td>
<td>57 (79.2%)</td>
<td>12 (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B-1 lists each facility for which the finding for potential residual beryllium contamination differs from that in the progress report.

Appendix B-2 lists all facilities and the findings for potential residual beryllium contamination.

The following results include all sites reviewed for residual beryllium contamination:

- 3 (4.2%) of 72 beryllium vendor facilities have little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
• 57 (79.2%) facilities identified have the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

• 12 (16.7%) facilities had insufficient information to make a determination.

Appendix B-3 provides descriptions of each facility evaluated for residual beryllium contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

V. Conclusions

The findings of this study are that there are atomic weapons employer facilities and beryllium vendor facilities for which the potential for significant residual radiological and beryllium contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. For the purposes of this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having “significant contamination” had quantities of radioactive material that “could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee with cancer.” The documents reviewed did not indicate the existence of a current, unrecognized occupational or public health threat.
## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alba Craft Shop</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1952-1957; DOE 1994-1995 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Chemical Corp. Plant</td>
<td>Metropolis</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1959-1976</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>American Bearing Corp.</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1954-1959</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Machine &amp; Foundry</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951-1954</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armour Research Foundation</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arthur D. Little Co.</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Associated Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1956; 1990s (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>B &amp; T Metals</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker and Williams Co.</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1957-1962</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker and Williams Warehouses</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s; DOE 1992 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blockson Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1952-1962</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeport Brass Co., Havens Laboratory</td>
<td>Bridgeport</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1952-1962</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co. (Cleveland)</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1942-1943; 1949-1953</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carborundum Company</td>
<td>Niagara Falls</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1944; 1960-1962</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Early 1940s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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<tr>
<td>Carpenter Steel Co.</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1943-1944</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-B Tool Products Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemical Construction Co.</td>
<td>Linden</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1953-1955</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combustion Engineering</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1955-1972; DOE 1993-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copperweld Steel</td>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crane Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1947-1949</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crucible Steel Co.</td>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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</tbody>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dorr Corp.</td>
<td>Stamford</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1954; 1963</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgerton Germeshausen &amp; Grier, Inc.</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1950-1953</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foote Mineral Co.</td>
<td>East Whiteland Twp.</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1940s-1991, BE 1947-uncertain</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardiner, Inc.</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1951-1954;1956-1961</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Company (OH)</td>
<td>Cincinnati - Evendale</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harshaw Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1942-1955</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizons, Inc.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1944-1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

<table>
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<tr>
<td>IMCC</td>
<td>Mulberry</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCNCL</td>
<td>Bayonne</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRMRF</td>
<td>Mount Kisco</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSC</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMSSC</td>
<td>Ft. Wayne</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1944-1952</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOPC</td>
<td>Verona</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPP</td>
<td>Hazelwood</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1967-1974; DOE 1984-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linde Air Products</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1945-1947</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay Light and Chemical Co.</td>
<td>W. Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1940-1953</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison Site (Speculite)</td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957-1960; DOE 1992-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnus Brass Co.</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1954-1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinney Tool and Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medart Co.</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and Controls Corp.</td>
<td>Attleboro</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1952-1967</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitts &amp; Merrel Co.</td>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monsanto Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Research Corp.</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1944-1952</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Research Laboratory</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>1943-1945; DOE 1959</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton Co.</td>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1943-1961</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) (Apollo)</td>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>late 1950s-1983</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) (Parks Township)</td>
<td>Parks Township</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>late 1950s-1980</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Corp.</td>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956-1957; 1961-1962</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painesville Site(Diamond</td>
<td>Painesville</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>early 1940s; DOE 1992-1998</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium Co.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Remediation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picatinny Arsenal</td>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1948-early 1950s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podbeliniac Corp.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Extrusion Co.</td>
<td>Bensenville</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1949-1950; 1956-1959</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radium Chemical Company, Inc.</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1943-1950</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare Earths/W.R. Grace</td>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1955-1967; DOE uncertain-1998</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revere Copper and Brass</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1943-1950s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seneca Army Depot</td>
<td>Romulus</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymour Specialty Wire</td>
<td>Seymour</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1962-1964; DOE 1985-1994</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shpack Landfill</td>
<td>Norton</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1960-1965; DOE 1986-1998</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonds Saw and Steel Company</td>
<td>Lockport</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer Chemical Co., Jayhawks Works</td>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
<td>KS</td>
<td>1958-1963</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Airport Storage Site(SLAPS)</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1946-1966; DOE 1984-1998</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard Oil Development Co. of NJ</td>
<td>Linden</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staten Island Warehouse</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1939-1942</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior Steel Co.</td>
<td>Carnegie</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1952-1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Labs.</td>
<td>Bayside</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1947-1962</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Hicksville Pl.</td>
<td>Hicksville</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1952-1966</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas City Chemicals, Inc.</td>
<td>Texas City</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyson Valley Powder Farm</td>
<td>St Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1942-1949</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Titanium Alloys Manufacturing</td>
<td>Niagara Falls</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1950-1956</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Lead Co.</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1950-1967</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nuclear Corp.</td>
<td>Hematite</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1958-1969</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California</td>
<td>Berkley</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1940s; DOE 1981-1982</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1942-1952; DOE 1984-1987 (Remediation)</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Corp of America (NJ)</td>
<td>West Orange</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1951-early 1960s</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Corp. of America (TN)</td>
<td>Chattanooga</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1957-uncertain</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix A-1 Changes to Radiological Facility Status

<table>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Manufacturing (Canonsburg)</td>
<td>Canonsburg</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1942-1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.E. Pratt Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Grace (TN)</td>
<td>Erwin</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1958-1970</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Grace and Company (MD)</td>
<td>Curtis Bay</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>1955-1958</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watertown Arsenal</td>
<td>Watertown</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1946-1952;1953-1957</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Advanced Reactors</td>
<td>Cheswick</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Atomic Power Development Plant</td>
<td>East Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1941-1944</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Electric Corp.</td>
<td>Bloomfield</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1941-1943</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NJ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woburn Landfill</td>
<td>Woburn</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp.</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>This site warrants further investigation.</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings</th>
<th>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC Spark Plug</td>
<td>Flint</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeroprojects, Inc.</td>
<td>West Chester</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1951-1973</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1951 - 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajax Magnathermic Corp.</td>
<td>Youngstown</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1958-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alba Craft Shop</td>
<td>Oxford</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1952-1957; DOE</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1952 - 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1994-1995 (Remediation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany Research Center</td>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>1948-1978; DOE</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948 - 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1987-1993 (Remediation)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliquippa Forge</td>
<td>Aliquippa</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1947-1950; 1983-1994</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1947 - 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny-Ludlum Steel</td>
<td>Watervliet</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1950-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Chemical and Dye Corp.</td>
<td>North Claymont</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>Early 1950s-Late 1960s</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Chemical Corp. Plant</td>
<td>Metropolis</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1959-1976</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allis-Chalmers Co.</td>
<td>West Allis, Milwaukee</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1943-1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA) (Pennsylvania)</td>
<td>New Kensington</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA) (New Jersey)</td>
<td>Garwood</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCOT</td>
<td>Fort Worth</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1961 - 1963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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## Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Bearing Corp.</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1954-1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1954 - 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Chain and Cable Co.</td>
<td>Bridgeport</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Machine &amp; Foundry</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951-1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Machine and Metals, Inc.</td>
<td>E. Moline</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Peddinghaus Corp.</td>
<td>Moonachie</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Potash &amp; Chemical</td>
<td>West Hanover</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Unknown-1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaconda Co.</td>
<td>Waterbury</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1942; 1956-1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armco-Rustless Iron and Steel</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armour Fertilizer Works</td>
<td>Bartow</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armour Research Foundation</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur D. Little Co.</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information required,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashland Oil</td>
<td>Tonawanda</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1944-1960; 1974-1982</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1944 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Fairfield</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1956; DOE 1990s (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1956 - 1992+</td>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B &amp; T Metals</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1943 - 1989+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babcock &amp; Wilcox Co.</td>
<td>Lynchburg</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>1959; 1968-1972; 1985-2001</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker and Williams Co.</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1957-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker and Williams Warehouses</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s; DOE 1992 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1940 - 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker Brothers</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1944; DOE 1990-1996 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1943 - 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker-Perkins Co.</td>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battelle Laboratories-</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1986; BE 1947-1961; DOE 1986-present (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King Avenue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battelle Laboratories -</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1956-1975; DOE 1986-present (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1956 - 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Jefferson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell Telephone Laboratories</td>
<td>Murray Hill</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1943-1944</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bendix Aviation (Pioneer Division)</td>
<td>Davenport</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besley-Wells</td>
<td>South Beloit</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bethlehem Steel</td>
<td>Lackawanna</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1949-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1949 - 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birdsboro Steel and Foundry</td>
<td>Birdsboro</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1951-1952; 1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bliss and Laughlin Steel</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1948-1952; DOE uncertain-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockson Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1952-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloomfield Tool Co.</td>
<td>Bloomfield</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1947; 1951</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowen Laboratory</td>
<td>North Branch</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeport Brass Co.</td>
<td>Adrian</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1954-1981; DOE 1988-1995 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1954 - 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridgeport Brass Co., Havens Laboratory</td>
<td>Bridgeport</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1952-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co. (Cleveland)</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1942-1943; 1949-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co. (Detroit)</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1940s-1950s</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. G. Sargent &amp; Sons</td>
<td>Graniteville</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. I. Hayes, Inc.</td>
<td>Cranston</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.H. Schnoor</td>
<td>Springdale</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1943-1951; DOE 1992-1995 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California Research Corp.</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1948-1949</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callite Tungsten Co.</td>
<td>Union City</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carboloy Co.</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carborundum Company</td>
<td>Niagra Falls</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1944; 1960-1962</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnegie Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Early 1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter Steel Co.</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1943-1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-B Tool Products Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chambersburg Engineering Co.</td>
<td>Chambersburg</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapman Valve</td>
<td>Indian Orchard</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1948-1949; 1991-1995 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948 - 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Construction Co.</td>
<td>Linden</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1953-1955</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati Milling Machine Co.</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonie Site (National Lead)</td>
<td>Colonie (Albany)</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1958-1984; 1984-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia University</td>
<td>New York City</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940-1947</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combustion Engineering</td>
<td>Windsor</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1955-1972; 1993-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1955 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copperweld Steel</td>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crane Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1947-1949</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crucible Steel Co.</td>
<td>Syracuse</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorr Corp.</td>
<td>Stamford</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1954; 1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dow Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Walnut Creek</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1947-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Pont Deepwater Works</td>
<td>Deepwater</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1942-1949; DOE uncertain-1988</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Du Pont-Grasselli Research Laboratory</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1945</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgerton Germeshausen &amp; Grier, Inc.</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1950-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro Circuits, Inc.</td>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro Metallurgical</td>
<td>Niagara Falls</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1942-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Technology Engineering Center (Atomics International/Rocketdyne)</td>
<td>Santa Susana (Canoga Park)</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1955-1988; DOE 1988-present (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>ETEC is no longer listed as an AWE and was, therefore, deleted from this report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA Tool and Engineering Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extruded Metals Co.</td>
<td>Grand Rapids</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fenn Machinery Co.</td>
<td>Hartford</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Fenwal Inc.</td>
<td>Ashland</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1967-1968</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foote Mineral Co.</td>
<td>East Whiteland Twp.</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1940s-1991; BE 1947-uncertain</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankford Arsenal</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1952-1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gardinier, Inc.</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1951-1954; 1956-1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Atomics</td>
<td>La Jolla</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1960-1969; DOE 1996-1999</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1960 - 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Company (Ohio)</td>
<td>Cincinnati Evendale</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Plant (Indiana)</td>
<td>Shelbyville</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Electric Vallecitos</td>
<td>Pleasanton</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1958-1978; 1981-1982; DOE 1998-present</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granite City Steel</td>
<td>Granite City</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1958-1966; DOE 1993-1994 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1958 - 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Carbon Corp.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1952-1958</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gruen Watch</td>
<td>Norwood</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSA 39th Street Warehouse</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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</tbody>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harshaw Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1942-1955</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1984+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heald Machine Co.</td>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heppenstall Co.</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heppenstall Co.</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co.</td>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1951</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1943 - 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizons, Inc.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1944-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1944 - 1977+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Douglas Aluminum Corp.</td>
<td>Riverside</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1959-1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Minerals and Chemical Corp.</td>
<td>Mulberry</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1951-1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Nickel Co., Bayonne Laboratories</td>
<td>Bayonne</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Rare Metals Refinery, Inc.</td>
<td>Mount Kisco</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Register</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ithaca Gun Co.</td>
<td>Ithaca</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Baker Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Phillipsburg</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>None Listed</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessop Steel Co.</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1950-1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Co.</td>
<td>Ft. Wayne</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1944-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaiser Aluminum Corp.</td>
<td>Dalton</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kellog/Pierport</td>
<td>Jersey City</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1943-1953; 1981-1998</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koppers Co., Inc.</td>
<td>Verona</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1956-1957</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Pointe Machine and Tool Co.</td>
<td>Hudson</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landis Machine Tool Co.</td>
<td>Waynesboro</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latty Avenue Properties</td>
<td>Hazelwood</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1967-1974; DOE 1984-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1967 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ledoux and Co.</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1946-uncertain</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linde Air Products</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1945-1947</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linde Ceramics Plant</td>
<td>Tonawanda</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940-1950; DOE 1996 -1997 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1940 - 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay Light and Chemical Co.</td>
<td>W. Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1940-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison Site (Speculite)</td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957-1960; DOE 1992-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1957 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnus Brass Co.</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1954-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1942-1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathieson Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Pasadena</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1951-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maywood Chemical Works</td>
<td>Maywood</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1947-1950; DOE 1984-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinney Tool and Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Cleveland, OH</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medart Co.</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals and Controls Corp.</td>
<td>Attleboro</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1952-1967</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex Municipal Landfill</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1948-1960; DOE 1980-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Galesburg</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchell Steel Co.</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitts &amp; Merrel Co.</td>
<td>Saginaw</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monsanto Chemical Co.</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Museum of Science and Industry</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1946-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Bureau of Standards, Van Ness Street</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>1943-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Guard Armory</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1942-1951; DOE 1980s-1988 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Research Corp.</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1944-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Research Laboratory</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>DC</td>
<td>1943-1945; DOE 1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New England Lime Co.</td>
<td>Canaan</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York University</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1946-1952</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton Co.</td>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1943-1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Material and Equipment Corp.</td>
<td>Parks Township</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Late 1950s-1980</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp.</td>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1957-1983</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Metals, Inc.</td>
<td>West Concord</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1954-1990</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Corp.</td>
<td>Battle Creek</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956-1957; 1961-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painesville Site (Diamond Magnesium Co.)</td>
<td>Painesville</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>Early 1940s; DOE 1992-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1952 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn Salt Co.</td>
<td>Philadelphia/Wyndmoor</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1953-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia Naval Yard</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Picatinny Arsenal.</td>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1948-Early 1950s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podbelinia Corp.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Extrusion Co.</td>
<td>Bensenville</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1949-1950; 1956-1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purdue University</td>
<td>Lafayette</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality Hardware and Machine Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944-1945</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. W. Leblond Machine Tool Co.</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Krasburg and Sons Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radium Chemical Company, Inc.</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1943-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rare Earths/W.R. Grace</td>
<td>Wayne</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1955-1967; DOE uncertain-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1955 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed Rolled Thread Co.</td>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revere Copper and Brass</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1943-1950s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1943 - 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roger Iron Co.</td>
<td>Joplin</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates that Residual contamination was identified in this year but an end date could not be determined due to insufficient information.
### Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
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<th>Period</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings</th>
<th>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sciaky Brothers, Inc.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaway Industrial Park</td>
<td>Tonawanda</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1974; 1969-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seneca Army Depot</td>
<td>Romulus</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1940 - 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seymour Specialty Wire</td>
<td>Seymour</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1962-1964; 1985-1994</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1962 - 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shattuck Chemical</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>1950s; 1963</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shpack Landfill</td>
<td>Norton</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1960-1965; DOE 1986-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1960 -1998+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simonds Saw and Steel Co.</td>
<td>Lockport</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1948-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948-2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Research Institute</td>
<td>Birmingham</td>
<td>AL</td>
<td>1955-1958; 1962; 1976</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer Chemical Co., Jayhawks</td>
<td>Pittsburg</td>
<td>KS</td>
<td>1958-1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spencer Chemical Co. (Missouri)</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1958-1963</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sperry Products, Inc.</td>
<td>Danbury</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis Airport Storage Site</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1946-1966; DOE 1984-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1946 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Oil Development Co.</td>
<td>Linden</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1942-1945</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Star Cutter Corp.</td>
<td>Farmington</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staten Island Warehouse</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1939-1942</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stauffer Metals, Inc.</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior Steel Co.</td>
<td>Carnegie</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1952-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1952 - 2001+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sutton, Steele and Steele Co.</td>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1951, 1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swenson Evaporator Co.</td>
<td>Harvey</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp. -</td>
<td>Hicksville</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1952-1966</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-</td>
<td>Bayside</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1947-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech-Art, Inc.</td>
<td>Milford</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee Valley Authority</td>
<td>Muscle Shoals</td>
<td>AL</td>
<td>1951-1955</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas City Chemicals, Inc.</td>
<td>Texas City</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>1952-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titanium Alloys Manufacturing</td>
<td>Niagara Falls</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1950-1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titus Metals</td>
<td>Waterloo</td>
<td>IA</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tocco Induction Heating Div.</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1966 - 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torrington Co.</td>
<td>Torrington</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1951-1953</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tube Reducing Co.</td>
<td>Wallington</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1952; 1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyson Valley Powder Farm</td>
<td>St Louis</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1942-1949</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S. Steel Co., National Tube Division</td>
<td>McKeesport</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Lead Co.</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1950-1967</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1950 - 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nuclear Corp.</td>
<td>Hematite</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1958-1969</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of California</td>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>AWE 1940s; DOE 1981-1982 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1940 - 1982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Chicago</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1942-1952; DOE 1984-1987 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Denver Research Institute</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Florida</td>
<td>Gainesville</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1950s-1960s</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Michigan</td>
<td>Ann Arbor</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Rochester Medical Laboratory</td>
<td>Rochester</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1943-1986</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
<td>Charlottesville</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>Early 1940s; 1960s</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utica St. Warehouse</td>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ventron Corporation</td>
<td>Beverly</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1942-1948; DOE 1986-1998 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia - Carolina Chemical Corp.</td>
<td>Nichols</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1952-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Corp. of America (New Jersey)</td>
<td>West Orange</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1951-Early 1960s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1951 - 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Corporation of America (Tennessee)</td>
<td>Chattanooga</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1957-uncertain</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitro Manufacturing (Canonsburg)</td>
<td>Canonsburg</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1942-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulcan Tool Co.</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.E. Pratt Manufacturing Co.</td>
<td>Joliet</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1943 - 1946+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Grace (Tennessee)</td>
<td>Erwin</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1958-1970</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Grace and Company (Maryland)</td>
<td>Curtis Bay</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>1955-1958</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1955 - 1978+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.R. Grace Co., Agricultural Chemical Div. (Florida)</td>
<td>Ridgewood</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wah Chang</td>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>1956-1959; 1971-1972</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Appendix A-2 Residual Radioactivity Summary

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wash-Rite</td>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watertown Arsenal</td>
<td>Watertown</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1946-1952; 1953-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1946 - 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Valley Demonstration Project</td>
<td>West Valley</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1966-1973; DOE 1980-present</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1966 - 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Advanced Reactors</td>
<td>Cheswick</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Atomic Power Development Plant</td>
<td>East Pittsburgh</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1941-1944</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westinghouse Electric Corp. (New Jersey)</td>
<td>Bloomfield</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1941-1943</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1941 - 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woburn Landfill</td>
<td>Woburn</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1955-1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp.</td>
<td>Brooklyn</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverine Tube Division</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyckoff Drawn Steel Co.</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyckoff Steel Co.</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  AC Spark Plug
Flint, Michigan

TIME PERIOD:  1946- 1947

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
AC Spark Plug was principally engaged in beryllium work. However, records indicate that 2.19 lbs of thorium metal was procured by the AC Spark Plug Company in December 1946, for research purposes.

Documentation reviewed was not specific as to the origination or production of this material. It is non-discernable as to whether AC Spark Plug was involved in refining thorium ores, metal production and/or metal workings.

While the quantity of material (2.19 lbs) is identified, the form of the material is not. It is not clear if the material was 5-7% ThO₂ ore, powder, or metal. Additionally, specific activities conducted with this material, final accountability or disposition and/or decontamination efforts are not contained within the reviewed documentation.

The start date 1946 appears to be supported however, a definitive determination cannot be reached with respect to the end date, without more descriptive documentation related to the disposition of the 2.19 lbs. of thorium.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and an internal DOE FUSRAP evaluation document.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Aeroprojects, Inc.  
West Chester, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Sonabond Ultrasonics

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1973

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Aeroprojects, Inc. performed research and development in areas of instrumentation, welding, filling of tubes with powders, extrusion, solidification and cleaning, under contract with the AEC from 1951 through 1973. While the exact quantities of materials used are not known, the alloys involved included compounds of thorium and uranium among other non-radioactive elements.

There is reason to believe that during the period of operation from 1951 through 1973, Aeroproject, Inc. did, on occasion, utilize site property for burial of uranium/thorium waste. However, radiological surveys of the property performed in 1988 do not indicate exposure levels/rates above natural background. However, there is documentation that during facility cleaning in 1975 and 1976 (outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred), some uranium shavings and slugs were discovered and buried on the site as well. These items, as described, are deemed significant enough to expand the listed dates through 1976.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques discussing radiological surveys performed for the DOE, written information provided by the present site owner (as of 1990), along with internal DOE FUSRAP and Office of Environmental Restoration documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1951-1976
FACILITY NAME: Ajax Magnathermic Corp.  
Youngstown, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1958-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
From 1959 through 1961, Ajax Magnathermic Corp. conducted feasibility tests on various sizes and shapes of uranium rods and tubes under contract to NLO (Fernald). In 1961, Ajax Magnathermic was developing and testing a newly designed induction coil for NLO (Fernald), to heat treat uranium cores. The new design was not fully successful and the old coil configuration was retained.

Multiple documents and radiological surveys were available demonstrating implementation of radiological contamination controls and representative monitoring during operations, along with descriptions of post-operational decontamination and area monitoring. These actions and documentation demonstrate elimination of the potential for residual radiological contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of an internal DOE FUSRAP evaluation document, and multiple NLO (Fernald) documents describing visits, inspections and/or radiological surveys of the Ajax Magnathermic facility.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Alba Craft Shop
Oxford, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1957; DOE 1994-1995 (Decontamination)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Alba Craft Shop performed a variety of machine shop services on uranium metals for the National Lead Company of Ohio (Fernald) during the period of 1952 through 1957. Production scale operations consisted of hollow drilling and turning of uranium slugs for the Savannah River and Hanford plutonium production reactors.

Survey results from 1992 confirm the presence of residual contamination, thirty-five years after operations ceased. While the conditions discovered in 1992 are well defined, there is no method to determine the actual conditions left at the end of operations in 1957.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included, the Department of Energy (DOE) Worker Advocacy Website, documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting an internal DOE FUSRAP evaluation document, DOE-EM publication “Linking Legacies”, and Army Core of Engineers Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP).

Reviewed ORNL Report (ORNL/RASA-92/14); Results of the Radiological Survey at the Former Alba Craft Laboratory Site Properties, Oxford Ohio; Issued March 1993.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1952 - 1995
FACILITY NAME: Albany Research Center
Albany, Oregon

ALSO KNOWN AS: ARC
U.S. Bureau of Mines
Albany Metallurgical Research Center
Oregon Metallurgical Corp.


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1948-1978, the Bureau of Mines conducted metallurgical research at the Albany Research Center for the AEC and ERDA. Beginning in 1955, the site performed research on alloys of uranium and thorium under an AEC contract. Metallurgical operations also included melting, machining and welding. Documentation indicates that the Oregon Metallurgical Corp. possessed production quantities of radioactive materials for work requested by NLO (Fernald) in November 1958.

Contracted services involving radioactive materials at this facility appear to have ended in 1978. However, a radiological survey of the site and facilities, performed in 1982 by a DOE subcontractor, identified significant levels of contamination, both fixed and removable. Documentation available for this review did not contain activity levels of the identified radioactive contamination but, based on the description of conditions in the documentation, the potential for significant residual contamination existed between 1978 and the beginning of cleanup activities (1987).

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group, consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTamination
1948 - 1993
FACILITY NAME: Aliquippa Forge  
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Vulcan Crucible Steel Co.  
Universal Cyclops, Inc.


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In the late 1940s, Aliquippa Forge (previously Vulcan Crucible) was a supplier of rolled uranium rods used in Hanford's reactors. The AEC operated a rolling mill, two furnaces and cutting and extrusion equipment at Vulcan. Work at the site ended after decontamination efforts were finalized by the operator in 1950.

Operations ceased in 1950. However, a subsequent radiological survey of the facility performed in May 1978, identified uranium contamination throughout several areas of the facility. From 1986 through 1988, phase one of a FUSRAP cleanup was begun and the area was isolated from access until 1993 when phase two was begun and completed in 1994.

Documentation reviewed indicates the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred (between 1950 and 1983).

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, as well as information contained on the Army Corps of Engineers Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1947 - 1994
FACILITY NAME: Allegheny-Ludlum Steel
       Watervliet, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel rolled uranium billets into rods for the AEC as part of the multi-site
process overseen by the New York Operations Office for the production of uranium metal for
fabrication into slugs for fueling the Hanford production reactors.

While full records were not immediately available to review, processes, material forms,
objectives, oversight by AEC during operations, and contractual requirements to recover and
return all uranium-bearing materials, are documented well enough to determine it unlikely that
significant residual radioactive contamination existed after operations. This determination is
further supported by radiological survey results from 1976 and 1980, finding no radiation above
background levels.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of
written communiques by or for the DOE and historical documentation from written publications.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Allied Chemical and Dye Corp.  
North Claymont, Delaware

ALSO KNOWN AS: General Chemical Div., Allied Chemical and Dye Corp.  
Allied Chemical Corp.  
Union Texas Petroleum Div.

TIME PERIOD: Early 1950s - Late 1960s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Allied Chemical and Dye Corp. was involved in research and development and small pilot-scale operations on uranium recovery from a phosphoric acid plant. Former AEC employees estimated that, at most, only a few pounds of uranium concentrate were produced.

Documentation does not specifically identify the periods of operation or quantify the media or uranium concentrations introduced to the processes. Documentation does, however, indicate that when operations ceased, there was a low potential for residual contamination based on the fact that only a few pounds of uranium concentrate were reportedly separated and recovered through filtration methods. Additionally, no radiological survey data or documentation that decontamination efforts were ever implemented were available for review.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and historical documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME:   Allied Chemical Corp. Plant
                  Metropolis, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS:  General Chemical Division

TIME PERIOD:     1959-1976

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
After World War II, many companies working for the United States Government produced UF₆ feed for uranium enrichment and diffusion plants. The Allied Plant in Metropolis, Illinois was completed and initial deliveries began sometime in 1959. In 1962, several feed plants were shut down and the privately-owned Allied Chemical Corp. Plant in Metropolis, IL, took over the conversion of U₃O₈ to UF₆. This plant produced approximately five thousand tons of uranium hexafluoride feed for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant per year. It was shut down in 1964. Though it later reopened, it is not clear that any material after this date was used in the atomic weapons production process.

Documentation available for review supports the start date of 1959. There is no available documentation to clearly define the radiological status of the facility at the end of weapons related work in 1976 but based on the nature of the work, there is a high degree of probability that residual contamination exists beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred and is indistinguishable from contamination resulting from commercial operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and historical documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information required
FACILITY NAME:  Allis-Chalmers Company  
West Allis, Milwaukee, Wisconsin  

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1944  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Allis-Chalmers Company constructed a new facility in 1943, near Milwaukee, under a contract negotiated with Army engineers. The purpose of this facility was to manufacture pumps necessary to transport process gas through cascade barriers of the K-25 plant. This facility was also used to wind silver strips around magnet coils for use in the Y-12 project.  

In December of 1943, the Y-12 project sent back to Allis-Chalmers all of the coils, which were found to have internal shorts due to rust or other sediment in the cooling oil. The objective was to clean the internal windings without complete dismantlement.  

It should be noted that the documentation reviewed does not firmly establish that the coils returned to Allis-Chalmers were contaminated internally or externally with uranium. Failure of these components was discovered in late October 1943 during the first testing of the magnet coils during system shakedown, and prior to startup of the process and/or plant.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and historical publication text.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) (New Jersey)  
Garwood, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Under subcontract to the Metallurgical Laboratory (University of Chicago), the Garwood facility manufactured casting dies and used them to cast uranium slugs. This work was conducted intermittently between July and October of 1944.  
The potential for residual contamination, post-operations, is low.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and/or internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA)  
New Kensington, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Aluminum Research Companies  
New Kensington Workers of ALCOA on Pine and 9th Streets

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Aluminum Co. of America (ALCOA) site in New Kensington, Pennsylvania was one of 14 facilities in the early 1940s that produced nuclear fuel for the X-10 pilot plant reactor in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and the production reactors at Hanford, Washington. ALCOA used a unique welding process to "can" and seal uranium slugs produced by these other facilities.

Documentation indicates that operations began in the spring of 1943 at the Pine and Ninth Street location within Buildings #29 and #44. There was no radiological survey data provided for Building #44. Documentation of radiological surveys was provided from the early 1990's confirming the absence of residual contamination at Building #29 (600 Freeport Road), and a Building #18 (Pine and Ninth Street).

It is unclear if Building #44 has been surveyed, and without such data a definitive determination cannot be made with respect to the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and historical documentation. Pertinent documentation reviewed included:

2. ORNL Survey Report (ORNL/RASA-92/4) Results of the Radiological Survey at the Alcoa Research Laboratory, 600 Freeport Road, New Kensington Pennsylvania (ANK001); October 1992.
3. ORNL Survey Report (ORNL/RASA-92/5) Results of the Radiological Survey at the Former ALCOA New Kensington Works, Pine and Ninth Streets, New Kensington Pennsylvania; October 1992

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: AMCOT  
Fort Worth, Texas

TIME PERIOD: 1961-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The American Manufacturing Company of Texas (AMCOT) conducted specialized tube elongation and billet piercing tests on uranium metal for NLO (Fernald). Tube elongation tests were conducted from July to September, 1961 and involved approximately 7 tons of uranium. The billet piercing tests were conducted from June to September, 1962 and involved approximately 23 tons of uranium. Both NLO (Fernald) and AMCOT employees participated in the tests.

There is detailed documentation describing the processes, material handled, radiological controls and monitoring, multiple equipment and area decontamination activities, as well as removal of materials and wastes generated during the processes which ended in 1962. However, additional documentation verifies that a final facility decontamination was not conducted until 1963. The presence of residual contamination cannot be ruled out prior to completion of this final task.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1961 - 1963
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** American Bearing Corp  
Indianapolis, Indiana

**TIME PERIOD:** 1954 - 1959

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
In 1954, American Bearing Corp. was selected to participate in the machining of a sample lot of four hollow extrusion uranium billets from ingots for National Lead of Ohio (Fernald). Subsequently, National Lead used the Special Products Area of American Bearing to process uranium materials in the late 1950s. In May 1959, National Lead Industries (NLI), Nuclear Division was formed in Albany (Colonie), NY, and this work was moved to this NLI facility. It is not evident in the available documentation as to how the facility was used after 1959.

An Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) report dated Nov. 1983, titled, Radiological Survey of the American Bearings Corporation Indianapolis, Indiana, confirms that a facility survey was performed by Radiation Management Corporation (RMC) in 1981/1982 identifying residual contamination in excess of unrestricted release criteria. This survey prompted decontamination and partial dismantlement of the facility, approximately twenty-two years after cessation of AWE operational activities. Subsequent to that effort, ORAU was requested to and performed a survey as detailed in the referenced report.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, and historical documentation. Pertinent document: Oak Ridge Associated University (ORAU) report dated Nov. 1983 titled, Radiological Survey of the American Bearings Corporation Indianapolis Indiana

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1954 - 1983
FACILITY NAME: American Chain and Cable Co.  
Bridgeport, Connecticut

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1944, American Chain and Cable Co. was contracted by the DuPont Company to evaluate the potential for reclamation of 6,231 uranium rods through swaging (diameter reduction). American Chain and Cable Co. received and swaged eight uranium rods which subsequently failed metallurgical evaluation, and the process was abandoned.

It is not likely or reasonable to suspect that significant levels of residual radioactive material were present after this operation. Documentation exists supporting that a limited quantity of material was processed (eight uranium rods 1.39 to 1.46 inches in diameter), and that the operation was of a short duration (which contractually included delivery and removal of all material). Additionally, the nature of the activity, swaging (cold-working), would most likely not lead to a high probability of dispersion of radioactive material, and apparent personnel exposure controls were reviewed and/or implemented which would lend to further reduction in the probability of dispersion of radioactive material.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, MED historical documentation and internal DOE FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  American Machine & Foundry
                Brooklyn, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS:  AMF
                 Lutheran Medical Center
                 Bus Terminal

TIME PERIOD:  1951-1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During the early 1950s, this location designed and produced industrial equipment for the AEC. American Machine & Foundry also performed a large volume of uranium, thorium and possibly zirconium metal machining work from 1951-1954.

Documentation available for review supports the start date of 1951. Available documentation also demonstrates that investigations have been conducted and no radiological survey data is known to exist, identifying radiological conditions after cessation of operations. Considering the absence of data, coupled with the fact that 200 tons U and Th metal were machined at this facility there is a high degree of probability that residual contamination existed after the period in which weapons-related production occurred. FUSRAP investigative surveys conducted in the early 1990s identified no contamination in excess of background however, several of the small buildings presumably used in these operations had been removed by that time, and the existing main building had at some point in time been "gutted" internally for renovation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP file documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  American Machine and Metals, Inc.  
                 E. Moline, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Vapofier Corp.

TIME PERIOD:  1960

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1960, American Machine and Metals demonstrated a process for NLO (Fernald) that involved dehydration of green salt using a centrifuge process.

Documentation demonstrates that a limited quantity of material was processed, controls and monitoring were in place during the tests, and the materials and wastes were returned to NLO (Fernald).

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: American Peddinghaus Corp.  
Moonachie, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1978

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: The facility conducted a one-day shear (cutting) test on uranium metal for NLO (Fernald) in 1978.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: American Potash & Chemical  
West Hanover, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: National Fireworks Ordnance Corp.  
National Northern Div.

TIME PERIOD: Unknown - 1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: American Potash & Chemical conducted uranium metal shaping and uranium-magnesium explosive forming studies for Union Carbide Nuclear Corporation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The tests done up to May, 1961 were performed with 430 stainless steel and uranium metal pieces. Work was also done with green and sintered uranium-based powders. The powders were formed in a die into discs approximately 4 ½ inches in diameter and 1 inch thick.

Documentation reviewed does not specify the time period activities began, nor is there documentation of the radiological conditions post-operation. While it is reasonable to believe that residual contamination after 1961 is a low probability, based on documentation that only test quantities of radioactive materials were handled, and that safety oversight was involved, this conclusion is not fully supported by available documentation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Anaconda Co.  
Waterbury, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: American Brass Co.  
Fabric Metal Goods and West Tube Mill  
Anamet, Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1942; 1956-1959

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1942, the American Brass Co. produced the barriers used in the gaseous diffusion process. In the late 1950s, under contract to Nuclear Metals, Inc., the company extruded copper-clad uranium billets into tubes at least two separate times for the Savannah River Site. While the original plans called for work on 500 billets, only around 50 were actually processed. The operations involved plating, heating, extruding, sawing, drilling, de-burring, cleaning, testing, crating, and shipping. Work was conducted at the West Tube Mill. AEC Health and Safety Laboratory personnel visited the site in 1956 and 1959, and obtained air quality and surface radiation measurements during the later visit.

Although the period in which weapons-related production occurred is determined to be appropriate, it is questionable as to whether radioactive materials were ever handled during the 1942 operations. Documented activities from the 1956-1959 period includes descriptions of the limited quantity of material handled, the physical form of the material as being copper-clad uranium metals, and radiological surveys of general area ambient dose rates and airborne radioactive material concentrations during operations. Based on an evaluation of this documentation, it is concluded that there was little, if any, potential for residual contamination after completion of the activities.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Armco-Rustless Iron and Steel  
Baltimore, Maryland

ALSO KNOWN AS: Armco Steel

TIME PERIOD: 1948

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: 
Armco-Rustless Iron and Steel Co. rolled eight billets of uranium for the AEC. It was a one-time test of rolling.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Armour Fertilizer Works
Bartow, Florida

ALSO KNOWN AS: U.S. Agri-Chemicals Pilot Facility
U.S. Steel Corp.

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1955

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Under contract with the AEC, Armour operated a pilot plant which produced uranium from phosphoric acid. No more than gram quantities of $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$ were believed to have been produced during the time period.

Documentation describes the processes employed and a 1977 radiological survey of the facility which identified conditions consistent with background, or no greater than expected from normal industrial processing of similar materials.

Given the limited production of material and the results of the 1977 survey, the period for this site appears to be appropriate.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Armour Research Foundation
Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS:  ARF
Illinois Institute of Technology
IIT

TIME PERIOD:  1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Records indicate that Armour Research Foundation may have tested radioactive materials for NLO (Fernald), specifically test quantities of materials other than metal (UF₄ or ThO₂).

Documentation does not fully support that radioactive materials related to weapons development were ever handled at this facility. This lack of operations confirmation, coupled with the fact that this facility operated an AEC licensed reactor for non-AWE related research, indicates there would be a low probability for significant residual contamination when considered against that resulting from non-AWE related work.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and/or internal/external communiques.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3 Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Arthur D. Little Co.
San Francisco, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Merrill Co.
A.D. Little Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1948-1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Under contract to the AEC from 1948-1956, initially as the Merrill Company, Arthur D. Little Co. researched the separation and recovery of uranium from various ores. Specific work included the recovery of uranium and vanadium from alkaline carbonate leach solutions from domestic ores.

Documentation confirms that this facility, owned by Arthur D. Little Co., performed the specified work from 1948 through 1956. There is no known data available demonstrating that residual contamination did not exist after operations ceased. Additionally, documentation describes the facility as having been demolished and removed at some time prior to 1979. The exact date of the facility demolition and/or use of the facility from 1956 through the time of demolition has not been determined. Based on the nature of the work performed from 1948 through 1956, there is a potential for significant residual contamination after operations ceased, up until the time of demolition.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information required, specifically the date of demolition.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Ashland Oil
Tonawanda, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Ashland #1, Ashland #2
Ashland Oil Company
Haist Property


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In August 1944, the MED purchased the Ashland #1 property, formerly known as the Haist Property, for use as a disposal site for approximately 7,250 metric tons (8,000 tons) of uranium ore tailings and concentrate refining residues generated at the nearby Linde site. When the uranium residues were transported to the Ashland #1 site, they were spread over two-thirds of the property to estimated depths of 0.3 to 1.5 meters (one to five feet). In 1960, the AEC determined that the levels of residual radioactivity at Ashland #1 site were below then-current criteria and released the land as surplus. The Ashland Oil Company eventually acquired the property. From 1957 to 1982, Ashland Oil used a portion of the Ashland #2 site as a landfill for disposal of general plant refuse and industrial and chemical wastes and materials. Between 1974 and 1982, Ashland Oil transported from the Ashland #1 site an unknown quantity of soil mixed with radioactive residues to the Ashland #2 landfill.

Based on the conditions disclosed in the documentation reviewed, it appears that significant quantities of uranium-contaminated residues and wastes were deposited on the property referred to as the Ashland #1 site, which at the time was owned by the AEC. The property was subsequently sold to a private enterprise in 1960. Radiological surveys performed for the government in 1958, 1976 and later, all confirmed the presence of uranium contamination and corresponding ambient dose rates well in excess of natural background. Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically in the gaps from 1960-1974 and after 1982.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1944 - 1998
FACILITY NAME: Associated Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Co.  
Fairfield, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Force Control Industries  
Fairfield  
Former Dixie Machinery Ownership

TIME PERIOD: 1956 and 1990s (Remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
From February to September, 1956, Associated Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Co. machined hollow uranium slugs for the Hanford and Savannah River plutonium-production reactors under a subcontract from NLO (Fernald). Associated Aircraft machined approximately 96,000 slugs during the eight-month contract period.

The presence of radiological contamination was confirmed during a radiological survey performed in 1992, 36 years after cessation of operations. There is no reliable method to determine the actual radiological contamination levels during the period after cessation of operations and the beginning of remediation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and/or internal/external communiques.

Pertinent document: ORNL Report (ORNL/RASA-93-2); Results of the Radiological Survey at the Former Associate Aircraft Tool and Manufacturing Company Site, Fairfield, Ohio.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
1956 - 1992+ (Contamination was identified in 1992 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: B & T Metals  
Columbus, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1943

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During the early stages of nuclear weapons production, uranium reactor fuel was produced by a variety of metallurgical techniques including extrusion, casting, and machining. In February 1943, DuPont, acting as an agent of the MED, contracted B&T Metals to extrude rods from uranium metal billets for the Hanford reactor in Washington State. B&T Metals extruded an estimated 50 tons of uranium between March 1943 and August 1943.

While MED/AEC contracted operations ceased in 1943, the presence of radiological contamination was confirmed during a preliminary survey performed in 1988-89, 46 years after cessation of operations. There is no reliable method to determine the actual radiological contamination levels immediately after cessation of operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of contracting information from the period in which weapons-related production occurred, DOE FUSRAP documentation, and/or internal/external communiques.

Pertinent document: ORNL Report (ORNL/RASA-89/1), Results of the Preliminary Radiological Survey at B&T Metals, 425 West Town Street, Columbus Ohio (CO001); October 1990.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1943 - 1989+ (Contamination was identified in 1989 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: Babcock & Wilcox Company (Virginia) 
Lynchburg, Virginia


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Babcock & Wilcox Company reportedly performed work for the AEC involving the Oxide Pellet Fabrication program. Records indicate that during the period of 1968 through 1972 shipments of enriched uranium were made to and from the NLO (Fernald) facility.

The documentation available for this evaluation is insufficient to rule out the period between 1959 through 1968, or the period after 1972. It is not discernable from the available documentation what activities occurred in 1959, other than reference to a radiological survey having been performed. Additionally, there was no available documentation describing the materials, processes and/or objectives of the enriched uranium shipments between Babcock & Wilcox and NLO (Fernald) during the 1968 through 1972 period.

No documentation has been provided or reviewed establishing that this facility ever handled radioactive materials related to AWE work.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Baker and Williams Co.  
Newark, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Englehard Industries  
Platinum (or Baker) Div. of Englehard Industries  
Baker and Co., Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1957-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Baker and Williams Co. processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC to recover enriched uranium for use in the weapons complex.

Available documentation does not fully describe the processes or amount and forms of radioactive materials handled. Considering this absence of detail, in conjunction with no documentation of radiological survey data subsequent to the operations, the presence of residual contamination after completion of the activities cannot be ruled out.

Additionally, documentation indicates that this facility was used from as early as 1943 through the early 1950s for the recovery of platinum from contaminated spent catalyst (platinized granular carbon). Neither the exact nature nor the extent of the contamination are clear but there are indications that it may have involved polonium and/or plutonium.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Baker and Williams Warehouses  
New York, New York  

ALSO KNOWN AS: Pier 39  
Ralph Ferrara Co. Warehouse  
Ralph Ferrara Inc.  

TIME PERIOD: 1940s and 1992 (DOE Remediation)  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
During the early 1940s, the MED and the AEC used the Baker and Williams site warehouses for short-term storage of uranium concentrates. This material was generated in Port Hope, Canada by milling African ores.  

The presence of radiological contamination was confirmed during a preliminary survey performed in 1990-91, approximately 50 years after use by the MED for storage of material. There is no reliable method to determine the actual radiological contamination levels immediately after cessation of operations.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and the Army Corp of Engineers FUSRAP website.  

Pertinent documents:  
1. ORAU Report (ORAU 91/L-36); Radiological Survey of the Baker and Williams Warehouses buildings 513-519 New York, New York; December 1991  
2. ORAU Report (ORAU 89/L-33); Radiological Survey of the Baker and Williams Warehouses New York, New York; June 1990  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1940 - 1992
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Baker Brothers
Toledo, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Rems, Inc.

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1944 and 1990-1996 (DOE Remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Between June 1943 and July 1944, DuPont and the University of Chicago subcontracted the Baker Brothers to machine roll metal rods into uranium slugs that were used for fuel in the world’s first production reactors located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington.

There is no evidence of a radiological survey having been performed after completion of operations in 1944. However, radiological surveys performed for the DOE in 1989 and 1990, identified several indoor and outdoor areas with radiation in excess of DOE guidelines, which led to a subsequent FUSRAP cleanup. Radiological survey data from the 1989 and 1990 surveys indicate that residual contamination, concentrations of which are not determinable, was left after cessation of AEC activities ending in 1944.

The documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1944 and 1990.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and the Army Corp of Engineers FUSRAP website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1943 - 1996
FACILITY NAME: Baker-Perkins Co.
Saginaw, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: APV Chemical Company

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In May 1956, Baker-Perkins performed a test of their mixing equipment for NLO (Fernald). The tests involved mixing uranium trioxide (orange oxide) with water and kneading the mixture with the Baker-Perkins “P” and “K” Ko-Kneader machines.

Documentation demonstrates that a limited quantity of radioactive material was used in the process, controls were in place during the process and post-operational decontamination was implemented with radiological release surveys having been performed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Battelle Laboratories-King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL)
Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI)

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1986; BE 1947-1961; DOE 1986-present (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1943 to 1986, Battelle Memorial Institute performed atomic energy research and development as well as beryllium work for the DOE and its predecessor agencies. The Battelle Laboratories have two separate locations in Columbus: King Avenue and West Jefferson. Battelle's research supported the government's fuel and target fabrication program, including fabrication of uranium and fuel elements, reactor development, submarine propulsion, fuel reprocessing, and the safe use of reactor vessels and piping.

The following activities were performed at the King Avenue location: processing and machining enriched, natural, and depleted uranium and thorium; fabricating fuel elements; analyzing radiochemicals; and studying power metallurgy. Beryllium work was conducted from 1947 until at least, 1961.

Documentation discloses initiation of activities for the AEC in or around 1943. It also demonstrates that residual radioactive material was present up until decommissioning activities were started in 1986.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
| **FACILITY NAME:** | Battelle Laboratories-West Jefferson  
| | Columbus, Ohio |
| **ALSO KNOWN AS:** | Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI)  
| | Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL)  
| | West Jefferson Plutonium Facilities |
| **TIME PERIOD:** | 1956-1975; DOE 1986-present (remediation) |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
From 1943 to 1986, Battelle Memorial Institute performed atomic energy research and development for the DOE and its predecessor agencies. The Battelle Laboratories have two separate locations in Columbus: King Avenue and West Jefferson. Battelle participated in research on fabrication of uranium and fuel elements, reactor development, submarine propulsion, fuel reprocessing, and the safe use of reactor vessels and piping.

At the West Jefferson location, Battelle operated a large hot cell facility and a research reactor. Reactor operations began in October 1956, and ended in December 1974. The reactor was defueled and partially dismantled in 1975 and Battelle's license was changed to possession-only status.

Documentation discloses initiation of activities for the AEC in or around 1956. However, documentation also demonstrates that residual radioactive material was present up until decommissioning activities were started in 1986.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically, between 1975 and 1986.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1956 - 2003
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Bell Telephone Laboratories  
Murray Hill, New Jersey

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Western Electric

**TIME PERIOD:** 1943-1944

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
This facility handled a quantity of uranium during World War II, probably in support of its work to develop effective barrier material for the K-25 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The barrier materials were not contaminated.

Documentation identifies the facility as having and/or using X-metals (uranium) during work being performed in 1943. There is no documentation available to identify the quantities or forms of the uranium, and while it is believed to be small quantities handled under laboratory conditions the presence of residual contamination after operations ceased cannot be ruled out.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Bendix Aviation (Pioneer Division)
Davenport, Iowa

TIME PERIOD:  1960

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
On three separate occasions, NLO (Fernald) personnel conducted tests to see how well a Bendix sonic energy cleaning system could clean uranium-contaminated 55 gallon drums. At least 18 contaminated drums were test-cleaned.

Documentation of the processes employed during the surface-contaminated drum cleaning tests, contamination controls, reclamation of contaminated materials and wastes, as well as post-operational decontamination efforts and radiological release surveys, is sufficient to demonstrate no residual contamination existed after the operation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as radiological surveys and FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
**FACILITY NAME:** Besley-Wells  
South Beloit, Wisconsin

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Besley Products Co.

**TIME PERIOD:** 1953

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Besley was a cutting tool manufacturer. An NLO (Fernald) proposal indicates Besley was to machine a trial lot of 500 uranium slugs at its Beloit, Wisconsin plant to evaluate whether the use of the Besley facing and radiusing machine could increase production. An NLO (Fernald) document lists Besley-Wells as the recipient of test quantities of radioactive materials.

There is no available documentation to confirm that this work was ever actually performed.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Bethlehem Steel
Lackawanna, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1949, Bethlehem Steel of Lackawanna, New York developed improved rolling mill pass schedules for uranium billets into 1½ inch rods to be used for reactor fuel rods to later be used at NLO (Fernald) plant. Bethlehem also performed uranium rolling experiments to help design the NLO (Fernald) rolling mill.

Documentation reviewed describes the activities as being limited in scope, principally being performed on weekends, which involved uranium metals being rolled into rods. Based on the nature of the activity, accompanied with documented discussion of cropping and residue collection and removal for material accountability purposes, it is reasonable to assume that there was a low potential for widespread or significant contamination. Radiological surveys were performed documenting contamination levels on and around equipment before and after decontamination. These surveys indicate that contamination levels were relatively low during operations and that decontamination took place after operations were complete. In addition to data available for review from the operational period, radiological surveys of the original facility and equipment, which still existed, were performed in 1976 and 1980, both of which identified no residual contamination above natural background levels.

UPDATE FROM PROGRESS REPORT
One record has become available confirming that uranium billets were being rolled as late as August 31, 1952, outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred as listed in the progress report.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included radiological surveys performed during the period of operations, the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1949 - 1952
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Birdsboro Steel and Foundry  
                   Birdsboro, Pennsylvania  

TIME PERIOD:  1951-1952 and 1962  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In the early 1950s, Birdsboro was involved in the design and construction of the FMPC in NLO (Fernald), specifically in the rolling mill plant. The documentation is unclear as to whether any uranium was actually handled at the Birdsboro Steel facility, but does indicate that 11½ pounds of “wafers” were shipped to the facility and that eight assorted pieces of billets weighing 346 pounds were shipped from Birdsboro to the Lake Ontario Ordnance Warehouse. A 1962 document indicates that Birdsboro also supplied rotary piercing equipment for the fabrication of uranium tubes at the FMPC and that an acceptance test took place at Birdsboro, but it is unclear whether any uranium was actually handled at the site.

Documentation is fairly descriptive with respect to material types handled. There is no expectation that significant residual contamination existed after cessation of any handling and/or activities. This is also supported by the limited quantities suspected and/or referenced as having been handled.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3     Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Bliss and Laughlin Steel
                    Buffalo, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: B & L Steel
                    Niagara Cold Drawn

TIME PERIOD: 1948-1952 and DOE uncertain-1998 (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Under contract to the NLO (Fernald), Bliss and Laughlin Steel rolled uranium rods for the AEC and also provided uranium slug machining services. Bliss and Laughlin was part of a complex called the Buffalo Works that fashioned components for the early weapons program. The functions were transferred to the Albuquerque South Valley Site in 1952.

While activities with radioactive material ended in 1952, a radiological survey performed in 1992 for FUSRAP purposes, identified residual radioactive materials affixed to overhead and floor surfaces. While conditions described in the 1992 survey present a low potential for worker exposure, it is reasonable to assume that the described conditions are not representative of the actual physical conditions of residual radioactive materials for the prior 40-year uncovered period. Without historical radiological survey data to demonstrate otherwise, residual contamination must be considered to have been of higher activity levels and transferable for the period between 1952 and 1992.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1948 - 1998
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Blockson Chemical Co.
Joliet, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Blockson Chemical Group
Olin Mathieson
Olin

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Blockson Chemical Co. operated a plant which produced uranium from phosphoric acid. The AEC contracted with Blockson for the recovery of the uranium, which was ultimately used in weapons production.

Documentation available for review identifies that large quantities, up to 50,000 pounds per year, of uranium intended for AEC purposes were handled and/or processed at this facility between 1952 and 1962.

A radiological survey performed for or by the DOE in 1978 identifies significant, widespread uranium contamination within the facilities used for extraction. Documentation also states that this uranium contamination cannot be conclusively distinguished from what might otherwise be unrelated natural sources. While there are complications associated with identifying the exact nature or origin of the uranium contamination, this facility has never been used for commercial uranium extraction purposes.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documents includes, DOE Report (DOE/EV-0005/35 & ANL-OHS/HP-83-103); Radiological Survey of Chemicals Group, Olin Corporation (Formerly Blockson Chemical Company) Joliet, Illinois, March27-November28, 1978; May 1983.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

POTENTIAL PERIOD OF RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Bloomfield Tool Co.  
Bloomfield, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1947; 1951

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The facility had a small research contract with the AEC in 1947. In 1951, it did some experimental machining of uranium slugs for the AEC. The results were not satisfactory and the work was not expanded.

Documentation reviewed during this evaluation does not fully substantiate that radioactive materials were handled or processed in 1947. However, the 1951 date is supported. Documentation for the 1951 time period is fairly descriptive with respect to material types and quantities handled. Based on the process and material descriptions and documented oversight, there is a low probability of residual contamination after cessation of activities in 1951.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Bowen Laboratory
North Branch, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1951

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Bowen Laboratory conducted some experimental work on uranium compounds during a two-day period in 1951. The tests were to develop a process calcining pitchblende raffinates (transforming liquid-like wastes into a more solid form).

Documentation contains descriptions of the process and objectives, equipment decontamination and radiological release survey results, with no residual contamination existing post-operation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Bridgeport Brass Co.  
Adrian, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Uranium Metals Extrusion Plant  
General Motors, Chevrolet Mfg. Div.  
National Distillers and Chemical Corp.  
Martin  
A.C. Spark Plug


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1954-1961, Bridgeport Brass performed contract work for the AEC. Operations included production of uranium fuel elements for the Hanford and Savannah River Plant reactors and developmental extrusion work on thorium and depleted natural and slightly enriched uranium. After termination of AEC activities in 1961, most of this plant's functions were transferred to Reactive Metals, Inc. (RMI) in Astabula, Ohio. Bridgeport shipped one large extrusion press to RMI and all other equipment was dismantled and scrapped. This location is now owned by General Motors and cleanup was completed at this site in 1995.

Available documentation demonstrates that AEC operations ceased in 1961-1962, including facility decontamination along with equipment dismantlement and removal from the site. However, a radiological survey of the facility, performed for the DOE in 1976, identified uranium-contaminated dust and dirt throughout the facility requiring an additional cleanup action. A subsequent radiological survey of the facility in 1979, only identified residual contamination in sub-floor and sump areas, with limited potential for personnel exposure.

Note: Reference AKA to A.C. Spark Plug on the Worker Advocacy Facility List varies from documentation and might actually be Air Force Plant #60.

Documentation reviewed indicates the potential for significant residual radioactivity existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1961 and 1988.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1954 - 1995

**FACILITY NAME:** Bridgeport Brass Co., Havens Laboratory
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Bridgeport, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: Reactive Metals, Inc.
Piedmont Manufacturing

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Bridgeport Brass, at the Havens Laboratory in Connecticut and in Adrian, Michigan, worked to improve the process for extruding uranium. Eventually this work was taken over by Reactive Metals, which operated the AEC/DOE extrusion facility in Ashtabula, Ohio. Bridgeport cut and stored uranium, and may have been involved in the rolling of uranium. Some work of the Havens Laboratory was moved to Seymour, Connecticut, in 1962, to a facility that is now owned by Seymour Specialty Wire.

The work performed at the Havens laboratory was mostly metallurgy work done on a laboratory scale.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME:  Brush Beryllium Co. (Detroit)  
Detroit, Michigan  

TIME PERIOD:  1940s-1950s  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Brush Beryllium Co. in Detroit, Michigan, was one of several companies that rolled or extruded uranium rods for Hanford reactor fuel in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1950, Hanford began making rolled uranium rods onsite, but the AEC shifted the rolling work to the NLO(Fernald), FMPC and its supporting contractors in 1952. A number of private companies, including Brush Beryllium Co., contracted with NLO (Fernald) to provide Hanford with these rolled rods.  

There is a reasonable expectation, based the described activities, that residual contamination existed after operations ceased. However no additional documentation has been acquired, therefore a recommendation can not be made for this facility.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
### Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

| FACILITY NAME:            | Brush Beryllium Co. (Cleveland)  
                          | Cleveland, Ohio               |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| ALSO KNOWN AS:            | Brush Wellman Co.  
                          | Motor Wheel Corp.  
                          | Magnesium Reduction |
| TIME PERIOD:              | 1942-1943; 1949-1953            |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The Brush Beryllium Co., Cleveland facility, conducted research on a process for producing uranium metal (1942-1943) through magnesium reduction of molten green salt (uranium tetra fluoride). The facility later conducted research and development with uranium (1949-1953) and extruded thorium billets into slugs which were placed in Hanford production reactors (1952-1953).

The Brush Cleveland facility also produced beryllium metal and beryllium oxide for the MED (1943-1946) and later for the AEC (1947-1965?).

This facility involved two buildings, one at Chester Street the other at Perkins Avenue. Based on the nature of the work, there is reasonable expectation that significant residual contamination existed after operations ceased. However, this determination is somewhat limited by the fact that both locations no longer exist. The Chester Street building was demolished in 1946 and since that time has been either a vacant field or a parking lot, it is not clear when the Perkins Avenue building was demolished and replaced. There is no indication that either facility was decontaminated between 1943 and 1949.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.


**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1942 - 1953
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  C. G. Sargent & Sons  
                Graniteville, Massachusetts  

TIME PERIOD:  1968  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
C.G. Sargents & Sons performed extruder and drying oven tests with thorium for NLO (Fernald).  
It also conducted a uranium sump cake drying test for NLO (Fernald).  These were apparently  
one-time tests.  

Documentation indicates that limited quantities of materials were processed and radiological  
monitoring was implemented during the activities.  These operations were conducted in 1968  
under an NRC source material license.  In 1970, at license expiration, the NRC concluded there  
was little likelihood of residual contamination above current guidelines.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy  
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of  
written communiques by or for the DOE as well as FUSRAP facility evaluation documents.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual  
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: C.H. Schnoor  
Springdale, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Conviber  
Premier Manufacturing


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: In 1943, C.H. Schnoor began providing metal fabrication services in support of MED operations. C.H. Schnoor machine extruded uranium for the Hanford Pile Project. Operations may have continued until 1951 when the building was sold.

Documentation from DOE/EM indicates that radiological surveys performed by the DOE in 1987, 1989 and 1990 confirmed uranium contamination under flooring up to 20,000 picocuries per gram. It is also stated that these surveys did not identify contamination outside the building, whereas FUSRAP website information states that there was contamination identified in outside areas. Aside from these conflicting statements, it is unclear as to whether the identified contamination was fixed and/or removable in nature. Additionally, the location of the contamination is stated as being under flooring which, in and of itself, does not identify if this was original or replaced flooring and there are no present means by which to assess periods of accessibility or potential personnel exposure.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE, information from the FUSRAP website and the DOE/EM website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: C. I. Hayes, Inc.  
Cranston, Rhode Island

TIME PERIOD: 1964

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1964, C.I. Hayes Inc., handled uranium metal under subcontract to the National Lead Company. The work involved heat-treating uranium in a vacuum furnace in order to test the decontamination and health and safety aspects of this work.

Documentation describing the process, material handled, radiological controls and monitoring, equipment and area decontamination, as well as removal of materials and wastes generated during the process, demonstrates no residual contamination existed post-operation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  California Research Corp.  
Richmond, California

TIME PERIOD:  1948-1949

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Using small amounts of plutonium and uranium, the California Research Corp. performed experiments to investigate the use of continuous chelation as a means of separating plutonium and zirconium from uranium. The California Research Corp. performed the work as a subcontractor to the Kellex Corporation which was under contract to the AEC to investigate waste recovery methods.

Documentation demonstrates that limited quantities of material were handled under laboratory conditions and controls, implementing personnel and area monitoring, material accountability and equipment decontamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Callite Tungsten Co.
Union City, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
According to a 1944 document, the Callite Tungsten Co., used its machines to cold roll uranium metal rods for the MED.

No new documentation has been acquired for this facility. Existing documentation is limited but has been re-reviewed. One single document originating in 1944 describes activities existing at the Callite Tungsten Co. in New Jersey involving the “cold rolling of uranium”. If these activities did in fact occur, there is no documentation available to describe the radiological conditions during or post operations. At this time a definitive determination is not possible without documentation more fully describing the activities, radiological conditions and/or the amount of materials involved.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Carboloy Co.
    Detroit, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: General Electric Metallurgical Products

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1956, the Carboloy Co. conducted operations to turn down the outer diameter of uranium slugs.

Activities conducted related to weapons development, specifically the downsizing of uranium slugs, was performed in 1956. Later in the same year, General Electric applied for a Special Nuclear Material License from the AEC, so as to receive and process uranium dioxide for conversion into solid fuel pellets associated with commercial boiling water reactor development. General Electric subsequently notified the AEC that commercial applications associated with the license had ceased and requested termination of the license in 1958. Detailed documentation was available for review demonstrating existence of a comprehensive site radiological control program which would have ensured that the weapons development work did not lead to residual contamination dispersed amongst commercial-purpose contamination. This is further evidenced by a radiological survey performed in 1982 by the NRC, verifying the decontamination and removal of equipment, whereupon all radiological conditions were at background levels and no residual contamination was identified.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation available indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Carborundum Company  
Niagara Falls, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: N/A

TIME PERIOD: 1944; 1960-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Carborundum Company engaged in various phases of a Manhattan Engineering District program in 1944 designed to determine suitable methods for shaping and engineering uranium rods. This work involved the forming, coating, and canning of uranium rods for the pile process. Between 1960 and 1962, the company fabricated plutonium carbide pellets for the AEC from materials supplied by Hanford. Carborundum also performed work during the 1950s not related to DOE activities, including: fabricating nuclear fuel elements for commercial purposes and producing zirconium, hafnium, and titanium for the AEC's special reactor materials program.

This is a newly incorporated facility reviewed during this evaluation. Available documentation is limited and neither the operational period dates nor the radiological conditions can be ascertained from available information.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Carnegie Institute of Technology
               Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Carnegie-Mellon Cyclotron Facility

TIME PERIOD: Early 1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During the Manhattan Project (1944), Carnegie Institute of Technology was a key participant in research on the phases of special metals and their alloys. It also worked on the development of methods for testing materials of construction and the construction of “necessary equipment.”

This facility may have performed limited research activities during the time frame of 1941 through 1944, under laboratory controlled conditions. There is no documentation indicating that radioactive materials handled for the MED/AEC would have led to residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Carpenter Steel Co.
Reading, Pennsylvania

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Beginning in 1943, Carpenter Steel Co. was one of the 14 private contractors and vendors that
produced fuel for the Oak Ridge X-10 pilot plant reactor and the full-scale Hanford production
reactors. As an alternative to extrusion, the Carpenter Steel Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania
experimented with rolled uranium rods in July 1944, but these proved to be inferior to the
extruded product. The metal tended to form laps and seams on the surfaces of the rolled bars.
Carpenter Steel has since changed its name to Carpenter Technology Corporation.

The processes are believed to have had a low potential for resultant, wide-spread contamination.
In 1981, a radiological survey conducted by Argonne National Lab identified several discrete
areas of elevated contamination which upon review of additional documentation were in
inaccessible areas. This initial survey prompted a comprehensive radiological survey in 1988
performed by ORNL. A review of this survey demonstrates that no residual contamination above
background was identified.
The site was eliminated from the FUSRAP system in 1991, based on the survey results.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of
written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documentation included, Report
(ORNL/RASA-89/3); Results of the Radiological Survey of the Carpenter Steel Facility,
Reading Pennsylvania; Date of issue - July 1990.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: C-B Tool Products Co.
Chicago, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
For a six month period in 1944, C-B Tool Products Co. had a subcontract with the University of Chicago to provide personnel, facilities, and equipment to produce special machining of parts for special equipment, tools, jigs, and fixtures to the Met Lab from materials provided by the University of Chicago. It is unclear whether the company handled radioactive materials. There is no available documentation to support or substantiate that radioactive materials were handled or involved at any time. Additionally, the building that may have served as the location for machining or tool development was demolished in the 1940s. Based on the available documentation there is little potential for residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documentation included a FUSRAP Elimination report dated January 31, 1990.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Chambersburg Engineering Co.
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania

TIME PERIOD: 1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In March 1957, a series of hot uranium forging tests were conducted at the Chambersburg Engineering Co. by the Metallurgical Department of NLO (Fernald). Approximately 150 hot uranium slugs were forged into washers on two Chambersburg air compressor impactors.

Documentation reviewed describes the processes, materials handled, equipment and area decontamination, recovery of materials as well as safety and health air sampling, all of which demonstrates that no residual contamination existed after the operation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation available indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Chapman Valve  
Indian Orchard, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: Chapman Valve Manufacturing Co.  
Crane Co.


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Chapman Valve supplied valves to the MED and the AEC. In 1948, Chapman Valve machined uranium rods into slugs for the Brookhaven National Laboratory. Uranium slugs were used as reactor fuel. Chapman may also have conducted rolling operations on uranium metal in 1949.

Documentation indicates that a radiological survey was performed at this site in 1991 with uranium contamination identified on floors, walls and overhead beams. Specific radiological survey data was not available but the written description of the 1991 survey verifies that residual contamination was present after cessation of the activities which ended in 1949.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and information obtained from the FUSRAP website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1948 - 1995
FACILITY NAME: Chemical Construction Co.  
Linden, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Chemico

TIME PERIOD: 1953-1955

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Chemical Construction Co. conducted research and development activities to recover uranium and other metals from low-grade waste materials. The wastes were generated by uranium processing operations at the Mallinckrodt facility in St. Louis, Missouri.

Available documentation briefly describes the process being researched and developed and it would appear that considerable quantities of residues were evaluated for processing but there is no documented evidence that these processes were ever employed. In a DOE Memorandum/Checklist; Young to File dated 12/4/87; the following quote is extracted “Absence of any record of radiological characterization of the property and the volume of material processed suggest that their may be potential for residual contamination. However insufficient info has been found to justify further consideration under FUSRAP.” Subsequently, in 1995, it appears that this site was removed from FUSRAP as DOE found they had no authority to perform remediation.

Based on the uncertainties associated with this site, coupled with determinations documented by DOE through internal reviews it is determined that this site has a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documentation included, DOE Letter; Wagoner to Gregorio; No Authority to Perform Remedial Action at the Former Linden Pilot Plant of the Chemical Construction Company; February 17, 1995.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Cincinnati Milling Machine Co.
Cincinnati, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. built electro-chemical machining units. In September 1963, the company tested the feasibility of electro-chemical machining of uranium. Eight normal uranium solid cylinders 1-inch in diameter and 1-inch long (approximately 14 pounds) were used in the test.

Documentation reviewed describes the processes, material handled, radiological controls, monitoring, equipment decontamination and removal of materials and waste. This activity was limited in scope and a post-operation survey identified no residual radioactivity above background levels.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation available indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Colonie Site (National Lead)
Colonie (Albany), New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Colonie Interim Storage Site
National Lead Co., Albany, NY
National Lead Co.-Nuclear Division
NL Industries-Nuclear Division


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1937 to 1984, National Lead Industries owned and operated the Colonie site. The site was first used as a foundry. During the years from 1958 to 1984, National Lead manufactured thorium and depleted uranium components at this site under license from the AEC.

Activities involving radioactive materials began in 1958 and were conducted through 1984, at which time the property was transferred to the federal government and cleanup under FUSRAP was initiated.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and information obtained from the FUSRAP website.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Columbia University
New York City, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Pupin Hall
Havemeyer Hall
Nash Building
Prentiss Hall
Schermerlimon Hall

TIME PERIOD: 1940-1947

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Columbia University began its nuclear research in 1939 by studying nuclear chain reactions. In 1940, the university was contracted by the National Research Defense Committee for additional research in areas including isotope separation, gas centrifuge for uranium separation work, and the nuclear chain reaction. Four of the university's buildings including Pupin, Schermerhorn, Havemeyer, and Nash, were known to have housed the research experiments.

Available documentation is not fully descriptive of quantities of materials handled. However, the nature of research work conducted under laboratory conditions, in and of itself, is sufficient to preclude the potential for significant residual contamination. A subsequent physical inspection and radiological survey of the involved buildings was conducted in 1976 for the DOE. Results of this inspection/survey identified no significant contamination and documented a determination of a low probability for residual contamination from MED/AEC activities.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Combustion Engineering
Windsor, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: Asea Brown Boveri


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES
Combustion Engineering (CE) supported the AEC beginning in the 1940s. Initial work at the site involved non-nuclear components. In 1955, CE began to use highly-enriched uranium. In the 1960s, CE obtained a license to fabricate fuel elements for power reactors. CE received uranium from NLO(Fernald) through 1972.

Radiological surveys conducted for DOE confirmed the presence of residual contamination and led to subsequent FUSRAP cleanup activities in 1986. Radioactive material contamination was identified in three buildings, related drainpipes and sewer lines, a waste storage pad area, a waste drum burial site, and a brook on the property.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and information obtained from the FUSRAP website.

Pertinent documents;

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1955 - 1998
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Copperweld Steel
Warren, Ohio

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1946

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Copperweld Steel of Warren, Ohio, straightened and outgassed a large number of uranium rods for the Hanford and Oak Ridge reactors between May and August of 1943.

Documentation reviewed includes process and material descriptions which when coupled with the radiological characterization survey results gathered by ORNL in 1990, there is no evidence or indication that residual contamination existed post-operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documentation included;
1. DOE Letter; A. Williams to F. Iannizzara; Subject: Summary of Radiological Survey Results and Site Elimination Information; April 5, 1991.
2. DOE/Oak Ridge National Laboratory Survey; R Foley and L. Floyd; Subject: Preliminary Site Survey at the Copperweld Steel Co. 4000 Mahoning Avenue, NW, Warren, Oh (CWO 001); ID# ORNL/RASA-90/2; December 1990.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Crane Co.
Chicago, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1947-1949

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Crane Co. supplied the AEC with uranium and thorium in the 1940s (and perhaps in the 1950s) and likely used materials containing uranium in manufacturing valves for the AEC. At the completion of one project in 1949, 1,000 pounds of contaminated wastes, including 346 grams of uranium, were shipped from Crane to Oak Ridge. In 1949, Crane also shipped 265 kg of normal uranium to Hanford. In 1954, records indicate government interest in purchasing more uranium and thorium from Crane, but this work has not been verified.

Documentation indicates that additional work was performed with radioactive materials after 1949, possibly up through 1954. Additionally, it appears that there is no radiological survey data from the operational or post-operational period. Based on the potential for work outside the listed end period of 1949 and the absence of radiological survey data this facility poses a potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE. Pertinent documents included, DOE Letter; J. Wagoner to Mayor R. Daley; Subject: Information concerning Crane Co. site; February 17, 1995.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Crucible Steel Co.
Syracuse, New York

TIME PERIOD:  1951

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1951, New York Operations office personnel performed a test forging and rolling of 10 thorium billets at Crucible Steel Co.

Documentation reviewed during this evaluation is limited but what has been available for review indicates that anticipated production of thorium slugs from billet stock may have extended past the 1951 date. The documentation is also void of any radiological characterization data which results in a determination that this site poses a potential for residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Dorr Corp.  
Stamford, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: Dorr-Oliver Corp.

TIME PERIOD: 1954; 1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Dorr Corp. conducted waste-handling tests on low-level radioactive material (ammonium diuranate). This work was done as a subcontractor to NLO (Fernald). NLO (Fernald) personnel monitored the tests and took air quality samples.

Documentation reviewed describes activities conducted in 1954, however there is no description of activities supporting the 1963 date. Based on a review of the air sampling data gathered during the 1954 activities, which demonstrates generation of significant airborne radioactive material concentrations, and the absence of any documentation of area or equipment decontamination, or associated radiological surveys, it is concluded that this site poses a potential for residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Dow Chemical Co.  
Walnut Creek, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Pittsburg, California

TIME PERIOD: 1947-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Dow operation involved process studies and experimental investigations on different uranium ores and thorium-bearing ores, including pilot-scale solvent extraction of uranium from phosphoric acid.

Documentation identifies the activities as research and investigative studies conducted under laboratory conditions and controls. A radiological survey, performed in 1977, identified overall contamination levels consistent with, and no higher than natural background levels, with the exception of relatively low levels of fixed activity discovered in an inaccessible area of a fume hood, which was subsequently decontaminated and removed. The presence of this contamination posed little, if any, potential for personnel exposure and is not significant.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  DuPont Deepwater Works  
Deepwater, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Chambers Chemical and Dye Works  
E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co.  
Dyeworks-Carneys Point  
Deepwater Dyeworks


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In the 1940s, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) produced uranium products and conducted research on uranium hexafluoride. These activities were conducted first for the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, and later under contract to the MED and the AEC. DuPont also developed processes to convert uranium dioxide to uranium hexafluoride, and produced uranium oxide and uranium metal which was used to fuel the CP-1 reactor at the University of Chicago. After completion of these activities, the AEC conducted limited decontamination and released the site to DuPont for reuse. DuPont currently operates a chemical plant at this site.

Documentation reviewed clearly establishes the period of MED/AEC operations as beginning in 1942 and ending in or around 1949, at which time decontamination activities were performed and the buildings were released back to DuPont. Radiological surveys of the properties, performed for the DOE in 1977 and 1983 identified elevated concentrations of uranium in surface and subsurface soils, building rubble areas and structures. These findings of residual contamination led to the subsequent FUSRAP clean-up actions. The potential for residual radioactive contamination exists between cessation of operations in 1949 and initiation of FUSRAP actions, as well as, during operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1942 - 1988
FACILITY NAME:  Dupont-Grasselli Research Laboratory  Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Standard Oil of Ohio

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Grasselli Laboratory participated in the development of the slug canning and coating processes for the Hanford site.

Documentation reviewed contains detailed descriptions of materials handled and processes being tested, both of which indicate a low potential for dispersion of contamination. No documentation of a radiological survey from the end of operations is known to exist. However, a radiological survey was performed in 1976 for the DOE which identified no radioactivity above background levels. This survey data and available process descriptions are adequate to determine that no significant residual contamination existed at the end of operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Edgerton Germeshausen & Grier, Inc.
Boston, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Edgerton Germeshausen & Grier, Inc. (EG&G) was under contract to the AEC during the period from 1950-1953 for "research and development and manufacturing incident to the installation of scientific test instrumentation at AEC test sites; design, manufacture, test, maintenance of operations systems, weapons systems; and participation in weapons test evaluation." It is unclear from the documentation whether any radioactive materials were handled at the Boston location.

Documentation does not confirm or substantiate that radioactive materials were handled or involved at any time including, during 1950-1953. It appears that this is an assumption based on the potential that contained and/or sealed radioactive material sources were used in the development of scientific testing instrumentation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Electro Circuits, Inc. Pasadena, California

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: Electro Circuits used uranium metal (approximately 300 lbs.) to conduct tests aimed at determining the usefulness of ultrasonics in the detection of pipe in ingots. Based on the material form (metal) and the process of non-destructive inspection, there is little, if any, potential for residual radioactivity after the operations were completed and the material was returned to the custody of the AEC.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation available indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Electro Metallurgical
Niagara Falls, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: ElectroMet Corp.; Umetco Minerals Corp
Union Carbide Corp.; Electro Metallurgical Corp.

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1942, the Electro Metallurgical Company (ElectroMet), a subsidiary of Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, was contracted by the MED to design, engineer, construct, and operate a metal reduction plant. This plant was to take uranium tetrafluoride and convert it to uranium metal. Developing the technology to produce pure uranium metal was a priority for the Manhattan Project. ElectroMet accomplished this conversion by taking the uranium tetrafluoride received from Union Carbide's Linde Air Products Division and reacting it with magnesium in induction furnaces. Once the metal was created, it was cast into ingots and the ingots were then shipped out for testing or for rolling. The leftover process residues were sent to other sites for uranium recovery, storage, or disposal. ElectroMet was also in charge of recasting metal, research and development in low- and high-grade uranium ores, and supplying calcium metal to Los Alamos and other laboratories. After the war ended, ElectroMet produced UF₄ that was reduced to metallic uranium either on site in Niagara Falls or by Mallinckrodt at the St. Louis Downtown Site. In 1946, production was suspended, and from 1950 through 1953, the plant began casting zirconium metal sponge into ingots. The plant was also used for titanium processing and uranium and thorium processing. Documentation reviewed contains a description of decontamination activities conducted at the cessation of AEC operations in 1953, along with data from a radiological survey performed at that time by the AEC. Review of this survey data and documentation that the facility where AEC operations were conducted was demolished in 1957, is sufficient to determine that little, if any, residual contamination existed after AEC operations. Radiological surveys performed in 1976 and 1980 for the DOE did identify contamination on the site. But, there is adequate documentation to demonstrate that the origin is from commercial activities and is not attributable to AEC work.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: ERA Tool and Engineering Co.
Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Audio-Tex, Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From February through June 1944, ERA Tool and Engineering Co. contracted with the University of Chicago to supply services and supplies to the Met Lab, specifically to provide necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment required to produce special machining parts for special equipment, tools, jigs, fixtures, etc. from materials furnished by the University. It is unclear from the records whether ERA handled radioactive materials.

It is reasonable to assume that, if in fact radioactive materials were handled, they would have been of a limited quantity presenting little potential for residual contamination. This assumption is further supported through a radiological survey performed in 1989, which identified no radioactivity above background levels.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation available indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Extruded Metals Co.
             Grand Rapids, Michigan

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
A November 7, 1944 document indicates that Extruded Metals participated in work related to
metal fabrication for the Manhattan Project.

Documentation available during this evaluation is limited and what is available is insufficient to
reach any determinations. The available documentation does not definitively confirm that
radioactive materials were handled or processed at the facility, nor does it specifically address
the time frame in which these activities may have been performed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of
written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Fenn Machinery Co.
              Hartford, Connecticut

TIME PERIOD: 1950

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Fenn Machinery Co. conducted tests to explore the feasability of swaging uranium rods to
finish size for use in Hanford’s reactor. Records indicate two tests with the possibility of a third
test, conducted during the month of June 1950. The tests probably took less than one day each to
complete. The test consisted of swaging approximately 15 rods out to 4-foot lengths. Material
was handled under MED/AEC with air sampling being conducted during two tests.

Although there was no documentation indicating decontamination, there was documentation
indicating air monitoring during the test. Records indicate little likelihood of contamination after
test.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website FUSRAP files, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Fenwal, Inc.  
Ashland, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: Kidde-Fenwal

TIME PERIOD: 1967-1968

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1967 and 1968, NLO (Fernald) asked Fenwal to conduct tests aimed at determining the capabilities of Fenwal’s fire extinguishing equipment for suppressing fires originating in uranium-contaminated magnesium. The tests were conducted at Fenwal facilities and involved small amounts of uranium. Some of Fenwal employees later traveled to NLO (Fernald) to service fire suppression equipment.

Documentation exists indicating that airborne radioactivity and surface contamination surveys were performed during the operation and resulted in very low radiological hazards. In addition, decontamination was performed and all material was returned to the NLO (Fernald) site.

This was a small-scale operation performed with a well-defined small amount of radioactive material.

The operation was well-defined and posed minimal radiological risks during the operation. Documentation exists indicating that monitoring and decontamination was performed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, memos from the director of Health and Safety of NLO (Fernald), and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY NAME:</th>
<th>Foote Mineral Co.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Whiteland Twp., Pennsylvania</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALSO KNOWN AS:</td>
<td>Exton Cyrus Foote Mineral Co.</td>
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<td>Shieldalloy Metallurgical</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cyprus Foote Mineral Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIME PERIOD:</td>
<td>1940s-1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Foote Mineral Co. produced monazite sands on a pilot plant scale, produced zirconium metal, separated hafnium from zirconium, produced lithium chemicals, processed lithium metal, and other ores, developed inorganic fluxes for the metal industry, and crushed and sized minerals. When the facility was closed in 1991, the site included more than 50 buildings and process areas.

The facility may have rolled some uranium metal during the mid 1940s.

Foote Mineral Co. was also a major importer of beryl ore from Brazil. Under contract to the AEC, Foote Mineral Co. procured 500 tons of beryl in 1947.

This facility reported closed in 1991 at which time is was reportedly decontaminated. Documentation also indicates that additional cleanup was performed in 1998. Both actions were performed by the Cyprus Foote Mineral Company. Without radiological survey data from these cleanup actions it is not possible to support the listed end date of 1991. The second cleanup action is however an indication that residual contamination existed after the end date.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, FUSRAP Considered Sites Database, and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information is required
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  Frankford Arsenal
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  Pitman-Dunn Laboratories

**TIME PERIOD:**  1952-1954

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The Frankford Arsenal performed experimental research on small amounts of uranium tetrachloride. Activities at the arsenal also involved the handling of normal uranium metal rods (approximately 500 pounds).

Although there is no documentation reviewed of any cleanup actions or radiological surveys conducted, it is felt that due to the amount of material at this site, there is little likelihood of significant contamination.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3    Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**    Gardinier, Inc.
                      Tampa, Florida

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**    U.S. Phosphoric Plant Uranium Recovery Unit
                      Cargill Fertilizer

**TIME PERIOD:**    1951-54; 1956-61

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
From 1951 to 1954, Gardinier, Inc. (under the name U.S. Phosphoric Productions) operated a
pilot plant which recovered uranium from phosphoric acid. From 1957 to 1961, Gardinier, Inc.
(under the name U.S. Phosphoric Productions) produced uranium by recovery of U₃O₈ from
phosphoric acid. The AEC contracted with Gardinier for both activities. The maximum
production was 60 tons of uranium concentrate per year. The old uranium recovery facility is
part of a large plant that is still used for the production of phosphoric acid and other phosphate
products. Gardinier conducted its own uranium recovery operations in an area immediately west
of the processing plant under a State of Florida license that expired in 1980.

Following a site visit in April 1977, ORNL personnel performed a complete radiological survey
of the site from December 14-19, 1977. The final report stated that the contamination at this site
has been identified as uranium and radium in concentrations exceeding NRC guidelines for the
release of property for unrestricted use at some points inside the process building and in the
outdoor area near the process building and pilot operations building. The contamination, except
for that measured on or near the uranium recovery equipment located on the second floor of the
process building, can be related primarily to radium or uranium in equilibrium with radium.
Therefore, this contamination is most likely due to other parts of the phosphoric acid process
rather than just uranium recovery.

Radioactive material other than that used for weapons production was processed during or after
the time of DOE contracts and exposure to workers in that facility cannot be clearly attributed to
either DOE or non-DOE sources. The survey conducted by ORNL personnel shows that levels
of contamination above NRC guidelines for unrestricted use do exist at this site. However, the
actual source of this contamination can be related to both AEC-related activities and Gardinier’s
own operations. It is not possible to separate the exposures based on the documentation
reviewed.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: General Atomics  
La Jolla, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: GA  
Division of General Dynamics  
John Jay Hopkins Laboratory for Pure and Applied Science


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: General Atomics was one of a number of private contractors that processed unirradiated scrap for the AEC in the 1960s. In addition, the Hot Cell Facility was used for numerous post-irradiation examinations of Department fuels, structural materials, reactor dosimetry materials, and instrumentation. The Department-sponsored activities at the General Atomics Hot Cell Facility primarily supported the High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor and the Reduced-Enrichment Research Test Reactor programs. In December 1994, General Atomics notified the NRC and the State of California Department of Health Services of its intent to cease operations in the Hot Cell Facility.

General Atomics was also the operating contractor for the AEC's Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. General Atomics manufactured EBOR fuel elements (UO₂-BeO) on site and examined them in the site's hot cell. A final closeout survey of the facility was conducted by ORNL in 2000, and the site was released for unrestricted use.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1969 and 1996.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE worker advocacy website, and internal DOE/AEC correspondence provided by the Department of Energy Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
1960 - 1999
FACILITY NAME: General Electric Company (Ohio)  
Cincinnati/Evendale, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: GE Evendale  
GE Cincinnati  
GE Lockland  
Air Force Plant 36

TIME PERIOD: 1961-1970

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
From 1961 through June 30, 1970, the AEC occupied Buildings C and D and certain other smaller auxiliary structures at AF Plant 36, Evendale, Ohio. The Evendale plant’s major mission is to build aircraft engines. The AEC used this facility to work with a variety of radioactive materials, including uranium and thorium. This facility was also involved in the refining or fabrication of beryllium or beryllium oxide.

Documentation reviewed indicates that Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) work reportedly began at this General Electric facility in 1951 as a joint Air Force/AEC program, which subsequently ended in 1961. Use of radioactive materials reportedly continued at this facility for other AEC related work until 1973.

A radiological survey performed at Building D in 1987 by ORAU, states that “preliminary measurements identified significant residual contamination exceeding the release guidelines” for unrestricted use. This survey resulted in additional decontamination efforts, and follow-up radiological surveys.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included, ORAU 88/H-106 Confirmatory Radiological Survey of the Building D Laboratory Area, General Electric Company, Evendale, Ohio.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: General Electric Plant (Indiana)  
Shelbyville, Indiana

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1956, this facility handled thorium metal under subcontract to NLO (Fernald). The work, which involved 500 pounds of thorium, was a test of compacting and shaping techniques using General Electric’s equipment.

Documentation also exists which shows that the facility was effectively decontaminated (immediately) after the DOE work was completed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: General Electric Vallecitos
Pleasanton, California


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1958, General Electric Vallecitos constructed four hot cells for post-irradiation examination of uranium fuel and irradiated reactor components. The U.S. Government's involvement (through the AEC and later, the DOE) was limited to a single hot cell, Hot Cell No. 4. Between 1965 and 1967, Hot Cell No. 4 was decontaminated, equipped with a stainless steel liner to contain plutonium, and dedicated to the study of mixed oxide fuel rods in support of the AEC’s fast breeder reactor development programs. In 1978, Hot Cell No. 4 was placed on standby; it was used by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for six months in 1981 and 1982.

A confirmatory radiological survey of Building 400 at the General Electric Company, Vallecitos Nuclear Center was performed by ORAU in 1987-1988 for NRC License termination. It was found that the facility met required conditions for release for unrestricted use. This document ORAU 88/B-87 did not contain any information about past activities that were related to weapons development, and it could not be ascertained from the documentation if this the building involved.

No other information was available for review, that could be used to assess the nature of the operations or the time-frames involved.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal DOE/AEC correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Granite City Steel
Granite City, Illinois

Old Betatron Building
Granite City Site
General Steel Castings Corporation
National Steel Corporation


From 1958 through 1966, Granite City Steel (under the name General Steel Castings) performed quality-control work for the AEC. Specifically, it x-rayed uranium ingots to detect metallurgical flaws for the Mallinckrodt Weldon Spring site.

No documentation reviewed indicated that the facility was adequately decontaminated after DOE work was discontinued in 1966. Survey results showed small amounts of residual radioactivity in excess of federal guidelines remained in several areas of the x-ray building. The residual radioactive material at the site was likely the result of operations, such as the rubbing off of oxidized uranium during handling. DOE cleanup of the site was completed in June 1993. Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1966 and 1993.

The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

1958 - 1994
| FACILITY NAME: | Great Lakes Carbon Corp.  
Chicago, Illinois |
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<tr>
<td>TIME PERIOD:</td>
<td>1952-1958</td>
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**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Great Lakes Carbon Corp. studied graphite for the AEC in 1952 under contract AT(45-1)-269. Great Lakes Carbon Corp. felt it was 2 years and $5 million dollars away from producing pile-grade graphite. In 1958, Great Lakes Carbon Corp. did some treat fuel work for ANL. As part of the contract, ANL agreed to decontaminate the facility used (Pilot Plant 3). Documentation exists which shows that the facility was effectively decontaminated (immediately) after the DOE work was completed (September 12, 1958).

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Gruen Watch
Norwood, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Gruen Watch Co., Time Hall

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: Gruen Watch conducted cold shaving and stamping and hot stamping washer tests for NLO (Fernald) in 1956. The tests involved shaving and stamping uranium washers on a 60-ton mechanical press and stamping washers from strips of uranium heated in a salt bath. Only small quantities of radioactive materials were handled.

Documentation exists which shows that contamination surveys were completed immediately after the DOE work was completed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME  GSA 39th Street Warehouse
                Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Resco Air Conditioning, Refrigeration and Heating Co.

TIME PERIOD:  1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The 39th Street Warehouse was occupied by the ANL and/or its predecessor, the Metallurgical Laboratory, until approximately 1949. Activities at the building included the storage of radioactive materials.

A radiological survey of this property, including soil surface, sheds, and loading platforms in the rear yard, was completed on July 7, 1949. After decontamination, the building and grounds were determined to be below acceptable levels. ANL re-surveyed the site from July 11-14, 1977, and found no radioactivity above natural background.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Facility Name: Harshaw Chemical Co.  
Cleveland, Ohio

Also Known As: Harshaw Filtrol Partners  
Uranium Refinery

Time Period: 1942-1955

Description of Activities:
Harshaw Chemical Co. of Cleveland, Ohio refined black oxide and sodium diuranate to orange oxide and then to brown oxide for the Manhattan Project during World War II. The final result was a "green salt," which the Manhattan Project used to produce uranium hexafluoride for enrichment into weapons-grade fuel for nuclear weapons at the gaseous diffusion plants. Harshaw also produced uranium hexafluoride during the war. This production activity was expanded in 1947. Harshaw production was reduced in 1951, and by May of 1953 the green salt plant was dismantled and the hexafluoride plant was placed on standby. The contract for removal of AEC equipment continued until September 30, 1955.

Available documentation does make it clear that Harshaw Chemical Co. provided significant quantities of uranium, in various chemical forms, to the MED/AEC during the period of 1942 through 1955. There is also documentation that a radiological decontamination effort was made of the area and equipment, potentially as late as 1960. However, subsequent radiological surveys performed in 1976 through 1979 for the DOE, and then again in 1984, identified widespread uranium contamination that could very well be attributable to MED/AEC activities. It is not clear from the documentation what, if any, use of the facilities occurred subsequent to cessation of MED/AEC activities in 1960, or if the facilities were in use during or after the identification of residual contamination in 1976. The available documentation does not describe what cleanup actions have been taken at this facility or what its current use or status is.

The start date of 1942 appears appropriate. Widespread contamination was identified by Argonne in 1976-79, particularly in "Plant C," the building that was used for AEC/MED activities. It appears that AEC activities terminated about 1960, and that Harshaw continued with commercial uranium operations under a source material license. Complete information has not been found about radiological conditions in 1960 (at the end of AEC activities). Given the results of the 1976 FUSRAP survey, it is likely that significant contamination existed beyond the current period in which weapons-related production occurred.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

Pertinent documents reviewed:
1. Brief History of the Work on the Manhattan District Project at the Harshaw Chemical Company, Cleveland, Ohio, by W. J. Harshaw (undated).

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1942 - 1984+ (Contamination was identified in 1984 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: Heald Machine Co.  
Worcester, Massachusetts  

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cincinnati Milacron  

TIME PERIOD: 1960  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: 
Heald Machine Co. conducted a two-day acceptance test of a multi-bore drilling machine built by NLO (Fernald) in 1960. Uranium metal was machined as part of acceptance tests for the new machine tools. All materials and residues were shipped to NLO (Fernald).

Existing documentation shows that contamination surveys and decontamination were conducted immediately after the DOE work was completed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
### Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACILITY NAME:</th>
<th>Heppenstall Co.</th>
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<td>Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</td>
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| ALSO KNOWN AS:          | Tippins Inc.                     |

| TIME PERIOD:            | 1955                             |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

In 1955, the Mallinckrodt Chemical Company, a prime AEC contractor, subcontracted to the Heppenstall Co. to heat, press, and water-quench uranium metal. Work was performed by Heppenstall for approximately six months, during which time the plant processed approximately 100,000 pounds of normal uranium metal. Records indicate that the forging was done on a 1,000 ton press on a schedule of two days per month by a Heppenstall crew of eight men. Mallinckrodt supplied the salt bath furnace used to heat the metal to forging temperatures and quenching tank to Heppenstall. The equipment was returned to Mallinckrodt upon completion of the work.

Although the work dates are well-documented in the existing documentation, there is no documentation which indicates that the facility was adequately decontaminated after DOE work was discontinued. There are indications that HASL may have performed radiological surveys during the operations. These surveys could not be located at the time of this evaluation. Available documentation that was reviewed included radiological surveys conducted in 1987 and 1991. Both surveys indicated no residual contamination in excess of guideline values. There is no indication, however, of the contamination levels shortly after operations ceased.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**

The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**

The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co.  
                Hamilton, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Diebold Safe Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1951

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: Intermittently from 1943 to 1951, the Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. machined natural uranium metal slugs from rolled stock under subcontract to DuPont and the University of Chicago.

The dates listed on the DOE website are not supported by documentation. Although the work dates are roughly documented in the existing documentation, there is no documentation which indicates that the facility was adequately decontaminated after work was discontinued. However, there is documentation showing radiological surveys were conducted in 1988 and 1989. Both surveys indicated that there was a small amount of uranium contamination found. This small amount was decontaminated when found. In 1993, public attention was drawn to this facility by former workers who stated that the earlier surveys did not include the portion of the third floor where actual machining work was conducted. Surveys were conducted and radioactive residues were found to be in excess of DOE guidelines on over 25 percent of the third floor. Restricted access to the third floor was recommended to the current owner at this time. Decontamination of the surface contamination on the third floor was completed February 1995.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1951 and 1995.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3    Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

1943 - 1995
FACILITY NAME: Hooker Electrochemical
Niagara Falls, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Hooker Chemical Co.
Occidental Chemical Corp.
Occidental Chemical Corp., Specialty Chemical

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1948

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In January, 1943, Hooker began work for the MED to manufacture fluoridated and chloridated organic chemicals. The by-product of this work was hydrochloric acid that was subsequently used in the chemical processing of a uranium-bearing slag as a precursor of uranium recovery.

Additional information is required to make a determination. Available documentation does not contain any information that indicates the presence of residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred. However there is no documentation identifying the radiological conditions at the cessation of operations or information that can be used to determine if the facility was adequately decontaminated after DOE work was discontinued. There is documentation of radiological surveys during the period of October 11-15, 1976. The conclusion from this survey, reports that residual radioactivity levels are within current Federal and State guidelines for unrestricted use.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Horizons, Inc.
Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Lamotite, Inc.

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During the 1940s and 1950s the metal handling facility was used for the production of granular thorium metal for the AEC and conducted some thorium research work for Savannah River. From July 1949 to November 1949, Horizons, Inc. was also under AEC contract to conduct research and perform development work on a process for the preparation of ductile, high-purity zirconium by fused salt electrolysis.

Documentation indicates that DOE predecessor contract activities started in 1952 and work may have continued through the early 1960's. A radiological survey was performed by ORNL in 1977 to determine the radiological status of the property. The results of that survey confirmed the presence of natural thorium and its decay products in the two buildings used for production of granular thorium metal. Under use conditions in effect at the time of the survey indicated that radiation exposures to employees working on the site were slightly greater than background exposure. However, contamination and beta-gamma dose rates in some isolated areas did exceed guidelines currently in use by the DOE.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included, Final Report (DOE/EV-0005/10); Formerly Utilized MED/AEC Sites Remedial Action Program Radiological Survey of the Former Horizons, Inc., Metal Handling Facility, Cleveland, Ohio, February, 1979.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1944 - 1977+ (Contamination was identified in 1977 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: Hunter Douglas Aluminum Corp.  
Riverside, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Bridgeport Brass Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1959, Hunter Douglas Aluminum Corp. fabricated hollow tubing by impact extrusion of approximately 1,600 pounds of solid uranium stock for NLO (Fernald) to determine the feasibility of impact extruding solid uranium castings to close tolerance tubing. A subsequent subcontract with the Hunter Douglas Division on Bridgeport Brass called for the extrusion of cast zirconium-clad billets into moderator pieces for shipment to the GE Evendale Plant for final machining. Shipments of uranium between NLO (Fernald) and Hunter Douglas took place during 1962-1963.

The facility did not have the potential for significant exposure during operations due to the small amount of uranium (1,600 lbs) used. Also, it is noted in the NLO (Fernald) contract that Hunter Douglas was responsible for the decontamination and cleanup of facilities and equipment.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  International Minerals and Chemical Corp.  

Mulberry, Florida

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Pilot Facility  

Uranium Recovery Unit at the Bonnie Plant  

Phosphate Chemicals Division, Bonnie Uranium Plant  

C.F. Industries, Inc.

TIME PERIOD:  1951-1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
International Minerals and Chemical Corp. produced uranium as a byproduct of the recovery of phosphate chemicals and fertilizers. In 1951, AEC contracted with International Minerals and Chemical Corp. for the recovery of uranium, which was ultimately used for the production of weapons. The original production plant was shut down in 1959. During the years of operation, 100 tons of U₃O₈ were produced, with a peak production of 2-3 tons per month. Starting in 1954, the uranium recovery unit was located at the Bonnie Plant. In 1955, it switched to the phosphoric acid process. International Minerals and Chemical Corp. became Central Farmers (now C.F.) Industries. In 1969, C.F. Industries became C.F. Chemicals, Bartow Phosphate Works. The phosphoric process was shut down in 1961.

A 1977 survey by ORNL identified radium in the soil up to 28 pCi/gram. This was not considered unusual at a phosphate plant as these levels are apparently within expected ranges at commercial phosphate recovery facilities. However residual contamination attributable to uranium production processes would also be expected and can not be distinguished from that originating from commercial activities.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: International Nickel Co., Bayonne Laboratories
Bayonne, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
International Nickel Co. plated uranium slugs with nickel for use in nuclear weapons production.

The records were not completely clear, but it appears this was test work that was conducted, and not production levels. There was no specific information regarding exactly how many uranium slugs were processed. Available documentation indicates that there is little likelihood of residual contamination outside the stated dates and that there is no additional documentation available for review.

Based on the documentation available and the premise that no additional documentation exists, there is no reason to dispute the established period in which weapons-related production occurred dates.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: International Rare Metals Refinery, Inc.  
Mount Kisco, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp.  
Pregals Mt. Kisco Refinery  
Pregal

TIME PERIOD: 1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
International Rare Metals Refinery, Inc. processed pitchblende ores for the African Metals Corp. to extract uranium. The same ores were processed for the MED to recover uranium and radium. The exact quantities of ore processed by the facility was indeterminate in the records provided. The exact dates of MED involvement, similarly, could not be determined. Sometime in the 1950s, the company shifted to primarily producing radium for commercial and medical uses.

There were radiological surveys conducted at the facility in 1952 and 1956, identifying significant levels of removable and airborne radioactive material contamination. The site was apparently remediated sometime prior to 1996 by the state of New York, however there was no information regarding close-out surveys or the status of the facility today. The determination for this facility is based on the inability to distinguish residual contamination attributable to MED involvement from that originating from commercial operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
| FACILITY NAME: | International Register  
| Chicago, Illinois |
| ALSO KNOWN AS: | Intermatic, Inc. |
| TIME PERIOD: | 1943 |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
International Register was involved in the development of uranium machining techniques for the Metallurgical Lab and the MED. There apparently was only a single test of center-less grinding conducted at the facility by Met Lab personnel. Only a few rods were ground, and the exact number is not specific.

There was a FUSRAP elimination recommendation conducted in 1987, indicating little likelihood of contamination, and no further action being necessary.

There were no radiological surveys performed during or after the test that were available in the provided documentation. However, given this was a one-time test, the likelihood of significant facility contamination is remote.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Ithaca Gun Company  
Ithaca, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1961-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1961 and 1962, Ithaca Gun Company (IGC) was under subcontract to NLO (Fernald), which was the prime contractor for the AEC NLO (Fernald) facility. Under the contract, Ithaca Gun Company conducted tests to determine the forging ability of the Gun Forging Machine (vertical forging unit) at IGC in 1961. These tests involved the forging of hollow uranium billets into tubes. An additional test to investigate alternative methods of production of the I and E fuel cores was conducted at IGC in 1962.

Documentation exists which shows that the facility was effectively decontaminated (immediately) after the DOE Work was completed. The document titled, “Authority Review for Ithaca Gun Co.” reveals that the testing site was vacuumed down to background levels after the completion of the test. All equipment was decontaminated using rags and solvents. All material was returned to NLO (Fernald).

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
| **FACILITY NAME:** | J.T. Baker Chemical Co.  
Phillipsburg, New Jersey |
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<tr>
<td><strong>ALSO KNOWN AS:</strong></td>
<td>Subsidiary of Vick Chemical Company</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TIME PERIOD:</strong></td>
<td>None Listed</td>
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**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
J. T. Baker Chemical Co. was licensed by AEC to process and distribute refined source material (uranium). The company had previously sought to purchase uranium compounds during World War II, but these were diverted for wartime use.

Available documentation does not provide any evidence of a contractual or similar relationship with the AEC, information about AEC operations involving radioactive material or radiological survey data from the facility. The available documentation does not provide any indication that J. T. Baker was anything other than a licensed commercial facility.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, FUSRAP files, and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Jessop Steel Co.
Washington, Pennsylvania

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In the early and mid-1950s, the Jessop Steel Co. was under contract for metal fabrication to the AEC, with some work through DuPont. The Jessop Steel Co. probably received shipments of uranium metal in nickel scrap, to make stainless steel piping for NLO(Fernald). In 1954, Jessop shipped some radioactively-contaminated pickling liquor to Mallinckrodt Chemical Works. Also, in 1954, Jessop sheared uranium plates for DuPont under purchase order AX-3104 for eventual use at Savannah River Laboratory. In 1954, tentative plans were made for Jessop Steel to roll uranium for NLO(Fernald) billet production.

Available documentation indicates that Jessop was involved with limited amounts of radioactive materials to include shearing of some uranium metal pieces on March 2, 1954, but a trip report from December 1954 reports that Jessop had little or no experience with uranium. Documentation does indicate the introduction of uranium through receipt of contaminated nickel in 1952. There is no documentation to determine if the facility was adequately decontaminated after DOE work was discontinued. Equipment and facilities involved with the work, were disposed or dismantled sometime after operations, up until the time-frame of 1960. Radiological surveys were conducted in 1988 identifying conditions which were not above background in the existing facilities.

Although no residual contamination was identified in the 1988 surveys, these surveys did not, or could not, be performed on facilities and/or equipment involved in operations which no longer existed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Co.  
Ft. Wayne, Indiana

ALSO KNOWN AS: Joslyn Stainless Steel Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1944 to 1949, this site was used under contract 7401-37-9 to MED/AEC to roll and machine uranium rods from billets. The billets were received by rail. Work was conducted under MED/AEC constant supervision, and scraps and ash generated were retained by MED/AEC personnel for uranium accountability. Small furnaces were used to heat the material. Three mills and straightening, cutting, threading, and grinding equipment were used in the operation. An outdoor area was used to burn waste.

No documentation exists which indicates that the facility was adequately decontaminated after DOE work was discontinued. A radiological survey was conducted by the AEC Health and Safety Laboratory on August 1, 1949 (at contract termination). Certain areas of the site were reported to have radioactivity levels above guidelines then in use. However, there is no record of any decontamination work. In 1976, ORNL personnel performed exploratory measurements to determine whether any significant contamination remained. Results indicated that radioactive surface contamination measurements were indistinguishable from instrument background levels.

With the absence of post operational radiological survey data and the indication that contract work continued through 1952, it is determined that this facility poses a potential for residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Kaiser Aluminum Corp.
                Dalton, Illinois

TIME PERIOD:  1959

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1959, Kaiser Aluminum Corp. completed extrusion of billets. The extrusion operation was carried out by Kaiser personnel under the supervision of Metallurgical Lab personnel. Normal U₃O₈ was used in the elements.

Documentation exists which shows that the facility was effectively decontaminated (immediately) after the DOE work was completed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Kellox/Pierport
Jersey City, New Jersey

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Vitro Corp. of America
Kellex Corp.

**TIME PERIOD:** 1943-1953; 1981-1998

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
In 1943, the M.W. Kellogg Company established the Kellex Corp. to design and construct the first gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility, the K-25 Plant, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. This work was conducted under contract to the MED and later to the AEC. In the 1940s and early 1950s, Kellex conducted research and development on fuel reprocessing and component testing using uranium hexafluoride, and uranium processing and recovery techniques. In 1951, the Vitro Corp. of America assumed all the rights and obligations of the Kellex Corp. In 1953, Kellex discontinued all AEC contract work at the Kellox/Pierpont site.

A 1953 survey performed by Vitro indicated that the site had been decontaminated to standards that were applicable at that time. ORNL radiological surveys from the late 1970's identified conditions at background with the exception of a few well-defined hot spots near the location where the Lab Building used to be (it had been demolished). A report that is excerpted in the OWA files says the Kellex Lab Building, Building 11, where all the radioactive material work reportedly occurred, was demolished in 1953.

Remedial action was conducted in 1979 by Envirosphere, a division of Ebasco Services. About 1,000 barrels of contaminated soil were removed from isolated areas found in the ORNL survey of March,1979. FUSRAP remedial action was completed in 1981. No documentation reviewed shows any DOE contract activity or remedial action after 1981.

It is unclear as to why the period in which weapons-related production occurred dates include the period after FUSRAP completion in 1981.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
## FACILITY NAME:
Kerr-McGee
Guthrie, Oklahoma

## TIME PERIOD:
1962-1973

## DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Kerr-McGee processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC in the 1960s.

No new information was available during this review. A determination cannot be reached.

## INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

## EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Koppers Co., Inc.  
Verona, Pennsylvania  

TIME PERIOD: 1956-1957  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: 
In conjunction with the Kennecott Copper Co., Koppers conducted pilot plant tests for the production of uranium hexafluoride. In 1956, Koppers was licensed to receive 2,000 pounds of refined source material for use in studies toward the preparation of uranium dioxide for reactor fuel elements and 6,150 pounds of refined source material for use in research and pilot plant investigations on feed material processing. In October, 1957, they were authorized to receive 110 pounds of normal uranium hexafluoride. Most of the research work appears to have taken place at the Koppers Research Department in Verona, Pennsylvania. 

Documents reviewed suggest that the work which the Koppers Co., Inc. was doing was licensed and could have been strictly a speculative commercial venture. They were commercially developing a UF₆ production process. On that basis, they were not considered under FUSRAP. It's not clear that the Koppers work was even done at AEC's urging. 

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. 

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3 Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: La Pointe Machine and Tool Co.
Hudson, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
NLO (Fernald) conducted tests on broaching machine and arbor press, in which uranium was used.

Documentation exists which shows that the facility was effectively decontaminated immediately after DOE work was completed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Landis Machine Tool Co.
Waynesboro, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Teledyne Landis Machine

TIME PERIOD: 1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Landis Machine Tool Co. processed an MED/AEC test quantity of uranium slugs to be cold formed to specified dimensions, using center-less grinders.

The facility did not have the potential for significant exposure before or after operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Latty Avenue Properties
Hazelwood, Missouri

ALSO KNOWN AS: Contemporary Metals Corporation
Continental Mining and Milling
Commercial Discount Corporation
Futura Coatings, Inc.
Jarboe Realty and Investment Company
Hazelwood Interim Storage Site
HISS
Futura Coatings Site

TIME PERIOD: AWE1967-1974; DOE 1984-1998 (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Mallinckrodt Chemical Company conducted uranium milling and refining operations under contracts with the MED/AEC at the St. Louis Downtown Site in Missouri. Mallinckrodt transported process residues to the St. Louis Airport Site for storage until the Commercial Discount Corporation of Chicago purchased them in 1967. Commercial Discount transported the residues to the Latty Avenue Properties for storage and processing. This material was sold to the Cotter Corporation in 1969 and was dried and shipped to their facilities in Canon City, Colorado. By 1974, most of the material had been sold and removed from the Latty Avenue Properties, leaving only residual contamination.

The 1984 Energy and Water Appropriations Act directed DOE to conduct a decontamination research and development project at four sites throughout the nation, including 9200 Latty Avenue and properties in the vicinity. Although contamination in Hazelwood did not result directly from atomic energy programs, Hazelwood properties were added to the DOE’s FUSRAP by Congress to expedite decontamination. After reviewing the FUSRAP web page, Latty Avenue Properties remedial action is not showing completed at this time.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in performing this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and other correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Pertinent documents reviewed:
1. DOE (ORNL) Report, "Radiological Evaluation of Decontamination Debris at Futura Chemical Company Facility, 9200 Latty Avenue, Hazelwood, Missouri," dated
September 9, 1981.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1967 - 1998
FACILITY NAME: Ledoux and Co.
New York, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1946-uncertain

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Ledoux and Co.'s work with uranium and nuclear materials began during the 1930s when the company first developed methods of analysis for uranium-bearing substances. From 1946 to 1955, Ledoux and Co. provided personnel who assayed uranium ore at the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works in St. Louis. By 1948, Ledoux was also providing personnel to perform assaying work at the Middlesex Sampling Plant, which probably continued until 1955.

Ledoux and Co. appears on NLO (Fernald)'s shipping and receipt reports for enriched uranium in 1986. Today, Ledoux and Co. represents many fuel fabricators at enrichment facilities offering surveillance, sampling, and analytical services at their Teaneck, New Jersey laboratory. Ledoux and Co. performs sampling, weighing, and analysis of all forms of nuclear materials from geological samples to enriched and depleted UF₆. Ledoux and Co. has obtained licenses from the NRC to handle Special Nuclear Materials, Source Material, and By-Products.

The documentation contains information verifying that personnel and resources were supplied by Ledoux Company at several processing facilities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, there is no documentation showing that radioactive materials were ever handled at the New York, New York offices during this time frame. One document indicates that Ledoux and Co. received materials from NLO(Fernald) in 1986. However, the documentation does not describe the material form and quantity, nor does it specify the exact location or facility where the material was shipped.

While it appears that Ledoux and Company never handled radioactive materials at the New York sites, documentation available for review during this evaluation is insufficient to reach a final determination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included, DOE Letter; James W. Wagoner II to Rudolph Giuliani; Subject: Elimination of ledoux and Co. site in New York City; December 12, 1994.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Linde Air Products
Buffalo, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Linde Air Products Div. Of Union Carbide
Linde
Linde Center
Chandler Plant
Chandler Street Plant
Linde Chandler Plant

TIME PERIOD: 1945-1947

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Linde Air Products facility, also known as the Chandler Plant, was involved in the development and production of barrier for the Oak Ridge Diffusion Plant. During World War II, Linde was part of the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation, later known as Union Carbide.

An AEC Realty & Leaseholding report shows that the Linde Air facility in Buffalo, New York was acquired in September, 1944 and terminated in November, 1947. The contracting period does not precisely correlate with the dates specified as the period in which weapons-related production occurred however documentation indicates that this facility did not handle radioactive materials and should not be mistaken for the Linde Tonawanda site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
| FACILITY NAME: | Linde Ceramics Plant  
|               | Tonawanda, New York |
| ALSO KNOWN AS: | Tonawanda Laboratory  
|               | Linde Air  
|               | Paxair |
| TIME PERIOD:  | 1940-1950, DOE 1996 - 1997 (remediation) |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
From 1940 to 1948, Linde Ceramics performed uranium processing for the MED and the AEC, predecessor agencies of the DOE. Linde produced uranium metal and nickel in the Ceramics Plant. Limited development activities were also carried out at the Linde Research and Development Laboratory adjacent to the Ceramics Plant. African and Canadian ores were milled to black oxides at the plant. Documents indicate that the facility was placed on standby as of March 1, 1950. During World War II, Linde was a part of Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation, later known as Union Carbide. Radiological surveys performed in the 1980s, identified conditions which subsequently led to FUSRAP actions. It is not clear from the available documentation how significant the potential radiological hazards were to non-occupational workers occupying these areas after 1950. However, the presence of this residual contamination and the need for FUSRAP activities indicates the need for further investigation to determine the potential for residual contamination after 1950. Documentation indicates that FUSRAP activities were initiated in 1990.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1940 - 1997
FACILITY NAME: Lindsay Light and Chemical Co.
W. Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Kerr-McGee
Reed-Keppler Park

TIME PERIOD: 1940-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Lindsay Light and Chemical Co. was a commercial processor of monazite sands, which yield
several commercially valuable products, including the radioactive metal thorium. The MED and
then the AEC purchased thorium from Lindsay. AEC contractors purchased a variety of products
from this firm as well. Documents indicate that the firm supplied thorium to the MED and AEC
through at least 1953. The facility received a source material license from the AEC in 1956, and
it continued to process radioactive materials for commercial purposes until 1973.

Precise dates of operation are not determinable, this condition neither supports nor contradicts
the “early 1940s” designation for the start of the period in which weapons-related production
occurred. It would appear that Lindsay was performing thorium extraction processes for
commercial purposes as early as 1931, well in advance of MED/AEC involvement. It also
appears that AEC/MED may have processed ores for source material purposes as late as 1963.
Regardless of when thorium supply for MED/AEC ended, one available document indicates that
a significant portion of the entire monazite processed at this site over its entire history may have
been for MED/AEC activities. This condition results in a determination that residual radioactive
material contamination existed after the cessation of MED/AEC activities and is
indistinguishable from contamination resulting from commercial processing activities prior to or
after MED/AEC involvement.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of
written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

Pertinent document: Argonne NL Report to the NRC; Written by Friferio, Larson and Stowe;
Subject: Thorium Residuals in West Chicago, Illinois; September 1978.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
### Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

| FACILITY NAME: | Madison Site (Speculite)  
Madison, Illinois |
|----------------|----------------------------------|

#### DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Dow Chemical operated the Madison Site under subcontract to Mallinckrodt Chemical Company. Dow supplied the AEC with materials (chemicals, induction heating equipment, and metal magnesium products) and services. In March, 1960, Dow received an order for straightening uranium rods from Mallinckrodt.

A radiological survey was performed in 1989 by ORNL for the DOE which identified residual contamination approximately thirty years after the period in which weapons-related production occurred, which subsequently led to FUSRAP activities.

#### INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included, ORNL Report (ORNL/TM-11552); Preliminary Results of the Radiological Survey at the Former Dow Chemical Company Site, Madison, Ohio; Issued December 1990.

#### EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

#### PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1957 - 1998
FACILITY NAME: Magnus Brass Co.
Cincinnati, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Magnus Metals
Moanes Brass

TIME PERIOD: 1954-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The site machined various forms of uranium metal under subcontract to the NLO(Fernald). The work was performed at two locations: Reading Road (from December, 1954 through November, 1955) and West 7th Street (from December, 1955 through December, 1957). Total production machining was approximately two or three hundred billets.

Documentation demonstrates that the machining work resulted in significant levels of residual contamination on equipment and surrounding areas during and after operations. A subsequent decontamination effort was reportedly performed but no radiological survey data is available documenting post-decontamination radioactivity levels. Based on the nature of operations, the amount of radioactive materials handled, and available radiological survey data from the operational period there is a high degree of probability that residual contamination existed beyond the end date.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.


EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: MIT, Hood Building

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was one of the institutions that contributed to early nuclear physics research in the United States. In addition to their research efforts, they also sent scientists to work at Los Alamos. For example, in 1942, MIT experimented on the process of melting and casting uranium metal, extracted uranium from low grade ores, studied the element beryllium, and experimented with nuclear propulsion systems. MIT also explored the coordination and the quality control of these processes. The building in which the research was done was demolished in 1963.

Records indicate that workers at MIT suffered from beryllium-related illnesses as early as 1947. Documentation indicates uranium extraction research was performed by MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts from 1942 through 1946. In 1946, MIT reportedly transferred the operations to the Watertown Arsenal (Bldg 421). American Cyanamid took over those activities in 1950. Activities in Bldg 421 reportedly continued through 1953 when the operations were transferred to a newly constructed laboratory in Winchester, Massachusetts. Documentation is not clear as to what activities were conducted at the MIT Cambridge site from 1946 through 1954. However, from 1954 through 1958, Nuclear Metals Inc. used the MIT Cambridge site for MED/AEC research. In 1958, Nuclear Metals Inc. moved operations to Concord, Massachusetts and the MIT Cambridge site was locked down and subsequently demolished in 1963. No radiological survey data was available for review, but as the period of 1942 through 1963 accounts for the entire time from initiation of activities through building demolition, the period in which weapons-related production occurred is deemed appropriate.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

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Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Mathieson Chemical Co.
Pasadena, Texas

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Pasadena Chemical Corp.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Co.
Mobil Mining and Minerals Co.

TIME PERIOD:  1951-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Mathieson Chemical extracted uranium oxides out of phosphoric acid compounds in a pilot study for the AEC.

Documentation describes the activities as bench-top type experiments for extracting uranium oxides from phosphoric acid compounds, which would most likely have been conducted under laboratory controls. There is no description of the quantities of uranium extracted or radiological conditions immediately after cessation of activities. But, it is reasonable to believe that laboratory work would not have resulted in widespread distribution or residual contamination post-operations. A radiological survey was performed for the DOE in 1977, with the only finding of residual contamination on inside surfaces of one sink and possibly the drain line, which in and of itself poses no significant exposure to personnel based on the low activity levels discovered.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Maywood Chemical Works
Maywood, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Maywood Site
Maywood Interim Storage Site
MISS
Stepan Co.
MCW


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1916 to 1959, Maywood Chemical Works extracted radioactive thorium and rare earth elements from monazite sands for use in commercial products. From 1947 to 1950, the AEC purchased thorium compounds from the Maywood Chemical Company.

Documentation exists demonstrating the MED/AEC acquired thorium products from Maywood, starting in 1947, due to the “fertile” nature of the material. Documentation is unclear as to the exact quantity of material acquired. Documentation demonstrates that the radioactive material residues associated from these MED/AEC acquisitions constitutes only a portion of the overall residual contamination and potential radiological hazards. However, the inability to disregard these residues and/or distinguish them from non-MED/AEC residues necessitates the determination that a portion of the residual contamination requiring FUSRAP activities beginning in 1984, are attributable to former AWE activities.

Documentation reviewed indicates the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1950 and 1984.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: McKinney Tool and Manufacturing Co.
Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Parker Rust Proof
Meister-matic Inc.
KC&F

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Between May and August of 1944, McKinney Tool and Manufacturing Co. of Cleveland, Ohio, turned and ground unbonded slugs to provide fuel for the first nuclear reactors, including the three Chicago piles; the Oak Ridge X-10 reactor; and the Hanford B, D, and F production reactors and 305 test pile.

Radiological survey data gathered for the DOE in 1991 demonstrates that no residual contamination existed at that time however, there is no documentation identifying the radiological conditions at the end of the operations in 1944.

This site was eliminated from FUSRAP based on the results of a 1991 survey conducted 47 years after operations. A review of documented radiological conditions observed at C.H Schnoor in Springdale, Pennsylvania and Baker Brothers in Toledo, Ohio, where similar activities were conducted, indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination having existed after operations ceased.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included;
1. DOE/Oak Ridge Laboratory Survey; R. Foley and M. Uziel; Subject Results of the Rad. Survey at the Former McKinney Tool and Mfg. Co., 1688 Arabella Road, Cleveland, OH (MTC001 and MTC002); ID#: ORNL/RASA-91/7; November 1991.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Medart Co.
St. Louis, Missouri

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Medart Co. manufactured steel mill machining equipment which was useful in uranium processing. In 1952, Medart conducted broaching machine and arbor tests turning uranium for NLO(Fernald). According to a former Medart employee, the bar turning machine was eventually shipped to NLO(Fernald) for use at the FMPC.

Available documentation supports the operational period of 1951 and 1952. Radiological monitoring was performed during operations and the data identifies significant airborne radioactive material concentrations as having been generated (reports show activity levels in m^2, these results most probably were meant to be reported in m^3 air concentrations.) This data indicates a strong potential for the dispersion of contamination throughout the immediate area of the facility where operations were performed. There is no documentation to demonstrate that decontamination efforts were initiated and no post-operational radiological survey data. Based on the available air monitoring data coupled with the absence of any post operational survey data this site poses a potential for significant residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Metals and Controls Corp.  
Attleboro, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: M&C Nuclear  
Metals and Controls Nuclear Corp.  
M&C  
Texas Instruments

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1967

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Records indicate that the Metals and Controls Corp. fabricated fuel elements for production reactors, but it is unclear whether its work was related to the nuclear weapons complex. For example, Metals and Controls Corp. fabricated uranium foils for reactor experiments and fuel components, fabricated complete reactor cores for the Naval Reactors program, and fabricated uranium fuel elements for experimental and research reactors. Records indicate shipments of depleted uranium between Rocky Flats and M&C during the period from 1955-1958.

Available documentation indicates fuel was fabricated for research reactors (Battelle) potentially used in AWE support. While the documentation does indicate that activities performed at this facility had a high potential for the spread of contamination, it does not rule out AWE related residual contamination which would be indistinguishable from contamination generated from other non-AEC activities.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included, NRC Investigative Report No. 078-154-A; March 1979.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
**FACILITY NAME:** Middlesex Municipal Landfill  
Middlesex, New Jersey

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** MML

**TIME PERIOD:** 1948-1960; DOE 1980-1998 (remediation)

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
From 1948 to 1960, the Middlesex Sampling Plant conducted thorium and uranium activities and disposed of the wastes at the Middlesex Municipal Landfill. Documentation is available and adequate to determine that the site was used for disposal of contaminated soils in 1948. In 1960, discovery of the contamination was made through observance of abnormal background radiation readings during a civil defense drill. Documentation establishes that subsequent to interactions between local and federal authorities, 650 cubic yards of surface material was removed on May 18, 1961. Residual subsurface contamination still existed after this action, but awareness of this condition and the documented radiation levels is considered to pose no significant exposure scenario.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1948 - 1998
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Midwest Manufacturing Co.
Galesburg, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Maytag Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
A November 7, 1944 document indicates that Midwest Manufacturing Co. worked on the "self-lubricating draw die" which was related to metal fabrication for the Manhattan Project.

Documentation available for review during this evaluation is insufficient to reach a final determination. It is unclear if radioactive materials were involved, nor is it clear what activities were involved in the process development operations.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included;
1. DOE Letter; Wagoner to Kimble; Subject; Midwest Manufacturing Co. Information; February 10, 1995.
3. MED Memorandum; Methods and Materials Section to Stearns; Subject; Metallurgical Fabrication and Physical Studies; November 7, 1944.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Mitchell Steel Co.  
Cincinnati, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1954, Mitchell Steel Co. may have participated in the machining of a sample lot of four hollow extrusion uranium billets from ingots for NLO(Fernald). It is unclear whether Mitchell conducted the test or performed any additional work for NLO(Fernald) or the AEC.

Documentation available for review during this evaluation is insufficient to reach a final determination. This facility performed a machining test on limited quantities of uranium (4 billets), and there is no documentation to demonstrate further work was performed. Cross referencing the 1954 National Lead Company of Ohio document "Request for a Subcontract To Produce Hollow Extrusion billets on a Lump Sum Basis" identifying Mitchell Steel Company, with four other companies, it appears after comparison that the Magnus Brass Manufacturing Company of Cincinnati was the contractor selected to continue this work.

Based on a review of the Magnus file describing the residual contamination after several years of activities with "hundreds of billets" it cannot be ascertained what the potential for residual contamination would be after only limited operations of the same nature were conducted at this facility. Additionally there is no radiological survey data from this facility, known to exist to identifying the conditions.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME:  Mitts & Merrel Co.  
Saginaw, Michigan  

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Genesse Packing Co.  

TIME PERIOD:  1956  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In a test for NLO(Fernald), Mitts & Merrell reduced a thorium metal chunk to small particle size pieces in its Hog Grinder.  

Review of the analytical air sampling data from 1956 results in a confirmation of a high degree of probability that radioactive contamination was dispersed during the operation. The available documentation refers to thorium metal (+10 pounds) without specification of the isotope, having been ground up to fine particles producing heavy visible dusting outside of the equipment. Without further documentation of follow-up decontamination actions taken at that time, and consideration of the assumption that no additional post-operations radiological survey documentation exists, it is determined that there is a significant potential for residual contamination after completion of this operation.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.  

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Additional information is required
**FACILITY NAME:** Monsanto Chemical Co.  
Dayton, Ohio

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  
Scioto Laboratory  
Dayton Project

**TIME PERIOD:** 1943-1946

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
In 1943, the MED began the Dayton Project to investigate the chemistry and metallurgy of polonium. This work was initially performed at the Monsanto Research Corporation's Scioto research laboratory in Dayton, Ohio. In 1946, the Dayton Project moved to its own facility in Miamisburg, Ohio. In 1947, the Dayton Project became the Mound Plant.

Documentation indicates that project activities were transferred from Dayton to Miamisburg in 1946, but it is unclear if operations were fully ceased at Dayton. Documentation indicates that decontamination efforts may have been conducted at various locations during 1949. Radiological survey data from the 1990's was available for review for multiple areas confirming the absence of significant residual contamination at that time however the conditions when operations were ceased is unknown.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation. Pertinent documents included;

3. USAF Report; Radiological Scoping Survey of Former Monsanto Facilities (Unit III and Warehouse); 4 Sept 1997.
4. DOE Letter, Fiore to Augustine (USACOE), concerning eligibility of Dayton sites for cleanup under FUSRAP, October 19, 1999.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Museum of Science and Industry  
Chicago, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1946-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Portions of the East Pavilion of the Museum of Science and Industry were used by employees of the Metallurgical Laboratory and the ANL. Although the facility was primarily used as office space, it is believed that radioactive materials were handled at this facility and that a spill of radioactive material may have taken place near the service elevator on the ground floor.

While a description of specific activities performed and/or material handled is not available, it is clear that work was performed for the AEC by ANL at this facility from 1946 through 1953. Documentation demonstrates that decontamination activities and radiological surveys were performed by ANL in the East Pavilion of the facility in 1949. It should be noted that while no such documentation was available for review relative to the West Court, which ANL occupied through 1953, a radiological survey was performed for the DOE in 1977 resulting in no identifiable residual contamination above normal background readings.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: National Bureau of Standards, Van Ness Street
Washington, District of Columbia

ALSO KNOWN AS: University of the District of Columbia

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) contributed to weapons research and development from the early 1940s until 1952. They participated in experiments related to developing the purification process of uranium oxide. From the early 1920s until 1952, the NBS had a radioactivity laboratory used for measuring radium samples for medical purposes.

The National Bureau of Standards also provided oversight for uranium metal production. During World War II, considerable emphasis was placed upon uranium metal production. Researchers at Iowa State soon perfected a magnesium reduction process, which quickly became the standard. The National Bureau of Standards in Washington, D.C., among other laboratories, provided quality control of the production of uranium metal using the magnesium process. Records also indicate that the NBS worked with thorium.

Area decontamination and radiological surveys were performed and documented in 1952 and 1968. Both of these surveys identified significant levels of fixed alpha contamination along with localized and general area external dose rates significantly above background levels. Based on a review of the survey data and associated documentation, the principal cause of these elevated readings is attributable to non-AEC related residual radium contamination. This is not to say that residual uranium contamination did not exist beyond 1952, but if present, it would be insignificant.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: National Guard Armory  
Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Washington Park Armory

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1951; DOE 1980s-1988 (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In the 1940s, the Manhattan Project leased the National Guard Armory from the State of Illinois for uranium processing and radioactive material storage. In 1951, the site was returned to the State of Illinois.

A radiological survey was performed for the DOE from September 1977 through October 1978, identifying widespread contamination in several areas of the facility and localized concentrations in others. After reviewing the radiological survey data, it is determined that the potential for residual radioactivity existed between 1951 and the beginning of DOE activities in the 1980s. This determination is principally based on the identification of removable surface contamination in overhead areas up to 1,700 dpm/100cm² alpha and 2,500 dpm/100cm² beta-gamma.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
1942 - 1988
### FACILITY NAME:
National Research Corp.
Cambridge, Massachusetts

### ALSO KNOWN AS:
NRC

### TIME PERIOD:
1944-1952

### DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
National Research Corp. had MED experience in working with vacuum centrifugal castings, in developing jets and baffles for diffusion pumps, and in developing cold trap systems. National Research's work with vacuum centrifugal castings (contract W-7405-eng-293) involved casting tube alloy (uranium metal) using the "lost wax" technique. In 1948, National Research did work for Mallinckrodt involving the vacuum melting of approximately 500 pounds of uranium.

A December, 1946 letter indicates that National Research Corp. requested a "leak detector for use in connection with some special development work on beryllium." It is not clear whether this work was ever actually done.

Documentation indicates through interviews with former employees that work with radioactive materials may have continued past 1952. There is documentation indicating that 69 kg. of thorium metal inventory was unaccounted for. There is discussion of need for a radiological characterization survey by or for the DOE. It is unknown if this survey has been performed, no data was available for review.

### INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

### EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

### PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Naval Research Laboratory
Washington, District of Columbia

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1945; DOE 1959

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During World War II, the Naval Research Laboratory produced quantities of enriched uranium through a thermal diffusion process. The Navy built a small pilot plant at the Anacostia facility for this purpose.

In the 1950s, the Laboratory handled radioactive materials for different research applications, and it is listed in the AEC annual report for 1959 as having just over $2 million in AEC-owned equipment on-site.

There was no documentation to firmly establish the start and end dates for gaseous diffusion activities, nor disclosure as to radiological conditions during and/or after completion of these operations. Based on these uncertainties it is possible that residual contamination existed after cessation of operations. Additionally, there was no disclosure relative to disposition of equipment used in the gaseous diffusion processes. Documentation was reviewed demonstrating issuance of a Source Material License and associated modifications in the 1950s, which contained identification of the material forms and quantities. Based on a review of the licensing documents there is a low probability of residual contamination or significant personnel exposure from these materials, but there is no disclosure identifying the disposition of these materials. The date of 1959 appears to be based on custody of AEC-owned equipment, there is no description of what the equipment was or the radiological status of the equipment.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
**FACILITY NAME:** New England Lime Co.
Canaan, Connecticut

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** NELCO

**TIME PERIOD:** 1963

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
In 1963, the New England Lime Co. (NELCO) conducted tests on “prill,” a magnesium-uranium waste product, to determine the feasibility of recovering these materials for re-use in the nuclear weapons production system. The prill came from the AEC’s NLO (Fernald) facility. Six drums of prill were sent from NLO (Fernald) to NELCO for the test.

The New England Lime Co. also provided magnesium and calcium to the MED and AEC from 1944-1956. This work did not involve radioactive materials. Documentation available for review describes the material handled as waste, bearing low uranium concentrations. This material description is adequate to assess a low potential for dispersion at significant activity levels. Documentation also describes that the workforce involved received fundamental training with respect to radioactive material handling, controls and monitoring, which additionally supports that no residual contamination is suspected post-operations.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: New York University
New York, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1946-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
New York University (NYU) worked on the development of counting equipment for the MED/AEC. NYU handled a small quantity of uranium for research purposes.

Documentation available for review during this evaluation is insufficient to reach a final determination. Available documentation does not clearly establish that research and development work performed for the AEC involved the handling of radioactive materials. There is documentation describing a request for a small quantity of UO₃ made in 1952, but there is no evidence of receipt or disposition of this material. While it appears that the form of radioactive materials which would have been used during instrumentation development, under laboratory controls, would have had a low probability for dispersion, there is no documentation indicating radiological surveys were or have been performed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Norton Co.
Worcester, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Norton Co. manufactured refractory products from boron, beryllium uranium and thorium for the MED and the AEC. Work was done both at the Worcester facility and at a facility in Canada.

As early as 1943, Norton was providing boron to the SAM laboratory. In late 1945, Norton was subcontracted by Brush Beryllium to fuse beryllium oxide. Norton developed methods for shaping beryllium powder into rods and hexagonal rings using molds. It also used the process to produce beryllium oxide-uranium oxide hexagonal rings. By 1949, at least one death from beryllium poisoning had been recorded at Norton.

Norton also provided thorium and uranium products to the MED/AEC. The company produced uranium crucibles for Argonne and fused thoria slugs that were irradiated in Hanford reactors. Contracts indicate Norton continued to produce refractory materials for the AEC until 1961.

Documentation reviewed during this evaluation indicates work with radioactive materials, performed for the AEC may have ended sometime in the late 1950's. There is no radiological monitoring data from the operational period or after cessation of activities. Available documentation indicates a high degree of probability for residual contamination originating from uranium and/or thorium work. Norton received an AEC license in the mid 1950's however, residual contamination from prior MED/AEC AWE activities in the 1940's through the 1950's would be indistinguishable from non-AWE work.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) (Apollo)
Apollo, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Babcock & Wilcox
Atlantic Richfield Corp.(ARCO)

TIME PERIOD: 1957-1983

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) began operations at the Apollo and
Parks Township facilities in the late 1950s. The Atlantic Richfield Corp.(ARCO) purchased the
stock of NUMEC in 1967. In 1971, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) purchased NUMEC and is the
current owner of the Apollo and Parks Township facilities.

NUMEC processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC in the 1960s. This facility also
provided enriched uranium to the naval reactors program and included a plutonium plant,
plutonium plant storage area, high-enriched uranium fuel facility, metals and hafnium complex
and a uranium hexafluoride storage area. The facility also fabricated plutonium-beryllium
neutron sources.

The B&W Apollo facility ceased manufacturing nuclear fuel in 1983.

Documentation indicates that the start date for the period in which weapons-related production
occurred should be designated as 1957. Based on the nature of AEC-related activities, the
contaminated state of the facility which subsequently led to D&D under NRC, and the inability
to distinguish AEC related contamination from that of other originating activities, it is
determined that AEC residual contamination existed beyond the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy
Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of
written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC)  
(Parks Township)  
Parks Township, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Babcock & Wilcox  
Atlantic Richfield Corp. (ARCO)

TIME PERIOD: late 1950s-1980

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) began operations at the Apollo and Parks Township facilities in the late 1950s. The Atlantic Richfield Corp.(ARCO) purchased the stock of NUMEC in 1967. In 1971, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) purchased NUMEC and is the current owner of the Apollo and Parks Township facilities.  
The primary function of the NUMEC Parks Township facility was the fabrication of plutonium fuel, the preparation of high-enriched uranium fuel, and the production of zirconium/hafnium bars. The Parks Township facility ceased fuel fabrication activities in 1980.  
Documentation suggests that the start date for the period in which weapons-related production occurred should be designated as 1957. Based on the nature of AEC-related activities, the contaminated state of the facility which subsequently led to D&D under NRC, and the inability to distinguish AEC related contamination from that of other originating activities, it is determined that AEC residual contamination existed beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Metals, Inc.
West Concord, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: NMI
Starmet, Inc.
MIT Met Lab
Whittaker Corp., Nuclear Metals Division

TIME PERIOD: 1954-1990

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Nuclear Metals, Inc. was incorporated in 1954. Its work evolved out of the MIT Metallurgical Laboratory. In 1958, the company moved from Cambridge (where the MIT lab had been) to Concord. The company's current name is Starmet.

In 1958, Nuclear Metals began operating as a facility that produced depleted uranium products, primarily as penetrators for armor-piercing ammunition. It also supplied copper-plated uranium billets that were used to fuel Savannah River's production reactors. Other work at this facility included the manufacture of metal powders for medical applications, photocopiers and other applications. Thorium and thorium oxide were also handled at the site under license to the NRC.

During the period from 1962-1986, Nuclear Metals was the sole source supplier for beryllium alloy end closure fuel element rings used in the “N” Reactor in Richland. Records also indicate beryllium work for the AEC at various times during the 1940s and 1950s.

Documentation available for review during this evaluation does not support the period in which weapons-related production occurred as being appropriate. Documentation does support the start date of the period in which weapons-related production occurred as 1954, and that AEC work was performed at MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts during 1954 through 1958. Documentation also supports that AEC activities were initiated at the new Concord facility in 1958. It is not discernable from the documentation when AEC/DOE work actually ended. Several documents indicate that the end of AEC/DOE work was in or around 1963. There are, however, records indicating that significant quantities of uranium were shipped to, and/or received from, DOE sites NLO (Fernald), Rocky Flats, and Savannah River as late as 1997. No radiological survey data was available from the site, but there are strong indications that the AEC/DOE work presents a significant potential for residual contamination, which is indistinguishable from non-AEC radioactive material contamination. In 2001, the site was added to the EPA Superfund List. Documentation reviewed indicates the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1960 and completion of cleanup activities.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE and FUSRAP documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Oliver Corp.  
        Battle Creek, Michigan

TIME PERIOD:  1956-1957; 1961-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Oliver Corp. participated in green salt briquetting testing for NLO(Fernald). Records indicate that testing took place in November, 1956; July, 1957; May, 1961; and May, 1962. It is unclear from the documentation whether the company ever performed this work at a production level. The DOE website states that the Oliver Corp. AEC license history indicates that it was licensed to receive 350 pounds of normal uranium (40-6977-03/08/63) and 20,000 pounds of uranium enriched in U-235 (70-646–03/26/62) (but comments that records indicate that it is not related to its work for NLO(Fernald)).

Trip reports from this period report that post-work surveys found no detectably contamination above background. Assuming that these surveys were sufficiently sensitive, the available documentation is sufficient evidence to support the dates provided, 1956-57 and 1961-62.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents includes;

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Painesville Site (Diamond Magnesium Co.)
Painesville, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Uniroyal
Lonza Chemical

TIME PERIOD: Early 1940s; DOE 1992-1998 (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In the early 1940s, the Defense Plant Corporation constructed a magnesium production facility on the Painesville site, which was owned by the Diamond Magnesium Company. The AEC provided the site with 800 tons of radioactively-contaminated scrap steel which was used to control chlorine emissions during the magnesium production. Storage of this scrap metal radioactively-contaminated soil was at the Painesville site.

Although the magnesium plant was constructed in the early 1940's, the information available indicates that the radioactive contamination was introduced with contaminated steel in 1952 and 1953. It might be relevant that, in the OWA file for Spencer Chemical, there is an excerpt from a report titled, "AEC Annual Report to Congress for 1963," that contains a list of principal producers of uranium materials." That list includes the company Diamond Alkali which is not one of the "also known as" names for the Painesville Site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Pertinent documents reviewed:
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1952 - 1998
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Penn Salt Co.
Philadelphia/Wyndmoor, Pennsylvania

TIME PERIOD:  1953-1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Penn Salt Co. experimented with samples of fluoride-containing by-products from AEC operations to determine if they could be used for hydrogen fluoride production or to extract uranium from the material. Penn Salt Co. was licensed to receive scrap from AEC operations.

Penn Salt Co. was licensed at one time to receive 2,000 pounds of magnesium fluoride scrap for testing. There is no information regarding any more than 350 pounds that were actually received and tested. Other information in the file supports that the material had a maximum of 5 percent U content. There is little else supported in the file.

The site was removed from FUSRAP in 1987 because of low probability for contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Philadelphia Naval Yard
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Abelson’s Pilot Plant
Koppers Co.
Naval Boiler & Turbine Laboratory

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1944, the Navy built a thermal diffusion pilot plant using concentric hot and cold pipes at the Philadelphia Naval Yard. The S-50 plant at Oak Ridge was a large-scale version of this plant. A large quantity of uranium hexafluoride was processed at this site. The exact quantity, however, is unknown.

The site was not included in the FUSRAP system, as it is controlled by the Department of Defense. There is no information regarding the exact period of operation, nor the condition of the site when operations were concluded.

No new information was available during this review.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Picatinny Arsenal
Dover, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: 1948-early 1950s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Picatinny Arsenal in Dover, New Jersey has assisted in the development and small-scale manufacturing of components since 1948. Picatinny has worked on fuses, detonators, firing sets, and generators for U.S. Army nuclear weapons, including nuclear artillery shells, demolition charges, and missile warheads. Although the Picatinny Arsenal disbanded its nuclear munitions group in the early 1950s, subsequent work did involve some nuclear weapons-related tasks.

Available documentation indicates that in 1947 or earlier, prior to the start of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, uranium billets were present at the site and documentation appears to imply that uranium metal machining had occurred prior to Dec 2, 1947. Available documentation does not establish an end period for work with radioactive materials, but does show activities up through 1951.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Podbeliniac Corp.  
Chicago, Illinois  

ALSO KNOWN AS: Capitol Associates  

TIME PERIOD: 1957  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1957, NLO(Fernald) used equipment at the Podbeliniac Corp. to conduct an extraction experiment using uranium in solution. NLO(Fernald) later traveled to the site to oversee the decontamination of equipment used in the experiment.

Available documentation includes a National Lead of Ohio, trip summary describing the decontamination efforts and residual contamination levels after completion of a limited scale operation. Based on the available documentation and the premise that no further activities with radioactive materials were performed, the period in which weapons-related production occurred for this site is appropriate.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Precision Extrusion Co.
Bensenville, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1950; 1956-1959

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Precision Extrusion Co. was involved in several projects for the AEC and ANL. From 1949 to 1950, it extruded experimental fuel channel tubes from aluminum and aluminum-lithium alloys. During 1956 through 1959, Precision Extrusion performed several uranium extrusion projects on a small-scale basis.

It was not clear in the documentation whether the site handled any radioactive material in the 1949-1950 time period. All the work at that time appeared to be with aluminum and various alloys.

The work in the 1956-1959 time period seemed to be experimental in basis and was never performed on a production scale. All testing operations were accompanied by ANL personnel, and decontamination and surveying of the machinery was conducted after each test.

Available documentation supports the 1956-1959 effective period, but does not support the 1949-1950 period.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents included:


EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Purdue University
Lafayette, Indiana

ALSO KNOWN AS: Chemistry Building, Locomotive Lab

TIME PERIOD: 1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Purdue University was involved in research during the Manhattan Project. Documentation indicates they performed work related to “Hydrochlorination (sic) of T salts followed by a vapor phase chloronization of the resulting residue to give satisfactory TCl₄ product with no appreciable loss of T material.”

Other work included unspecified testing of metal sawdust, and process development in the manufacture of fluorocarbons.

Materials used appear to be small research quantities. A FUSRAP determination made in 1987 indicates little likelihood for radioactive contamination.

Documentation exists supporting that limited research quantities of material were used. While there is no documentation identifying radiological surveys or decontamination that was provided, little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from AEC/DOE research beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Quality Hardware and Machine Co.  Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Ravenswood Venture, Marden Manufacturing

TIME PERIOD: 1944-1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Quality Hardware and Machine Co. had a contract to support the University of Chicago. The company canned experimental unbonded uranium slugs for Hanford, and may have canned all of the slugs used in the Hanford production reactors during World War II. As many as 48,000 slugs may have been canned by Quality Hardware and Machine Co. in the time frame of 1944-1945. The slug canning process that was probably used was developed by DuPont, and involved a “triple dip” including: 1) cleaning the slug in a nitric acid bath; 2) bathing in a molten bronze, tin, aluminum-silicon mixture; and, 3) water quenching. There is nothing to indicate that machining or turning of the uranium slugs occurred at these facilities. However, there would be removable contamination from the oxidization of the uranium slug prior to nitric acid cleaning. Once the slug was coated in aluminum, the potential for contamination is essentially eliminated.

Records indicate that the work may have been conducted at two facilities in the Chicago area. A 1978 internal DOE memo indicates that site 1, located on North Ravenswood in Chicago, was occupied by a furniture manufacturing company, Marden Manufacturing. There was no information regarding how long Marden Manufacturing has occupied the property. However, records indicate that the property had been transferred in 1968.

The facility at site 2, 1046 West Fullerton in Chicago, was apparently demolished and replaced by a grocery store as late as 1976. The Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (a.k.a. A&P Grocery Store) was the property owner as of 1976, and DOE memoranda indicate that the building appeared new. There is no information regarding the use of the property prior to that.

Site 1 was recommended for a designation survey by ORNL in 1987, and FUSRAP records indicate that a survey was completed in 1989; however, the results were unavailable for review.

Documentation exists supporting that there was a significant quantity of material processed between 1944 and 1945. After 1945 however, there is no evidence that further coating of uranium was performed. While there is no documentation containing the results of the 1989 survey, little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from AEC/DOE research beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred, as the process used to can the slugs should not have resulted in a significant spread of radioactive contamination.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, DOE report DOE/EM-0319 “Linking Legacies”, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: R. Krasburg and Sons Manufacturing Co.  
Chicago, Illinois

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
R. Krasburg entered into a subcontract with the University of Chicago in 1944 for services and supplies for the Metallurgical Laboratory. R. Krasburg was required to provide necessary personnel, facilities and equipment to produce special machining parts for special equipment, tools, jigs, fixtures, etc. from materials furnished by the university. The documentation provided does not identify whether Krasburg actually handled radioactive materials.

A radiological survey of the facility conducted by Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU) did not identify any radioactive contamination at the facility above the levels specified in 10 CFR 835. Exposure rates in the facility were well within the range typically considered background levels. The facility was removed from FUSRAP status in late 1989.

Documentation provided does not identify that radioactive material was used at the facility. Radiological surveys conducted support the facility is not contaminated above accepted guidelines.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Cincinnati Ohio

TIME PERIOD: 1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
NLO (Fernald) contracted with Leblond Machine for the purchase of a rapid boring machine in 1961. Acceptance testing of the machine was conducted at the Leblond facility two times in 1961 (January and August/September). It is not clear on the exact quantity of uranium that was used during the first test; however, there are references to fourteen 7-inch x 21-inch billets being successfully drilled. For the second test, documentation exists to support 60,000 pounds of uranium metal being shipped to the R.W. Leblond Machine Tool Co. for the test.

At the conclusion of each test, there is documentation to support decontamination of equipment, and a return of all metal, machining chips, fines, turnings and decontamination equipment to the FMPC. The cutting oil used in the process was released to Leblond after analysis showed that the uranium contamination was 2.4 mg/liter.

There is little likelihood of significant residual contamination remaining at the facility at the conclusion of the September testing period.

Documentation exists supporting that there were only two tests conducted at the facility. Given the nature of the described decontamination effort, and controls that were put in place during the testing, there is little potential for significant contamination at the facility after the second test was complete.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Radium Chemical Company, Inc
New York, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: J. Kelly

TIME PERIOD: 1943 - 1950

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Radium Chemical Company, Inc. was a major supplier of radioactive sources to the MED in the 1940s. Documentation exists to support that Radium Chemical had to devote large fractions of the laboratory to fulfill MED needs. MED, however, had no direct involvement or control over the activities at Radium. All purchases were made on a purchase order basis.

The facility was in operation as late as the 1980s. In 1987, the New York State Attorney General issued a Stipulation and Order intended to result in the ultimate decontamination of the facility. Decontamination was initiated in 1988, by the State of New York, however, there was no documentation indicating when the decontamination was complete.

There are no records to indicate exactly how many sources were purchased by MED and when such purchases stopped.

No new documentation was available during this review, but with the high level of residual contamination existing at the end of its commercial operations coupled with the presumption that radiological work practices were the same, there is a strong indication that residual contamination existed after MED involvement.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Rare Earths/W.R. Grace  
Wayne, New Jersey


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
From 1948 to 1971, Rare Earths Inc. and W. R. Grace and Co. operated a plant at the Wayne site to extract thorium and rare earth elements from monazite sand ore. While this was primarily for commercial purposes, the documentation suggests that the company had entered into agreement with the AEC as early as 1948. The original AEC contract and other documentation is not included in the subject file. However, there is reference to a 1950 amendment to produce 9 tons of ThO₂ in 1951, and 12 tons in each of the years of 1952 and 1953.

Radiological surveys were conducted at the property in 1981 and 1982, and the site entered the FUSRAP process. The site was added to the National Priorities List in 1985. The Certification Docket from 1993 identifies DOE FUSRAP remedial actions at the property have been completed.

Documentation suggests that the period in which weapons-related production occurred start date should be 1950, or maybe even 1948. Based on the inability to distinguish AEC related contamination from that of commercial operations, results in a determination that AEC related residual contamination existed outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, and internal DOE/AEC correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Pertinent documents:
1. Contract No AT(29-6)-993 [might actually be contract AT(49-6)-993], dated July 9, 1957.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1955 - 1998
FACILITY NAME: Reed Rolled Thread Co.
Worcester, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: Reed Rolled Thread and Die

TIME PERIOD: 1955

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Reed Rolled Thread and Die conducted a thread roll test on 1,500 Savannah River plant slugs on September 14-15, 1955. There is little additional information regarding this test.

A FUSRAP determination in 1990, listed the site as “TBD”. There is no documentation supporting whether or not radiological surveys were conducted as part of this test or afterwards. Even though the duration of the test was reportedly only two days, the nature of the operation leads to a high probability of a spread of radioactive contamination.

Documentation exists supporting that there was only one planned operation involving AEC material, however, there is no documentation demonstrating the radiological status of the facility during or after the test. No new documentation was available during this review, the radiological status during and/or after the operation is still unknown and it is still unclear whether the planned operation was actually conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, New York

TIME PERIOD: Unknown

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Rensselear Polytechnic Institute (RPI) conducted research on anisotropic self-diffusion in metals, as well as research in the diffusion of special nuclear materials (SNM) into glass fibers. There is no information regarding the quantity of materials that were used in this research. It is clear, however, that this was strictly research, and no production-level operations occurred at the facility.

RPI was recommended for removal from the FUSRAP list in 1987, as there were only research quantities of material used and little potential from contamination existed. The dates stated on the Worker Advocacy Website identify RPI as “unknown.” There is information to support research was being conducted as early as 1958 through at least 1965.

There is little likelihood of residual contamination after completion of contracted activities. Appropriate dates for the period in which weapons-related production occurred cannot be ascertained without copies of contracts AT(30-3)-328 and AT(30-3)-321.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Revere Copper and Brass  
Detroit, Michigan

TIME PERIOD:  1943-1950s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Revere Copper and Brass extruded uranium rods for the Hanford plant and Oak Ridge. While there is no indication of the exact quantity of material that was processed, at least 130 tons of material were processed for Oak Ridge in 1943. Documentation also suggests that thorium metal (presumably Th-232) was formed, rolled extruded, and/or machined by Revere Copper and Brass sometime during the above time period. Again, there is no indication of the quantity of material that was processed.

Argonne National Laboratory personnel performed a preliminary survey of the facility in 1981, finding no significant residual contamination in readily accessible areas or equipment. It was recommended in that report that a more detailed and thorough survey be performed to assess overhead and other surface areas for accumulated airborne uranium aerosols/dust based on the nature of the prior work performed and the absence of ventilation systems for control. Information indicates that some of the equipment that was used during the AEC contract was still in use at the facility as late as 1981, but subsequently stolen when the facility was closed and demolished in 1984, prior to a detailed survey having been performed. DOE eliminated the facility from FUSRAP actions in 1990, based on the preliminary survey results (1981) and the absence of the facility due to demolition (1984).

Based on the nature of uranium extrusion work and associated activities with thorium, coupled with the lack of a detailed radiological survey, it is determined that this facility poses a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred up to the time that the facility was demolished.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation. Pertinent documentation included;
1. ANL Preliminary Survey Report; Subject: Notes and Comments Revere Copper and Brass, Detroit, MI, circa 4/22/81;
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1943 - 1984
FACILITY NAME: Roger Iron Co.
Joplin, Missouri

ALSO KNOWN AS: Roger Iron Works Company

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Roger Iron Co. conducted a test operation involving the crushing of a dolomite c-liner for the AEC. The liner had trace amounts of uranium and magnesium fluoride. The test involved four individuals, including two employees of NLO (Fernald).

This was a single point test conducted at the vendor’s facility. Air monitoring was performed during the crushing operation, both Breathing Zone and General Area samples were collected.

There is little information regarding the disposition of the material following the test. Given the results of the air monitoring, and the fact that this test was only conducted over a short period of time, with material only containing trace quantities of radioactive material, it is doubtful that there was a significant spread of radioactive contamination.

A FUSRAP determination made in 1990, excluded the site from further consideration.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
**FACILITY NAME:** Sciaky Brothers, Inc.
Chicago, Illinois

**TIME PERIOD:** 1953

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Sciaky Brothers, Inc. was under contract to ANL to perform a “Stitch Welding” operation on a single specimen of zirconium-clad uranium. The material that was provided was a single plate containing 12-13 grams of 93%-enriched uranium clad in zirconium.

This appears to be a single operation involving only one specimen. Given that the uranium was clad when provided to Sciaky Brothers, and the operation apparently only occurred once, there is little to no potential for radioactive contamination at this facility. The facility was removed from FUSRAP in 1987, and no further actions were recommended or taken.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Seaway Industrial Park
Tonawanda, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Charles St. Plant

TIME PERIOD: 1974; 1989-1998

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Seaway Industrial Park is a landfill located in Tonawanda, New York. In 1974, Ashland Oil excavated and created bermed areas on its property to construct two petroleum tanks. Some of the soil from this construction activity was placed in the Seaway landfill. Subsequent investigations revealed that the soil originally came from an area used for disposal of radioactive residues from the nearby Linde Air Products site, which processed uranium for the AEC and the MED.

A radiological survey of the property was conducted in 1978 as part of the FUSRAP process. The survey indicated that the site was contaminated in an approximately 13-acre area of the landfill. External exposures ranged from 8-80 microrem per hour, and averaged 36 microrem per hour. DOE cleanup activities were apparently begun, under the FUSRAP program in 1984. There is no documentation identifying when or if that activity was completed.

A pathway analysis was conducted in 1986, the results of which indicated that resultant exposures, from realistic but conservative models, would not exceed 100 mrem in one year. The report however is incomplete in the provided documentation. The site was apparently an active landfill at the time of the 1986 evaluation, and it is unclear when, or if, the site ever suspended operations in the time period.

Documentation provided supports that 1974 is the initial year of consideration; however, the potential for significant residual contamination existed between 1974 and 1998 (the year in which cleanup activities were completed), as this remained an active landfill for an indeterminate time past 1974. Given the exposure rates in the 1978 survey, the potential for significant external exposure to any one individual is low.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Seneca Army Depot
Romulus, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The MED temporarily stored approximately 2,000 drums of pitchblende ores at the Seneca Army Depot in the 1940s. The drums were stored in bunkers at the facility, which were returned to munitions storage after the drums were removed.

The eight bunkers used to store the ore were determined to be contaminated in 1976 during a survey conducted by the U.S. Army. “On Contact” radiation levels from 9-21 mrem/hr were reported in this survey. The U.S. Army performed an exposure evaluation based on the results of the survey, and determined that, because of occupancy factors and the locations of the contamination, an individual would not be exposed to more than 100 mrem per year as a result of the contamination in the bunkers. While the levels of residual contamination were low, and occupancy appears to have been low, the contamination did exist until 1985.

In 1985, remediation was completed at the Seneca Army Depot, and a closeout survey was performed. The site was removed from FUSRAP in 1985.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE worker advocacy website, and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Pertinent documents:

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1940 - 1985
FACILITY NAME: Seymour Specialty Wire
Seymour, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: Reactive Metals, Inc.
National Distillers and Chemical Co.
Bridgeport Brass Co.


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1962-1964, Bridgeport Brass performed contract work at the Seymour site for the AEC. This work involved developing an extrusion process for natural uranium metal. After 1964, the work was consolidated at the Reactive Metals site in Ohio.

A radiological survey was conducted at the facility in 1964. According to the records, removable contamination ranged from 20-90 dpm/100 cm² and fixed contamination ranged from <800 dpm-3200 dpm/60 cm². The facility was substantially renovated sometime prior to 1977, to house corporate printing operations and a warehouse. While residual contamination in 1964 met existing standards and a survey in 1977 didn't find need for decontamination, subsequent surveys in 1985 and 1993 found areas that exceeded then-applicable standards. A December 1985 memo determining that this site should be remediated, also states that the remaining contamination is inaccessible, and therefore if not disturbed poses no threat to anyone.

In 1985, the site was designated under FUSRAP for remedial action because of contamination detected in floor drains, soil contamination and minor surface contamination. Cleanup of the site was completed in 1993 with the removal of approximately 38 cubic yards of waste.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents:
1. DOE memo Hazard Assessment dated 8/10/93;
2. ORNL survey report from 1985;
3. ORNL survey report from 1993;
4. ORNL final verification survey report from 1995.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3     Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

1962 - 1994
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Shattuck Chemical  
Denver, Colorado

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  
Dawn Mining Corp  
Denn Mining Corp

**TIME PERIOD:**  
1950s, 1963

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
Shattuck Chemical was a commercial supplier of uranium compounds in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the actual dates of operation are unclear in the available documentation. The Office of Worker Advocacy Website states that Shattuck Chemical supplied a small amount of uranium (quantity not stated) to the Rocky Flats plant.

There is nothing in the documentation reviewed that either supports or refutes that claim. In 1987, a FUSRAP elimination recommendation was made with the basis being “no records found which indicate there were any contracts between MED/AEC and Shattuck.”

No new documentation was available for review during this evaluation. Available documentation contains no clear evidence that Shattuck ever had a contract with MED/AEC. For the most part, Shattuck is referred to as a uranium producer for the commercial market. However, there is a 1951 AEC letter saying that a Mr. Potter from Shattuck had been a reliable source of information since 1943, and it appears that the DOE's investigation of recycled uranium uncovered one record of a shipment of 10 kg of uranium from Shattuck to Rocky Flats in 1963.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Shpack Landfill
               Norton, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Metal and Controls Nuclear Corp.
                 Texas Instruments
                 M&C Nuclear


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Shpack Landfill began operating as a private landfill in the early 1960s and received both domestic and industrial waste. The landfill was closed by court order in 1965. In 1978, a concerned citizen detected elevated radiation levels at the site and contacted the NRC. The radiation levels were verified by the NRC in late 1978.

There is evidence to support that the site was used to dispose of uranium and radium-bearing waste in the 1950s. It appears that M&C Corp, now called Texas Instruments, is the source of the material in this site, and M&C Corp had a contract with AEC to produce fuel for naval reactors, starting in 1952. The site is currently undergoing a site investigation survey and remedial actions are scheduled to be initiated in late-2002 or 2003. Residues and waste containing uranium (enriched to > 90%), thorium, and radium have been detected in the soil and groundwater of the site. Radiological surveys taken in the late 1970s revealed extensive contamination at the landfill, so the effective period should be continuous from 1952 through remediation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents:

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3 Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

1960 - 1998
**FACILITY NAME:** Simonds Saw and Steel Company  
Lockport, New York

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.  
Simonds Saw and Steel Division  
Guteri Special Steel Corp.

**TIME PERIOD:** 1948-1956

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
Simonds Saw and Steel Company rolled uranium into rods for the AEC as part of the multi-site process overseen by the New York Operations Office for the production of uranium slugs for fueling the Hanford production reactors. Simonds also rolled thorium metal during this time, primarily for Babcock & Wilcox, Inc., but possibly for irradiation studies at the Hanford production reactor.

Records indicate that between 25 million and 35 million pounds of uranium, and 30,000 to 40,000 pounds of thorium may have been processed at this facility.

Contract activities with AEC ended sometime between 1957-58. A radiological survey by ORNL in 1977 found contamination in excess of standards, warranting remediation. Evaluation of exposures resulting from this contamination (published in 1979) indicates exposures to employees wouldn't be significantly different than background. DOE originally determined that it did not have authority to remediate this site, but according to the FUSRAP Considered Sites database, it is now considered a FUSRAP site under the Corp of Engineers and cleanup is pending.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents:
2. Undated report of unknown origin, "Guterl Steel Corporation, Lockport, New York," (describes visit to former Simonds site by two ORNL staff at the request of DOE on July 9, 1984

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1948-2003
FACILITY NAME: Southern Research Institute
                  Birmingham, Alabama


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Southern Research Institute conducted several tests for the AEC and NLO(Fernald) during the above times. During the time frame of 1955-1958, the facility was licensed to receive source material from NLO(Fernald) for research on the properties of uranium-liquid metal fuel elements. During the time frame of 1955-58, the facility handled as much as 430 pounds of uranium, the majority being “refined source material” with no specifics as to its form.

In 1962, Southern Research Institute received 300 pounds of normal uranium for hot tensile experiments. The receipt was presumably uranium billets (only a few inches long).

There is no mention of the work performed in 1976, other than a FUSRAP document identifying test quantities of uranium. However, there is no mention of this work actually being performed. There is insufficient documentation to make an assessment of the scope of AEC activities during or after the time frame.

No new documentation was available for review during this evaluation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Spencer Chemical Company (Missouri)  
Kansas City, Missouri

TIME PERIOD: 1958-1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES
Spencer Chemical Company processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC recovering enriched uranium from it for use in the weapons complex. This work was apparently conducted under several AEC licenses at the time. There also was work conducted with thorium oxides, the detail of which is not known.

This facility appears to have been listed under the same Spencer Chemical Company-Jayhawks Works nuclear material license. But it would appear that there was no nuclear work performed at the Kansas City site. It was all done at the Jayhawk Works. Therefore there should only be one Spencer Chemical site -- the Jayhawk Works at Pittsburg, Kansas.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME:  Spencer Chemical Co., Jayhawks Works
Pittsburg, Kansas

TIME PERIOD:  1958-1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Spencer Chemical Co., Jayhawks Works processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC to recover the enriched uranium for use in the weapons complex. Other information in the provided documentation indicate there was some work with uranium hexafluoride, uranium oxide, and thorium. Uranium enrichments apparently ranged from depleted to 93%.

There were two Special Nuclear Material licenses issued to Spencer Chemical at this facility, #154 and #329. SNM-329 allowed the facility to possess up to 1,000 kilograms of 5% enriched uranium at any one time. SNM-154 was not available for this review, but in the absence of any identified license amendments to SNM-329, higher enriched work and thorium work may have been conducted under SNM-154. Spencer Chemical also had a Source Material License (C-4352) issued, however the specifications of that were unavailable. Spencer Chemical was cited for non-compliance with license conditions as a result of a May 2-5, 1961 inspection by the AEC. The total quantities of material handled under these licenses were indeterminate in the information, and in 1962, SNM-154 and SNM 329 were cancelled.

Conditions for license termination were stipulated in Dec. 18, 1962 letter from Donald Nussbaumer to Greenlee however there is no documentation that the stipulations were met. There is strong indication of dispersion of airborne radioactive material during operations (thorium and uranium), without decontamination verification at 1962 license termination, there is a high degree of potential for residual contamination existing past the date of 1963.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group, consisting of US Army Corps of Engineers correspondence, and internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Sperry Products, Inc.  
Danbury, Connecticut

ALSO KNOWN AS: PCC Technical Industries

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1953

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Sperry Products developed a process for performing non-destructive testing and examination of uranium plates for the Sylvania Corp. Based on documentation provided, the testing involved ultrasound of uranium plates. As much as 70 kg of uranium may have been processed through the facility between 1952 and 1953.

Given the nature of the work and the limited quantity of material used at the facility, there is little likelihood for residual radioactive contamination and subsequent employee exposure.

Documentation exists supporting that there was only a small quantity of material processed. While there is no documentation containing the results of radiological surveys, little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from AEC/DOE testing beyond the time period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group, consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME:  St. Louis Airport Storage Site (SLAPS)
St. Louis, Missouri

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Robertson Airport
Robertson Storage Area


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The St. Louis Airport Site Vicinity Properties are associated with both the St. Louis Airport Site and the Latty Avenue Properties. The MED acquired the St. Louis Airport Site in 1946 and used it to store uranium-bearing residues from the St. Louis Downtown Site from 1946-1966, when Continental Mining and Milling Company of Chicago purchased the waste, removed it from the storage site at the airport, and placed it in storage in Latty Ave. under an AEC license.

The information supports that as much as 121,000 tons of refining residue were stored at the site, containing as much as 236 pounds of uranium.

A draft environmental assessment conducted in 1981 indicates that “in1973. . .the Airport Authority removed more residue from the site, razed and buried all onsite structures except the fence, and spread clean fill over the entire site to reduce radiation levels and control runoff and erosion.”

Radiological survey data from 1979 identified residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Environmental reports from 1981 and 1986. Pertinent document: DOE Report (DOE/EV - 0005/16); Radiological Survey of the St. Louis Airport Storage Site, St. Louis, Missouri; Sept. 1979.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1946 - 1998
FACILITY NAME: Standard Oil Development Co. of NJ
Linden, New Jersey

ALSO KNOW AS: Bayway Exxon

TIME PERIOD: 1942-1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Standard Oil performed a variety of tasks during World War II. It was under contract to coordinate materials for work to be done by the Metallurgical Laboratories of the MED. It also conducted studies to develop uranium metal through chemical reduction process, and to develop and construct centrifuges for uranium separation. It appears that the work took place at two separate facilities, one in Linden, New Jersey, one in Bayway, New Jersey. The Linden facility was, as of 1987, occupied by the Exxon Research and Engineering Company. The property in Bayway was occupied by an Exxon refinery operation.

Radioactive residues from MED operations were present at the site as late as 1949, including 475 pounds of UO$_3$ in 75-pound containers and 1,100 pounds of uranium in process solution. There is no radiological survey data available from general areas, to evaluate the potential for dispersed radioactive contamination, however based on the presence of the containerized material described as being onsite in 1949 the potential for contamination exists beyond 1945. The company continued to provide consulting and analytical services for the AEC into the 1950s, as evidenced by a 1953 memo requesting the services of Standard Oil to assist in the development of a fluidized bed reactor for the conversion of UNH to UO$_3$, which may have involved the use of radioactive materials.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents included;
1. Oak Ridge Associated Universities Letter; Berger to Wagoner; Subject: Visit to Potential Sites in Newark and Linden New Jersey; February 12, 1990.
2. Exxon Research and Engineering Company Letter; Buckman to Willis (Weston/OTS); providing a plot plan of the Linden Technology Center (old Standard Oil Development Company site); July 18, 1988.
3. Weston OTS Note; Stout to Williams (DOE); Revised Site Summary for the Exxon Company in Linden, New Jersey; March 22, 1991.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Star Cutter Corp.
Farmington, Michigan

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Star Cutter Corp. was a manufacturer of machine tools. There is documentation to support that a one-time test was conducted with NLO (Fernald) to drill hollow uranium slugs. The test involved approximately 100 pounds of uranium. There is no evidence of any subsequent operations involving uranium.

The site was removed from FUSRAP action in 1991.

Little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from processing this material beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group, consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Staten Island Warehouse  
New York, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Archer Daniels Midland Company

TIME PERIOD:  1939-1942

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
This warehouse was used for uranium ore storage from the Belgian Congo during the period from 1939-1942. From this warehouse, the ore was transported to various MED sites for long-term storage and/or processing. The ore was the property of the African Metals Corporation and the MED contractor purchased only the U₃O₈ content of the ore while African Metals retained ownership of the radium and precious metals in the ore. The ore contained 600 metric tons of uranium and 170 Ci. of radium.

Documentation identifies that ores stored at this location from 1939 through 1942 were a result of an independent speculative business enterprise. The MED learned of this material in 1942 and subsequently purchased and removed the ores at that time. The building where these ores were stored appears to have been demolished after MED acquisition of the materials sometime between 1942 and 1946. A radiological survey of the area of the demolished storage facility in 1980 identified a localized area of potential residual contamination, but is not significant.

This material was not government controlled or owned until 1942 whereupon it was removed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3     Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:            Stauffer Metals, Inc.
                          Richmond, California

ALSO KNOWN AS:            Stauffer-Tenescal Co.
                          Tenescal Co.

TIME PERIOD:              1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  Stauffer Metals, Inc. performed a one-time test of melting uranium metal with an electron beam. There were 720 pounds of normal uranium metal provided for the test, and a single ingot was cast. The metal was apparently returned to the NLO (Fernald) site at the conclusion of the test.

There is no more information regarding this facility in the FUSRAP records. Because this was a one-time test, the likelihood for significant long-term contamination at the facility is remote.

There is little likelihood of long-term significant contamination resulting from this one-time operation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Superior Steel Co.
Carnegie, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Copper Weld, Inc.
Lot and Block 102J210

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The company apparently rolled production quantities of uranium metal for NLO(Fernald) in the
time frame identified above. A 1981 ORNL survey indicated that the site was contaminated in the
area where the uranium operations took place, on and under floors, in sumps and on some of the
machinery that was used during production. A 1985 survey indicated that the site was still
contaminated, however, there are no specifics as to the level of contamination that was found
during this survey. There is no information contained stating whether the site was ever
remediated.

Available documentation states that residual contamination existing at the site is most likely from
AEC activities however the site was eliminated from FUSRAP based on "It appears from the
records that although the radioactive contamination remaining at this site may have been from
DOE predecessor agencies (MED/AEC), there is no recorded evidence that the AEC had
responsibility for the personnel health of the workers or public at this site or for decontamination
of the site after work had been completed. Therefore, it is determined that the DOE has no
authority for remedial action at this site."

While there is no known documentation to assess the radiological conditions at the time of
contract termination, a Radiological Scoping Survey performed by ORISE in May 2001 was
reviewed and found to confirm the presence residual uranium surface contamination in excess of
guideline values for unrestricted release.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker
Advocacy Group. Pertinent document: ORISE 01-0740 Radiological Scoping Survey of Portions

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1952 - 2001+ (Contamination was identified in 2001 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: Sutton, Steele and Steele Co.
Dallas, Texas

TIME PERIOD: 1951;1959

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Sutton, Steele and Steele Co. conducted two tests for the AEC, one in 1951, the other in 1959. In 1951, the test was aimed at devising a means of recovering uranium from low-grade wastes and residues. During the first test, 2 tons of C-liner and C-special were processed to determine whether the uranium could be separated from the dolomite and magnesium fluoride. As this was liner material, the uranium concentrations were relatively low, only about 50 pounds of uranium were processed through the equipment. At the conclusion of the test, the equipment was decontaminated and residues were returned to the AEC.

In 1959, NLO (Fernald) personnel evaluated Sutton, Steele and Steele’s dry tabling equipment for the separation of uranium shot. Fifty pounds of normal uranium were processed in a single test to evaluate particle size separation. As in the first test, the equipment was decontaminated and monitored after the operation.

Sutton, Steele and Steele was eliminated from FUSRAP action in 1993 based on the low potential for residual contamination at the facility.

Little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from processing this material beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Swenson Evaporator Company  
Harvey, Illinois

**TIME PERIOD:**  
1951

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
Swenson Evaporator was scheduled to perform a raffinate spray test for NLO (Fernald) on March 20, 1951. The test was supposed to involve a radioactive residue.

Documentation supports that because of public relations issues, and health department intervention, the test was never performed. There were approximately 40 drums of raffinate liquor that were delivered to Swenson for the test. Evidence supports that the drums were never opened and subsequently returned to NLO (Fernald). The exact dates of the shipments are not clear.

A FUSRAP determination in 1987 recommended removal from the FUSRAP process because of low potential for residual contamination.

Documentation supports that a limited evaluation was scheduled, however, never performed. There is little to no potential for residual contamination remaining at the site as a result of AEC/DOE activities.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Laboratories  
Bayside, New York

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.  
Metallurgical Laboratory  
Sylvania Electric Corporation, Atomic Energy Division  
Sylvania Bayside Laboratories  
Sylcor

**TIME PERIOD:**  
1947-1962

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp. (SCNC) investigated uranium and thorium powder metallurgy. It also produced powdered metal slugs, developed bonding techniques, and plated uranium metal slugs in nickel. The work with slugs included the conversion of uranium metal to metal hydride using hydrogen. The lab was also involved in determining the health hazards of and physical properties of uranium and beryllium powders and the applications of powder metallurgy to these metals and their alloys.

Other work at the facility included UO$_2$ wafer production, flat plate production, pipe cutting using abrasive wheel cutters, canning slugs, thorium slug canning, and thorium metal production.

In 1973, a FUSRAP site status report indicated that New York had terminated the facility’s license after verifying there was no contamination at the site. The facility was demolished sometime before 1977. An ORNL survey of the property in 1977 identified no contamination at the site distinguishable from background. The site was removed from FUSRAP in 1993. Based on a description of the survey performed prior to turn-over to GTE Labs in 1962, coupled with results from follow-up surveys in 1973 and 1977, there is no indication that residual contamination existed beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included, Aerospace Corporation memorandum from Vierzba to Mott, Sylvania-Corning Nuclear Corporation, Inc. Bayside, New York Disposition of Radioactive Materials.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.- Hicksville Plant
Hicksville, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: General Telephone and Telegraph Laboratories
Sylcor

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1966

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp (SCNC) performed research and development with radioactive
materials, principally uranium and thorium, for the AEC. The facility was licensed by the AEC to
fabricate reactor fuel elements for the AEC, Sylvania use, for commercial sale, and for research
use.

Documentation reviewed during this evaluation, indicates that a radiological survey performed in
1979 identified residual contamination at levels requiring some form of action. Exactly what
actions have been taken was not included in available documentation.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker
Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included;
1. AEC (SROC) Letter; Stetson to Pittman; Subject: Decontamination and Decommissioning
   of AEC Facilities (Your TWX, 10/29/73); November 13, 1973.
2. DOE Letter; W. Mott to R. Cunningham; Information regarding radiological survey; June

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE
activities.
FACILITY NAME:  Tech-Art, Inc.  
Milford, Ohio

TIME PERIOD:  1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Tech-Art contracted with NLO(Fernald) in 1952 to grind inserts as part of a study of Firth Sterling H7 carbide profile inserts in conjunction with the machining development program. Based on the available documentation, there is little likelihood that this facility handled any radioactive material. There is a reference to “machine shop operations on government-owned materials at prescribed hourly rates of pay,” but exactly what was performed is not clear.

There is reference to a 1990 memorandum to the file, indicating that this site was to be evaluated by FUSRAP, but there is no documentation indicating that this was ever completed. The site remains classified as FUSRAP-TBD, based on the provided documentation.

There is insufficient documentation to determine whether radioactive material was actually handled by Tech-Art.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Tennessee Valley Authority  
Muscle Shoals, Alabama

TIME PERIOD: 1951-1955

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Tennessee Valley Authority performed research and development of uranium recovery at the National Fertilizer Development Center. The work involved extraction of uranium during the production of fertilizer from phosphate ore.

Very little uranium was produced at this facility, only about 2.5 kilograms. A preliminary survey of the facility, conducted in 1980 by ORNL showed that the radiation and contamination levels at the facility did not vary significantly from background.

A FUSRAP determination made in the 1980s recommended elimination from the process based on the limited material processed and low potential for radioactive contamination remaining at the facility after the operation was ceased.

There was limited radioactive material produced at the facility. Little potential exists for radioactive contamination beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Texas City Chemicals, Inc. produced uranium by recovery of U₃O₈ from a phosphate fertilizer production plant. The AEC contracted with Texas City Chemicals for the recovery of uranium which was ultimately used in weapons production. Contract specifications identify that as much as 12 tons of U₃O₈ per year may have been produced at the plant during the contract years of 1952-1956. Texas City Chemicals subsequently declared bankruptcy in 1956, and the facility in which the uranium was produced was demolished at an unknown time after that.

Radiological surveys performed at this site by, or for, the DOE in 1977 identified residual contamination (Ra-226) in excess of unrestricted use guidelines. A preliminary survey conducted by ORNL in 1980, did not identify radiation levels above what would normally be expected at a phosphate fertilizer plant in that region of the country. Subsequent evaluations determined that the Ra-226 contamination was not AEC attributable. However, based on the nature of the uranium recovery process and the amount of uranium produced, there is a high degree of probability that residual contamination existed after cessation of operations up until the time the facility used for this operation, was demolished and removed.

The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Titanium Alloys Manufacturing
Niagara Falls, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Humphreys Gold Co.
Titanium Alloys Manufacturing Co, Division of NLO(Fernald)
Titanium Alloys Metals
Titanium Pigment Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Titanium Alloys Manufacturing (TAM) was under contract in the 1950s to provide zirconium tetrachloride. In 1955, TAM was issued a license to do work related to the conversion of thorium scrap to anhydrous thorium fluoride. Further work in 1956 involved reducing ores and other uranium compounds by arc melting in an induction furnace.

Records also indicate that additional work was performed by TAM in 1969 for NLO(Fernald). This involved performing a feasibility study to electrolyze magnesium fluoride (with approximately 5% U content).

FUSRAP documentation mentions additional National Lead of Ohio contract work in 1976, but there is no reference to the type of material handled or nature of the work. (EM/FURAP Database Report Site Operations section (identified source 372).

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Titus Metals
Waterloo, Iowa

ALSO KNOWN AS: Titus, Incorporated

TIME PERIOD: 1956

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Titus Metals performed extrusion of uranium oxide billets into fuel plates for the Argonaut reactor at ANL in 1956. Records indicate that as many as 50 billets may have been extruded at the facility.

Records also indicate that, at the completion of the operation, the facility and equipment were decontaminated to non-detectable levels.

A FUSRAP determination made in 1987 recommended elimination from the process based on the decontamination of the facility, the limited material processed, and low potential for radioactive contamination remaining at the facility after the operation was ceased.

There was limited radioactive material use, and the operations only lasted a few days. Provided documentation supports that the facility was decontaminated at the conclusion of the operations at Titus Metals. Little potential exists for radioactive contamination beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Tocco Induction Heating Div.  
Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Ohio Crankshaft Company  
Tocco Heat Testing  
Park Ohio Industries

TIME PERIOD: 1968-1969

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Tocco Induction Heating Div. had a contract to develop induction heating coil equipment for heating fuel cores at its Ohio facility. The work was apparently carried out under AEC license SUB-895. This license was issued in October, 1966 and authorized Tocco Induction Heating Div. to possess up to 7,600 pounds of uranium (natural and depleted).

The license was amended in 1967 to authorize up to 16,000 pounds of uranium. A 1968 inspection of the facility by AEC identified several areas of low-level contamination on the working area floor (300-1500 dpm/100cm²) and on the machinery (3,000-4,500 dpm/100 cm²).

In 1968, the facility sent a letter to AEC stating that all materials had been returned to NLO (Fernald), and questioning whether the license should be cancelled or allowed to expire. In January 1969, the AEC terminated the license. There was apparently no follow-up inspection of the facility.

In 1993, the NRC conducted a survey of the facility and found that the radiation levels and contamination levels in the facility did not vary significantly from background. Removable contamination surveys were also performed at the facility and there was no evidence of removable contamination detected.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the facility was licensed to perform work under contract with NLO (Fernald) from 1966 to 1969. There is however, no reason to expect that significant radioactive contamination existed at the facility after the 1969 date when the AEC license was terminated.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1966 - 1969
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Torrington Co.  
Torrington, Connecticut

**TIME PERIOD:** 1951-1953

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The Torrington Co. performed small-scale swaging experiments on uranium rods in 1951, 1952, and 1953. In each of the tests, only small quantities of uranium were used in each of the three identified tests.

Given the short duration of the testing, and the limited use of uranium, it is not likely that significant contamination existed at the facility beyond the dates identified on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website.

A FUSRAP determination made in 1987, recommended elimination from the process, based on the limited quantity of material and low potential for radioactive contamination.

There was limited radioactive material use, and the resultant tests only lasted a few days. While there is no documentation containing the results of radiological surveys, little potential exists for radioactive contamination resulting from the limited use of radioactive material used at the site beyond the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Tube Reducing Co.  
Wallington, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD:  1952; 1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Tube Reducing Co. conducted tests for NLO (Fernald) on the shaping and sizing of uranium rods. In January 1952, two uranium rods were processed. In 1957, another test was conducted, apparently using two more rods. The tests that were conducted were apparently of short duration, lasting only one or two days each.

Given the short duration of the testing, and the limited use of uranium, it is not likely that significant contamination existed at the facility beyond the dates identified on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  Tyson Valley Powder Farm  
St Louis, Missouri

**TIME PERIOD:**  1942-1949

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The Tyson Valley Powder Farm was a storage site for radioactive materials during the 1940s. Records indicate that in 1946, 206,110 pounds of uranium were stored at this location for the MED. The material was stored using a variety of containers: metal drums with lids, wooden barrels with lids, and wooden barrels without lids.

Given the quantity of material at the facility and the variety of storage methods used, it is reasonable to assume that radioactive contamination was present in the facility during the time the storage took place.

The materials were removed from the site in 1948, and records suggest that the site was sold to a local municipality, and subsequently developed into a park.

The DOE OWA Website was updated to include 1949.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group consisting of internal DOE facility evaluation documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: U.S. Steel Co., National Tube Division
McKeesport, Pennsylvania

TIME PERIOD: 1959-1960

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
In 1959 and 1960, the National Tube Division conducted tests for NLO (Fernald) to determine if rotary piercing of uranium was possible. This was conducted at the Christy Park Works in McKeesport, Pennsylvania.

There is no information regarding how many times these tests were conducted, nor the amount of uranium that was used in each of the tests.

There is a 1967 report indicating that the testing phase occurred during the 1959-1960 time frame. Rotary piercing of uranium was never adopted by NLO (Fernald).

Because no production quantities were apparently used, there is little likelihood of widespread or long-term facility contamination at the facility.

Test quantities of material were utilized in the 1959-1960 time frame, and there is little likelihood of long-term facility contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3   Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: United Lead Co.
Middlesex, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Perry Warehouse; Middlesex Sampling Plant

TIME PERIOD: 1950-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
From 1950 to 1955, United Lead Co., a subsidiary of National Lead Company, was the AEC's operating contractor for the Middlesex Sampling Plant. The Middlesex Sampling Plant sampled, assayed, stored, and shipped uranium, thorium, and beryllium ores. The plant discontinued uranium and beryllium assaying and sampling activities in 1955. Until 1967, the site was used as a thorium storage and sampling site.

Documentation indicates that operations began at this facility in 1943 and ended in 1955, at which time the facility was used for storage of radioactive materials through 1967. Work included receiving, storing, crushing, grinding, and sampling of ores received from African Metals and other sources.

In 1969, the property was transferred to the Department of the Navy and used as a Marine Corps training facility. In 1978, the property was transferred back to the DOE for remedial activities.

Documentation states that prior to the GSA transfer, the site was decontaminated. A subsequent survey performed by ORNL in 1976 identified significant residual contamination that led to decontamination and restoration activities of the facility and surrounding properties.

There was no information regarding the completion of remedial actions. However, it appears to have been completed in 1984.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1950 - 1984
**Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities**

**FACILITY NAME:** United Nuclear Corp.
Hematite, Missouri

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, Chemical Div.

**TIME PERIOD:** 1958-1969

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The United States Nuclear Corporation in Hematite, Missouri processed unirradiated scrap for the AEC, recovering enriched uranium for use in the nuclear weapons complex.

The exact quantities and forms of radioactive material processed at the facility could not be readily determined from available documentation. There are statements in the records that "thousands of pounds of uranium" were processed. Enrichments of the uranium varied from low-enriched to > 90%.

In 1970, United Nuclear Corp. received a contract from the AEC to fabricate fuel plate elements which was apparently terminated in 1972.

There is no documentation supporting the radiological status of the site at the end of the contract. However, United Nuclear Corp. was contracted to supply uranium fuel for the commercial nuclear industry as well as the AEC.

Documentation does indicate residual contamination post operations due to the presence of Tc-99, which may be attributable to cross contamination from the AEC/DOE uranium recycling programs. Documentation indicates that this site may have received recycled uranium from Paducah Kentucky into the 1970s.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: University of California
Berkeley, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: California Resources and Development

TIME PERIOD: 1940s; DOE 1981-1982

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Gilman Hall, located on the University of California-Berkeley campus, was the site of nuclear research involving plutonium and uranium. These activities were conducted during the 1940s, first in support of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development and then for the MED and AEC. Only the third floor and basement areas were associated with MED activities.

No radiological survey data was available from the period ending MED/AEC activities in the 1940s however, the 1976 survey performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories which identified low-level residual contamination and subsequently led to decontamination of the facility, indicates the potential for significant residual contamination post MED/AEC operations.

DOE completed the cleanup of all FUSRAP-related radioactive contamination in FY 1982. DOE-FUSRAP has no continuing presence at the site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents included DOE documents related to the Conditional Certification of Gilman Hall, University of California, May 1985.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1940 - 1982
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Eckhardt Hall
West Stands
New Chemistry Lab and Annex
Ryerson Physical Lab
Kent Chemistry Lab

TIME PERIOD:  1942-1952; DOE 1984-1987 (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory was involved in early uranium metallurgical work in 1942-1943. The first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the university in a "pile" called the Chicago Pile 1, built by Enrico Fermi and his Met Lab colleagues. The University of Chicago continued to perform research and metallurgical work for AEC until the early 1950s. The University of Chicago site includes seven buildings that were associated with MED/AEC nuclear research and development between 1942 and 1952. These include the new Chemistry Laboratory and Annex, West Stands, Ryerson Physical Laboratory, Eckhart Hall, Kent Chemical Laboratory, Jones Chemical Laboratory, and Ricketts Laboratory.

Radiological survey data from 1977 demonstrates that residual contamination attributed to MED/AEC activities existed, and led to subsequent FUSRAP actions. Cleanup of the sites where MED/AEC work was performed, was completed in 1987.

At the time of this report, this site is not listed on the OWA website.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents included, Radiological Surveys performed by Argonne National Laboratories during 1977 (DOE/EV - 0005/23 0005/24 and 0005/26), along with a Draft Certification Docket for the Remedial Action Performed at the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, From December 1982 to October 1987.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

1942 - 1987
FACILITY NAME:   University of Denver Research Institute
                 Denver, Colorado

TIME PERIOD:     1963-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The University of Denver Research Institute is listed as a processor of radioactive materials for
NLO(Fernald). It appears that the University of Denver handled test quantities of radioactive
metal in February, 1965.

There is no information in the documentation about the specifics of any research conducted at the
facility, nor the type of form or amounts of any radioactive material handled by the University of
Denver. Without additional documentation, a definitive determination can be reached with respect
to the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker
Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  University of Florida
                    Gainesville, Florida

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  J. Hillis Miller Health Center
                    College of Medicine, Department of Radiology

**TIME PERIOD:**  1950s-1960s

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The University of Florida handled test quantities of radioactive material for NLO(Fernald) during the 1950s and 1960s. There is no information regarding the quantities of material and the scope of work that may have been performed at this facility.

The exact dates could not be immediately determined. FUSRAP documentation indicates that this work may have been conducted only between 1959 and 1960.

The work at the University of Florida was apparently of limited scope. The site was eliminated from FUSRAP in 1990. There is no information in the documentation about the specifics of any research conducted at the facility, nor the type of form or amounts of any radioactive material handled by the University of Florida. Without additional documentation, a definitive determination can be reached with respect to the potential for residual contamination.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

TIME PERIOD: 1944

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The University of Michigan handled small quantities of uranium in 1944 under AEC contract.

The testing involved developing a coating mechanism to can uranium slugs to prevent them from corrosion. The University of Michigan subsequently was involved in the development of a non-destructive evaluation method to verify the integrity of the canning of the slugs.

All contract work was apparently terminated in April, 1944. It is apparent that only small quantities of material were used during these tests.

In 1987, the University of Michigan was removed from FUSRAP consideration under a general elimination recommendation.

There is little potential for significant facility contamination at the University of Michigan resulting from MED/AEC activities.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: University of Rochester Medical Laboratory Rochester, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: University of Rochester School of Medicine and Dentistry University of Rochester Atomic Energy Project

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1986

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: The University of Rochester (U of R) had major responsibility for the medical aspects of the atomic weapons program during and after World War II. The U of R focused on two primary activities: 1) analysis of periodic medical examinations for all personnel at MED facilities, and 2) biomedical research, primarily with polonium, radium, and plutonium, to establish occupational radiological control standards.

After the war, the U of R received a contract from AEC to operate the Atomic Energy Project which focused on the biomedical aspects of nuclear energy, and was a major center for radiation experiments.

There was other unspecified work with uranium compounds, including metal, and thorium compounds during the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: University of Virginia  
Charlottesville, Virginia

TIME PERIOD: early 1940s; 1960s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The University of Virginia (UVA) played an integral role in developing the process used in enriching the uranium used in the development of nuclear weapons. Significant research was conducted surrounding the enrichment of uranium by centrifuge at UVA’s facility.

The documentation was conflicting regarding the dates that the work was carried out, and some may have been confused with the university’s operation of a research reactor from the 1960s to 1998.

There were indications that work under AEC contract may not have ceased until 1985 when research into the centrifuge process was terminated by DOE.

The facility was removed from FUSRAP determination because of no potential for significant facility contamination resulting from MED/AEC operations.

There is no information in the documentation about the specifics of any research conducted at the facility, nor the type of form or amounts of any radioactive material handled by the University of Virginia. Without additional documentation, a definitive determination can be reached with respect to the potential for residual contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Utica St. Warehouse
Buffalo, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Linde Air Products

TIME PERIOD: 1945

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Utica St. Warehouse was a storage facility for residues produced at the Linde Air Products operations in Buffalo, New York.

As of 1945, as much as 355,000 pounds of residues were stored at the facility in steel and wooden barrels. There is no information regarding how long the material was in storage, but it is indicated that several of the drums required repackaging because of deterioration.

The material was apparently moved out of the warehouse in late 1945. The facility was subsequently demolished sometime prior to 1981 and replaced with a parking lot. Surveys by ORNL conducted in 1982 did not indicate any radioactivity above what would be considered background and the site was removed from FUSRAP determination.

There is no information concerning the radiological status of the facility after the material was moved in 1945.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
**Facility Name:** Ventron Corporation  
Beverly, Massachusetts

**Also Known As:** Metal Hydrides Corp., Ventron Division  
Morton Thiokol, Inc.

**Time Period:** 1942-1948; DOE 1986-1998

**Description of Activities:**
Ventron Corporation was under contract with the MED and AEC from 1942-1948 to convert uranium oxide to uranium metal powder. Later operations were involved in recovery of uranium from scrap and turnings from a fuel fabrication plant in Hanford. During the period 1942-1948, Metal Hydrides was the AEC’s primary scrap recovery contractor.

The Ventron Site consisted of several buildings that were once used to support AEC contracts. The buildings that were used as the foundry for scrap recovery operations were demolished shortly after the contract with AEC expired in 1948.

The site was surveyed as part of the FUSRAP process in 1982 and found to be significantly contaminated. Remedial cleanup was conducted in 1996-1998, and nearly 10,000 cubic yards of contaminated material were removed to a licensed facility. On August 8, 1997 the DOE determined that the site was clean, and released it for unrestricted use.

It was clear from available documentation that the site was significantly radiologically-contaminated for the entire period in which weapons-related production occurred.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1948 and 1986.

**Informational Sources:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**Evaluation Findings:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1942 - 1988
FACILITY NAME: Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.
Nichols, Florida

ALSO KNOWN AS: Conser Department of Phillips Brothers
Englehard Minerals and Chemical Corp.
Socony Mobile Oil Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1952-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp. produced uranium as a by-product of the recovery of
phosphate chemicals and fertilizers. The AEC contracted with the company for the recovery of
uranium which was ultimately used in weapons production.

The Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp. was under contract to produce 12 tons of U₃O₈ per year
during the years 1952-1959. The facility that was used to extract the uranium was disassembled
in 1960.

The plant underwent a complete shutdown and abandonment between the years 1969-1973, and
as of 1979, was completely remodeled and modified from its original configuration.

Documentation reviewed indicates that the potential for significant residual contamination existed
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1957
and 1960.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker
Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination
outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE
activities.
FACILITY NAME: Vitro Corp of America (New Jersey)
West Orange, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Heavy Metals Co.
Vitro Chemical Co.

TIME PERIOD: 1951-early 1960s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Vitro was asked to submit a proposal for research on thorium fluoride production, scrap recovery, and waste recovery in 1951. The work was apparently carried out in 1952. However, it is unclear how much material was used in the process. In the late 1950s to 1960s, Vitro conducted work under AEC contract converting low-enrichment uranium dioxide to uranium carbide spheres. The uranium was then shipped from Rockwell International to Vitro, and then returned to Rockwell. This work lasted until at least 1965 when Vitro shipped 5,186 kilograms of 4.91% enriched uranium to Rockwell.

In 1958, Vitro apparently conducted work under contract with AEC Oak Ridge Operations for the separation of fission products.

Available documentation supports that scrap uranium recovery work was conducted and also indicates that production of ThF4 from thorium nitrate work was being planned. There is an indication that Rockwell International received shipments of enriched uranium from Vitro (assumed to be New Jersey) as late as 1965. The processing facility used for these operations was demolished sometime prior to 1977 when radiological surveys were conducted identifying no radioactivity above what would be considered background. At the time of the survey the property was owned and occupied by the West Orange Tennis club. With the absence of any radiological survey data from the operational period or the facility after operations were completed, it is concluded that there is a reasonable potential that residual contamination existed at the facility up until the time the building was demolished.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included, DOE Report; FUSRAP Elimination Report for the former Vitro Laboratories Vitro Corporation; West Orange, New Jersey; September 30, 1985.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

1951 - 1977
### FACILITY NAME:
Vitro Corp. of America (Tennessee)
Chattanooga, Tennessee

### ALSO KNOWN AS:
Chattanooga Site owned by W.R.Grace
Vitro Chemical, a subsidiary of Vitro Corporation
Heavy Minerals Company.

### TIME PERIOD:
1957-uncertain

### DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The original owner of this site was Heavy Metals, Inc. and possessed an AEC license to process uranium and thorium products beginning as early as 1957. Documentation indicates that the company provided price quotes to the AEC for thorium products as early as 1954. But, there is no indication that it received a contract for that work. Vitro Chemical of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a subsidiary of Vitro Corp., took over the site at the end of 1959, and was under contract to the AEC to produce thorium metal, thorium fluoride and thorium oxide. This site was purchased by W.R. Grace in 1965.

While an end date is not specified for the period in which weapons-related production occurred, based on the amount of radioactive materials handled/processed for AEC activities, there is a high degree of probability that residual contamination existed after cessation of these operations, which would be indistinguishable from contamination originating from commercial operations.

### INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

### EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

### PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME:  Vitro Manufacturing (Canonsburg)  
Canonsburg, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Vitro Rare Metals Company

TIME PERIOD:  1942-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Vitro Canonsburg was a major uranium milling facility. Starting in 1948, Vitro was under contract to recover uranium from scrap. During the period 1954-1956, Vitro produced production quantities of uranium tetra-fluoride for NLO(Fernald).

In 1949, Vitro received uranium scrap from the Tyson Valley Powder Farm. From 1957-1967, the site was used only for storage, and its license was changed to a storage-only facility. During the period of 1956-1957, 12,003,726 pounds of uranium-bearing wastes were removed from the facility and dumped in a landfill on the Pennsylvania Railroad property. The facility’s AEC license was terminated in 1966.

In 1976, an ERDA survey identified “excessive radium contamination” at the facility. The Canonsburg site was designated for DOE remediation by the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act.

The available documentation supports the 1942 beginning date. Documentation supports that uranium recovery operations under MED/AEC contracts ended in 1957 however surveys performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1977 identified "large quantities of radioactive wastes still remain, contaminating almost the entire site." A review of the radiological survey data indicates that MED/AEC residual contamination would be indistinguishable from contamination resulting from prior commercial radium production operations at this site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Vulcan Tool Co.  
Dayton, Ohio  

TIME PERIOD: 1959  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
The Vulcan Tool Co. conducted experiments involving the cutting of uranium slugs and tubes on a Brehm cutter at the request of NLO (Fernald). This was apparently a single test performed in October 1959. There is no information regarding the quantity of material used in the test; however, the likelihood of significant contamination remaining at the facility is remote.  

Given that there was only a single test performed at the facility, the likelihood of significant contamination is remote at this facility.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  W.E. Pratt Manufacturing Co.
Joliet, Illinois

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  William E. Pratt Manufacturing Co.
Klassing Handbrake
Altrachem, Inc.

**TIME PERIOD:**  1943-1946

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The W.E. Pratt Manufacturing Co. performed metal fabrication for the University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory beginning in the spring of 1943. The purpose of the machining done by Pratt was to speed up delivery of pieces for the experimental pile and “learn all that could be learned” about handling uranium in turret lathes and screw machines.

In 1944, Pratt was subcontracted by the University of Chicago to finish “short metal rods” by center less grinding. This work continued until 1946. There is information to support that DuPont placed an order at one point to turn and grind unbonded Hanford slugs. As many as 48,000 unbonded Hanford slugs could have been processed by Pratt between 1944-1946. The contract with the University of Chicago was terminated in 1946 when operations were consolidated at the Hanford site.

This site poses a high probability for dispersion of radioactive materials during operations however most of the facility was demolished between 1943 and 1989 when the FUSRAP survey was performed. The controls during and decontamination after operations may have removed residual contamination however there is no documentation to demonstrate the effectiveness. The survey performed in 1989 indicates that while the conditions of the existing buildings met current unrestricted guidelines, those that were demolished may have had residual contamination up until the time of their disposition. Additionally, the building surveyed had been extensively remodeled prior to the 1989 survey.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1943 - 1946
FACILITY NAME:  W.R. Grace (Tennessee)  
Erwin, Tennessee  

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Nuclear Fuel Services  
Davison Chemical  

TIME PERIOD:  1958-1970  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
W.R. Grace processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC, recovering enriched uranium for use in the nuclear weapons complex. The company also processed thorium, and in 1963 had as much as 36,782 pounds of thorium and thorium nitrate in inventory.  

The company received an AEC license to engage in the conversion of UF₆ to forms needed for the fabrication of fuel elements for research and development. It is unclear what the elements were used for, as they may have been part of fuel manufacture for the Department of the Navy.  

While it is unclear as to whether weapons development work was concluded in 1969, there is a strong probability that any residual contamination existing after that time would be indistinguishable from commercial operations contamination. There is a probability that AWE residual contamination existed outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.  

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: W.R. Grace and Company (Maryland)  
Curtis Bay, Maryland

ALSO KNOWN AS: Davison Chemical Corp.  
Agri-Chemicals Division

TIME PERIOD: 1955-1958

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES: 
Processing of radioactive materials at W.R. Grace began in July, 1955 when Rare Earths, Inc. (W.R. Grace’s predecessor) entered into a contract with the AEC to extract thorium and rare earths from naturally-occurring monazite sands. In 1956, the AEC contract and Rare Earths’ license to possess, transfer, and use radioactive thorium was transferred to W.R. Grace and Company. The facility where thorium processing took place (Building 23) operated until late spring of 1957, when W.R. Grace and the AEC agreed to terminate the contract, effective January 31, 1958. At the time of contract termination, 998 tons of ore had been processed.

The wastes were buried in a landfill-type area covering about 4 acres. The site currently supports commercial activity.

In 1978, the landfill area was fenced off, and patrolled by the facility security guards to preclude access. Also in 1978, a radiological survey was conducted indicating that the landfill area was contaminated at depths up to 15 feet. The building where processing took place (Building 23) was also identified as contaminated, indicating “excessive alpha contamination on all five floors” and “radiation levels as high as 3 mrem/hr around the vats and hoppers.” Confirmation of residual contamination, 30 years after termination of AEC activities led to subsequent FUSRAP action authorization, however the current FUSRAP status is unknown.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent document; ORNL Report (ORNL/TM-10439); Results of the Indoor Radiological Survey at the W.R. Grace Co. Curtis Bay Site Baltimore Maryland; Issued - July 1989.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1955 - 1978+ (Contamination was identified in 1978 but the end date cannot be determined due to insufficient information)
FACILITY NAME: W.R. Grace Co., Agricultural Chemical Div. (Florida)  
Ridgewood, Florida

TIME PERIOD: 1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
W. R. Grace performed pilot plant work on solvent extraction for Armour Fertilizer, which used the solvent process to extract uranium from phosphates. There was an AEC contract in place in 1954-1955 to perform this work.

The pilot plant was operated for approximately one month from November to December, 1954 in one building on the property. The building and equipment used for uranium production have since been dismantled.

A site survey was conducted in 1977, which did not indicate radiation and/or contamination levels above what would be considered background for this type of facility. Given the documented contract dates of 1954-1955, the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1954 and 1955.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Wah Chang
      Albany, Oregon

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Teledyne Wah Chang

**TIME PERIOD:** 1956-1959;1971-1972

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Wah Chang operations began in 1956 when, under contract with the AEC, Wah Chang reopened the U.S. Bureau of Mines Zirconium Metal Sponge Plant. Construction of new facilities, at the location of the existing plant, began in 1957. These facilities were established primarily for the production of zirconium and hafnium sponge. However, tantalum and niobium pilot facilities were also included. Melting and fabrication operations were added in 1959. Wah Chang may also have been involved in thorium work. In 1971-1972, a subcontract existed with Union Carbide Corporation (Y-12 plant) for melting uranium-bearing material.

Specific information regarding the scope of work conducted by Wah Chang or the radiological conditions of the facility is not contained within available documentation. It does appear that there was any work performed with radioactive materials from the 56-59 time frame. Re-melting of uranium in the 71-72 time was may conducted under license and with appropriate controls, posing a limited potential for residual contamination however, ERDA/FUSRAP surveys were apparently not performed. In 1987, a FUSRAP determination eliminated the site from further consideration.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Wash-Rite
               Indianapolis, Indiana

TIME PERIOD:   1953-1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
During 1953 and 1954, Wash-Rite was under contract with NLO (Fernald) to decontaminate work
gloves by washing or cleaning. Residual uranium was found in the lint and solvent after cleaning.
There is no specific information regarding how many times NLO (Fernald) used Wash-Rite.

The site was demolished sometime prior to 1991, the location of the original facility is now part
of Interstate 70.

There is little likelihood of significant radioactive contamination existing at the facility at the
conclusion of the NLO (Fernald) contract.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker
Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker
Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual
contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Watertown Arsenal
Watertown, Massachusetts

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** American Cyanamid Co.

**TIME PERIOD:** 1946-1952;1953-1957

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
The Watertown Arsenal continued the work begun in 1946 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on methods for extraction of uranium and thorium from ore and to prepare metal grade uranium tetra fluoride. The work was transferred from MIT later that year to Watertown Arsenal. American Cyanamid Co. succeeded MIT in operating the project at Watertown Arsenal from 1951 until October,1952, when it was transferred to the Winchester Engineering and Analytical Facility. The Watertown Arsenal was also involved in work requested by NLO(Fernald) between 1953 and 1957 which involved reducing hollow uranium tubes by the Hamiroll Swaging Process.

AEC activities were apparently conducted in Building 421 at the Watertown site. However, there is also information that supports Department of Army work being conducted at the same time, in the same facilities. AEC work was apparently transferred to a new laboratory in Winchester, Massachusetts sometime during 1953. The building in which AEC work was performed at the Watertown Arsenal was razed after 1967.

Documentation demonstrates that hollow uranium tube reducing was performed by Hamiroll Swaging Processes at the Watertown facility in 1958, generating significant airborne radioactive material concentrations. Additionally, FUSRAP documentation from the 1980's, confirms the presence of residual contamination and declares it "is probably the result of AEC related activities." This was noted as low level fixed contamination on the pad where the building had been and was not considered a significant source of exposure.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documents include, Memo, D.E. Carr to J.A. Quigley, April 3, 1958, "Trip Report To Watertown Arsenal, Watertown, Massachusetts on March 17-21, 1958", and DOE FUSRAP related documentation.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1946 - 1967
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** West Valley Demonstration Project  
West Valley, New York

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Nuclear Fuel Services, West Valley  
Western New York Fuel Services Center

**TIME PERIOD:** 1966-1973; DOE 1980-present

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
From 1966 to 1972, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., under contract to the State of New York, operated a commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at the Western New York Nuclear Services Center. The plant reprocessed uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Sixty percent of this fuel was generated at defense facilities. Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing generated approximately 600,000 gallons of liquid high-level radioactive waste. This waste was stored onsite in underground tanks.

In 1980, the United States Congress passed the West Valley Demonstration Project Act (Public Law 96-368), which authorized the DOE to conduct a technology demonstration project to solidify the liquid high-level waste at the Western New York Nuclear Services Center. Under this Act, DOE is also responsible for developing containers suitable for the permanent disposal of the solidified high-level waste at an appropriate Federal repository; transporting the containers to this repository; disposing of low-level waste and transuranic waste generated by high-level waste solidification; and decontaminating and decommissioning facilities used for the solidification. DOE is also responsible for disposing of the spent nuclear fuel stored at the site.

In 1982, DOE selected vitrification as the treatment process for high-level waste. This process solidifies and stabilizes nuclear waste by mixing it with molten glass. Pretreatment of the high-level waste began in 1988 and was successfully completed in 1995. DOE expects to complete the West Valley Demonstration Project by 2023.

Documentation reviewed indicates the potential for significant residual contamination existed outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1972 and 1980.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1966 - 2003
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Westinghouse Advanced Reactors Division
                 Plutonium Fuel Laboratories and the Advanced Fuel Lab
                 Cheswick, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Westinghouse Commercial Manufacturing

TIME PERIOD:  1971 - 1972

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
The Westinghouse Nuclear Fuels Division received shipments of nuclear materials from the AEC nuclear weapons complex in 1971 and 1972. The Cheswick site received a shipment of enriched uranium from the AEC’s Fernald plant in 1971. It also received a shipment of plutonium in 1972 from the West Valley facility. This plutonium originated out of Hanford. Because this material came from the nuclear weapons complex, the site qualifies as an Atomic Weapons Employer for these years.

Although the Westinghouse facility in Cheswick, PA, conducted substantial work with radioactive materials in previous years, this work is not covered under EEOICPA because it was not related to nuclear weapons production. This includes the fabrication of nuclear fuels and reactor subsystems for naval, space, and civilian applications. Among the projects to which the Cheswick facility contributed were the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, the Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) program, and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) program.

Documentation reviewed during this evaluation indicates that remedial actions were conducted, under NRC, up through 1979. Without specific information related to the work conducted with the materials in question, it appears that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred. This contamination could not be differentiated from contamination originating from non-AWE work.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
### FACILITY NAME:
Westinghouse Atomic Power Development Plant  
East Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

### ALSO KNOWN AS:
East Pittsburgh Plant

### TIME PERIOD:
1941-1944

### DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Westinghouse prepared uranium metal for Enrico Fermi’s staff and conducted development and pilot scale production of uranium oxide fuel elements. There could have been as much as 65 tons of uranium produced at this facility. But, the information is unclear as to whether all of the operations took place at the East Pittsburgh facility.

Documentation indicates that centrifuge assemblies existed at this facility as late as April 1946, with requests for disposition instructions. There is no available radiological survey data associated with this equipment. Additionally, documentation indicates that this facility was performing energy threshold and cross section fission studies in 1947, and was requesting information from the AEC on the process to obtain limited amounts of high purity metallic U-235.

A 1976 survey by ORNL did not identify any radioactive contamination above which could normally be considered background at the East Pittsburgh facility. The site was eliminated from FUSRAP consideration in 1985.

At the time of this report, documentation indicates that other Westinghouse facilities located in the Pittsburgh area may have been performing MED/AEC reactor development work, but are not listed on the AWE facility listing.

### INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

### EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

### PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  Westinghouse Electric Corp. (New Jersey)
Bloomfield, New Jersey

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  North American Phillips Lighting

**TIME PERIOD:**  1941-1943

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Westinghouse Electric Corp., located in Bloomfield, NJ, was one of the large commercial contributors to Manhattan Project research with specific tasks related to uranium metal production and enrichment. Because developing the technology to produce pure uranium metal became a priority for the Manhattan Project, universities and private companies with experience in related chemical processes participated in the task. From 1942-1943, Westinghouse used a photochemical process for metallic uranium and supplied metallic uranium for the first self-sustaining chain reaction in Chicago. In addition to contributing to uranium metal production, Westinghouse Electric participated in activities related to uranium enrichment.

Westinghouse also worked with thorium, but it is unclear if that work took place in Bloomfield, or at another Westinghouse location. Records indicate thorium work may have occurred as late as 1949 at a Westinghouse facility. Three MED contracts were identified covering the dates August, 1942-August, 1944. There were two additional MED contracts that were issued in which the dates could not be verified.

A confirmatory survey was requested and performed by ORISE, of Building 7 in 1993 which identified areas of localized residual uranium surface contamination throughout several elevations of the facility, and widespread distribution of residual uranium surface contamination within the basement elevation. These survey results confirm that in 1993, Building 7 still had radiological contamination in excess of unrestricted release values.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent document: ORISE 93/H-110 Confirmatory Survey of Buildings 7,8,9, and 10A Bloomfield Lamp Plant Westinghouse Electric Corporation Bloomfield, New Jersey dated August 1993

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
1941 - 1993
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Woburn Landfill  
Woburn, Massachusetts

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Winchester Engineering Vicinity Property

**TIME PERIOD:** 1955-1960

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**
Fifty 55-gallon drums of low grade uranium ore were buried at the Woburn site. The material came from the AEC Raw Materials Development Laboratory operated by the National Lead Company under contract from 1955-1960.

Documentation indicates that the material in question had an activity level similar to granite, and was dumped from the drums into a truck for disposition, and subsequently co-mingled with other refuse and waste. The original landfill was excavated in 1974 and was replaced with clean backfill to support construction of a light industrial complex.

Radiological surveys of the old landfill site and the new landfill (where the excavated material was taken to) does not indicate radioactivity greater than expected background levels at either facility.

It appears that the dumping of the contents from fifty drums occurred in 1960, whereupon the drums were reused. Based on the described low-level radiological characteristics of the material and subsequent radiological surveys from the affected areas there is no indication or reason to suspect residual contamination of any consequence, existed beyond the date of 1960.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp.
Brooklyn, New York

TIME PERIOD: 1949-1950

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp. was under contract with the AEC (#AT-30-1-Gen-287) for the procurement of thorium-containing sludge for stockpiling by the AEC. A March, 1949 document mentions the "current contract expires June 30, 1949 and will probably be extended for another year. Cost is approximately $50,000 annually." This same document shows that almost 30,000 pounds of thorium oxalate sludge was provided to the AEC that year.

Records further indicate that activities were conducted as early as 1948 and continued on through 1954 when 238 drums of thorium oxalate sludge were sold to the AEC. Inventory records indicate that each year from 1948 to 1951 a minimum of 3,400 kilograms of thorium oxalate sludge were transferred to AEC.

There is a high potential that this site having residual thorium (and potentially thoron) contamination indirectly attributable to AWE activities. Wolff-Alport was a commercial producer of rare earths and only sold thorium process residues to the AEC incidentally. This is to say that thorium contamination existed at the site prior to AEC involvement and the sale of thorium sludge probably reduced the overall site contamination.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent documentation included, DOE Letter; Fiore to Solon; Subject: Notification of no DOE authority for Remedial Action at Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp.; 9/29/87. Attachment: FUSRAP Summary Report and Designation/Elimination Analysis for Wolff-Alport Chemical Corp. Brooklyn, N.Y. 1987.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Wolverine Tube Division  
Detroit, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS:  
Hermes Automotive  
Mamif Corporation  
Division of Calumet Consolidated Copper Company

TIME PERIOD: 1943-1946

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
In 1943, the University of Chicago subcontracted to Wolverine Tube for help in extrusion of metals that were needed as part of the Manhattan Project. Wolverine Tube performed research on the fabrication of slugs and the process of aluminum canning and also experimented with thorium and beryllium.

From available documentation, there is no indication that residual contamination at any level of concern existed after cessation of AWE related work.

Documentation does however state that "Work probably continued through 1955 under sub-contract with Dupont (Savannah River Operations)."

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group. Pertinent document: (ORAU 90/A-16) Report; Radiological Survey at 1411 Central Avenue, Detroit, Michigan; June, 1990

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix A-3  Residual Radioactivity Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Wyckoff Drawn Steel Co.  
Chicago, Illinois

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  
Wyckoff Steel Co.  
Ferranti Steel and Aluminum Company

**TIME PERIOD:**  
1943

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**  
In 1943, the Metallurgical Laboratory conducted experiments of center-less grinding equipment on uranium. Wyckoff Drawn Steel Co. surfaced two tubes and one rod; however, its process was deemed to be too expensive and too slow to be used in production.

Given that only one test was conducted using a limited amount of material, the facility is not likely to be contaminated beyond the date indicated on the DOE website.

In 1987, DOE FUSRAP completed an elimination report, removing this facility from FUSRAP activities.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Wykoff Steel Co.
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

TIME PERIOD: 1950

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Wykoff Steel Co. conducted a one-time test of methods to straighten and finish uranium rods on September 6, 1950. The materials used were only two four-foot uranium rods.

There were no radiological surveys performed during or after the test that were available in the provided documentation. However, given this was a one-time test, the likelihood of significant facility contamination is remote.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
The sources of information used in this evaluation include information on the DOE Worker Advocacy Website and internal AEC/DOE correspondence provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy Group.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
### Appendix B-1 Changes to Beryllium Facility Status

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<td>A.O. Smith</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1948-1950</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Accurate Machine &amp; Tool</td>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>1987-2002</td>
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<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
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<td>Atomics International-Los Angeles</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>BE 1954-1966; DOE 1948-1988; DOE 1988-1999 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Previously listed as ETEC</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Brush Beryllium Co.-Elmore</td>
<td>Elmore</td>
<td>OH</td>
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<td>Brush Beryllium Co.-Lorain</td>
<td>Lorain</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1948</td>
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<td>BWX Technologies</td>
<td>Lynchburg</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>AWE 1959; 1968-1972; 1985-2001; BE 1995-2001</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
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<td>CL Hann Industries</td>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-1994; 2000</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Ceradyne, Inc.</td>
<td>Costa Mesa</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1996</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>City Tool &amp; Die Manufacturing</td>
<td>Santa Clara</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-2001</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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## Appendix B-1 Changes to Beryllium Facility Status

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<td>Eagle Picher Industries Inc</td>
<td>Quapaw</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>1988-1996</td>
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<td>EDM Exotics</td>
<td>Hayward</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1997</td>
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<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Electrofusion Corporation</td>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1986-2002</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
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<td>Energy Technology Engineering Center (Atomics International/Rocketdyne)</td>
<td>Santa Susana (Canoga Park)</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>AWE 1955-1988; BE 1959-1966; DOE 1988-present</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>ETEC is no longer listed as a Beryllium vendor and was, therefore, deleted from this report.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethyl Corporation</td>
<td>Baton Rouge</td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>1967-1971</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Fairchild Hiller Corporation</td>
<td>Farmingdale, Long Island</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1969-1970</td>
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<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Hafer Tool</td>
<td>Oakland</td>
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<td>1964-1985</td>
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<td>Hexcel Products, Inc</td>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1964-1965</td>
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<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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<td>Jerry Carroll Machining, Inc</td>
<td>San Carlos</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-1991</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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</table>
### Appendix B-1 Changes to Beryllium Facility Status

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas City Plant</td>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1949-present</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Deleted from Facility List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebow</td>
<td>Goleta</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1977-2002</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machlett Laboratories</td>
<td>Springdale</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Sciences Corporation</td>
<td>Oak Ridge</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallugical Laboratory</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>AWE 1942-1952; BE 1942-1946; DOE 1984-1987 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philco-Ford Corporation</td>
<td>Newport Beach</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1967-1972</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasanton Tool and Manufacturing</td>
<td>Pleasanton</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1989-2002</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltech Precision</td>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radium Chemical Co</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1943-1950</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951-1952; 1963</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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### Appendix B-1 Changes to Beryllium Facility Status

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Robin Materials</td>
<td>Mountainview</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-1997</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Witherspoon, Inc</td>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Not Included</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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### Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings</th>
<th>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.O. Smith</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1948-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Spark Plug</td>
<td>Flint</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accurate Machine &amp; Tool</td>
<td>Albuquerque</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>1987-2002</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeroprojects, Inc.</td>
<td>West Chester</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1951-1973</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Beryllium Co.</td>
<td>Sarasota</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td>1968;1980s</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomics International-Los Angeles</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>BE 1954-1966; DOE 1948-1988; DOE 1988-1999 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1954 - 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battelle Laboratories-King Avenue</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1986; BE 1947-1961; DOE 1986-present (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beryllium Corp. of America-Hazelton</td>
<td>Hazleton</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1957-1979</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required</td>
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</table>
## Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Summary

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<th>Facility</th>
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<tr>
<td>Beryllium Corp. of America-</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1943-1979</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reading</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beryllium Metals and Chemical Corp.</td>
<td>Bessemer City</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>1963-1969</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beryllium Production Plant-</td>
<td>Luckey</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>BE 1949-1959; DOE 1949-1961; 1992-present (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co.-Cleveland</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>AWE 1942-1943; 1949-1953; BE 1943-1967</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co.-Elmore</td>
<td>Elmore</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1957-2001</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brush Beryllium Co.-Lorain</td>
<td>Lorain</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1943-1948</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed does not indicate that there is a potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>As Listed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burns &amp; Roe, Inc.</td>
<td>Maspeth</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1948 - 1949</td>
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<td>Facility</td>
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<td>Evaluation Findings</td>
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<td>BWX Technologies Lynchburg VA</td>
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<td>AWE 1959; 1968-1972; 1985-2001</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<td>CL Hann Industries San Jose CA</td>
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<td>1985-1994; 2000</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceradyne, Inc. Santa Ana CA</td>
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<td>1977-1988</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceradyne, Inc. Costa Mesa CA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1990-1996</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Tool &amp; Die Manufacturing Santa Clara CA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1985-2001</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clifton Products Co. Painesville OH</td>
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<td>1940-1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory - CANEL Middletown CT</td>
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<td>BE; DOE 1958-1965</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</td>
<td>Evaluation Findings</td>
<td>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</td>
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<td>Coors Porcelain</td>
<td>Golden</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>1947-1975</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<td>Eagle Picher Industries Inc.</td>
<td>Quapaw</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>1988-1996</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<td>EDM Exotics</td>
<td>Hayward</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1997</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrofusion Corporation</td>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1986-2002</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethyl Corporation</td>
<td>Baton Rouge</td>
<td>LA</td>
<td>1967-1971</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<td>Fairchild Hiller Corporation</td>
<td>Farmingdale,</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.</td>
<td>North Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>1944; 1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foote Mineral Co.</td>
<td>East Whiteland Twp.</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>AWE 1940s-1991; BE 1947-uncertain</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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### Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings</th>
<th>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Franklin Institute</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Astrometals</td>
<td>Yonkers</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>General Atomics</td>
<td>La Jolla</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>AWE 1960-1969; BE 1959-1967; DOE 1996-1999 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1959 - 1999</td>
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<td>General Electric Company  (Ohio)</td>
<td>Cincinnati/Evendale</td>
<td>OH 1961-1970; BE 1951-1970</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gerity-Michigan Corp.</td>
<td>Adrian</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1949-1950s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hafer Tool</td>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1965-1985</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hexcel Products, Inc.</td>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jerry Carroll Machining, Inc.</td>
<td>San Carlos</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-1991</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</td>
<td>Evaluation Findings</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kettering Laboratory, University of Cincinnati</td>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>1947-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladish Co.</td>
<td>Cudahy</td>
<td>WI</td>
<td>1959-1965</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebow</td>
<td>Goleta</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1977-2002</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machlett Laboratories</td>
<td>Springdale</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing Sciences Corporation</td>
<td>Oak Ridge</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1992-1994</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Cambridge</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1942-1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McDanel Refractory Co.</td>
<td>Beaver Falls</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metallugical Laboratory</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>IL</td>
<td>AWE 1942-1952; BE 1942-1946; DOE 1984-1987 (Remediation)</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>1942 - 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Beryllia</td>
<td>Haskell</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1968-1973; 1983-1986</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest Machining and Manufacturing</td>
<td>Meridian</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norton Co.</td>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1943-1961</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC) (Apollo)</td>
<td>Apollo</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>AWE 1957-1983; BE 1960-1968</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Metals, Inc.</td>
<td>West Concord</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>BE 1954-1986; AWE 1954-1990</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philco-Ford Corporation</td>
<td>Newport Beach</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1967-1972</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<td>Pleasanton Tool and Manufacturing</td>
<td>Pleasanton</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1989-2002</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltech Precision</td>
<td>Fremont</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radium Chemical Co.</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1943-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>Troy</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1951-1952; 1963</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revere Copper and Brass</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>AWE 1943-1950s; BE 1946-1950</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robin Materials</td>
<td>Mountainview</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1985-1997</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Witherspoon, Inc.</td>
<td>Campbell</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</td>
<td>Evaluation Findings</td>
<td>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speedring Systems, Inc.</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1963; 1968</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speedring, Inc.</td>
<td>Culman</td>
<td>AL</td>
<td>1971-1998</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevens Institute of Technology</td>
<td>Hoboken</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvania Coming Nuclear Corp - Bayside Laboratories</td>
<td>Bayside</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>AWE; BE 1947-1962</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapemation</td>
<td>Scotts Valley</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>1990-1995</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trudeau Foundation</td>
<td>Saranac Lake</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>1950-1957</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pipe and Foundry</td>
<td>Burlington</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B-2 Residual Beryllium Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Period in which weapons-related production occurred</th>
<th>Evaluation Findings</th>
<th>Period of Potential Residual Contamination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Lead Co.</td>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>1950-1967</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Denver Research Institute</td>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>CO</td>
<td>1963-1965</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of North Carolina</td>
<td>Chapel Hill</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>1949 - 1954</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vitro Corporation of America</td>
<td>Chattanooga</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>1957-uncertain</td>
<td>There was insufficient information to make a determination.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolverine Tube Division</td>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>1943-1946</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Additional information is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wymann-Gordon Inc.</td>
<td>Grafton, North Grafton</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>1959 - 1965</td>
<td>Documentation reviewed indicates that there is potential for significant residual contamination outside of the period in which weapons-related production occurred.</td>
<td>Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** A.O. Smith Corporation
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

**TIME PERIOD:** Beryllium Vendor, 1948-1950

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
A.O. Smith studied methods for protecting beryllium carbide-matrix bodies for the Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft (NEPA) project.

**Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:**
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

**Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:**
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the listed dates.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information required
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  AC Spark Plug
Flint, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS:  AC Spark Plug

TIME PERIOD:  Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor: 1946-1947

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
AC Spark Plug performed beryllium work for the AEC. Records indicate that approximately 10 men worked with beryllium at this location in 1947. Information about AC Spark Plug is found in health hazard surveys, shipping reports, and in a MED history. The company continued to receive hundreds of pounds of beryllium for use under government contract into the 1960s. It is possible that some or all of this beryllium was being used for other, non-AEC projects. There was also a small amount of thorium procurement related to AC Spark Plug in the 1946-1947 time frame.

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
The specific name of this site is AC Spark Plug Division of General Motors, Dort Highway Plant. The time period for AEC involvement with this site goes back as far as 1943, but it appears that activities involving beryllium did not start until the Fall of 1946. At this time, they were asked to research the possibility of fabricating beryllium oxide (BeO) into the form of hexagonal bricks. They were to get 5,000 pounds of SP grade BeO from the Brush Beryllium Company. It appears that between Fall, 1946 and February, 1947 small quantities were obtained for the purpose of conducting research to see if the fabrication of the bricks was possible. This research was conducted by three employees in what probably was a specialized area. In February 1947, an AEC site visit was conducted and various recommendations were made including the need for improvements in working conditions and reducing beryllium exposures. By March 1947, the site had received about 900 pounds of BeO. In May 1947, another AEC site visit was conducted, mainly dealing with a safety and health evaluation. After the May 1947 information, there is no further documentation if in fact the site continued with the fabrication project, of specific AEC involvement, or decontamination efforts. There is documentation that in 1961 the site had obtained about 900 pounds of BeO from DOD. It could not be determined how this was used. In the AWE files, there is a report dated December 2000 that states that a 1987 evaluation of the site indicated there was little likelihood of contamination. This probably just refers to the radiation issue, but at least there is no specific mention of beryllium problems.
Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not necessarily support the end date on the Website for this facility as a Beryllium Vendor for two reasons. First, beryllium probably was received long after the end date listed (e.g., at least in 1961), though there is some question whether or not the beryllium was used in the weapons production process through this date. Second, no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the General Motors company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Accurate Machine & Tool
Albuquerque, New Mexico

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1987-2002

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Accurate Machine & Tool provides machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. This work has included the use of beryllium-copper materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined if contract work continues beyond 2002. Either way, there is no specific mention of decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found; it is possible that this site still is a DOE contractor. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Aeroprojects, Inc.
                 West Chester, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS:  Sonabond Ultrasonics

TIME PERIOD:  Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1951-1973

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Beginning in 1951, Aeroprojects Inc. performed research and development for the AEC. The company's work included investigation of the use of ultrasonic energy in the areas of instrumentation, welding, filling of tubes with powders, extrusion, solidification and cleaning. Materials used by the company include alloys and compounds of aluminum, beryllium, mercury, thorium and uranium.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
No specific information was readily available in the Beryllium Vendors files. In the AWE files, it was noted that the exact quantities of the materials mentioned above are not known. It was noted that work for the AEC decreased in the mid-1960s and that the site began doing research and development work under other government contracts. The AEC contracts were closed out in 1973, and there is no mention of decontamination activities. A report shows that workers: (1) in the late 1950s buried welding shavings and rags that were involved in an accident involving beryllium and other materials; (2) in 1966 buried in a concrete container air filters that were used to monitor beryllium and other welding activities; and (3) in 1976 buried in a glass jar small quantities of beryllium wire and other materials. There is a DOE report dated December 2000 that states that a 1991 evaluation of the site indicated there was little likelihood of contamination. This probably just refers to the radiation issue, but at least there is no specific mention of beryllium problems.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The time period for the AEC contracts (1951-1973) is well documented. However, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support the end date on the Website for this facility as a Beryllium Vendor (since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found). Of note is the fact that other government contracts were given to this site during the stated period in which weapons-related production occurred. It is not clear, though, what these contracts involved and if they pertained to beryllium use. However, as mentioned above, DOE conducted a “site” evaluation in 1991. This company could not be located in the yellow pages on the internet.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3    Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:    American Beryllium Co.
                  Sarasota, Florida

TIME PERIOD:      Beryllium Vendor, 1968;1980s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Records, including purchase orders and shipping/receipt records, indicate that American Beryllium manufactured parts for Dow/Rocky Flats in 1968 and for Y-12 in the 1980s. While none of the purchase orders mention beryllium, the name of the vendor suggests that it was involved in beryllium work.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
OSHA measured beryllium at this location sometime between May 1979 and December 1999. No other records pertaining to beryllium could be specifically identified.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. It is not clear that just because the company name mentions beryllium that it was involved in beryllium work for AEC/DOE. There is no current listing for this site or their parent company, Loral, Inc., in the yellow pages on the internet. However, OSHA did conduct monitoring at this site sometime in the last 20 years, and there is a company of this name in Akron, Ohio that currently does business with Oak Ridge National Laboratories.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  
Atomsics International - Los Angeles County  
Los Angeles County, California

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**  
Energy Systems Group

**TIME PERIOD:**  

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

*Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:*
The Atomics International Division of North American Aviation consolidated its nuclear research and development program, which began in 1948, to the Canoga Park area in 1956. The nuclear related work included a nuclear fuel fabrication facility which produced a variety of different fuel elements for test reactors, a radiochemistry laboratory, and a mass spectrometer laboratory. The mass spectrometer laboratory analyzed non-fissile materials irradiated in DOE and international reactors.

Covered nuclear related work by Atomics International in Los Angeles County took place at Downey, on DeSoto Avenue and in the Vanowen Building.

AEC-sponsored work involved the manufacture of beryllium-containing parts at the sites between 1954 and 1966. Decontamination and decommissioning of the sites was completed in two phases, initially in 1985 and later in 1999.

*Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:*
There were very few documents that could be located in either the Beryllium Vendor or AWE files pertaining to beryllium. A beryllium inventory dated 1949 and a document dealing with beryllium hazards was all that could be found. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. Even though DOE remediation ended in 1999, there is no indication this included beryllium decontamination.

*Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:*
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the company (Parent company is Boeing-Rocketdyne) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1954 - 1999
FACILITY NAME: Battelle Laboratories - King Avenue
Columbus, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Battelle Columbus Laboratories-BCL
Battelle Memorial Institute-BMI

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer, 1943-1986; Beryllium Vendor,
1947-1961; Department of Energy, 1986-present (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On Worker Advocacy Website:
From 1943 to 1986, Battelle Memorial Institute performed atomic energy research and development as well as beryllium work for the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. The Battelle Laboratories have two separate locations in Columbus - King Avenue and West Jefferson. Battelle's research supported the government's fuel and target fabrication program, including fabrication of uranium and fuel elements, reactor development, submarine propulsion, fuel reprocessing, and the safe use of reactor vessels and piping.

The following activities were performed at the King Avenue location: processing and machining enriched, natural, and depleted uranium and thorium; fabricating fuel elements; analyzing radiochemicals; and studying power metallurgy. Beryllium work was conducted from 1947 until at least 1961.

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
The nonspecific words mentioned above “beryllium work” could not be further defined by a review of the available records. The following passages were noted: (1) This project concerned itself with developing methods for fabrication of beryllium oxide hexagons, research in making beryllium metal of high purity and the alloying of beryllium with uranium; (2) Research is conducted to furnish information on beryllium; (3) General metallurgical research and development is conducted; and (4) Beryllium and its compounds were supplied to the Manhattan Engineer District. The following information also was noted: (1) Beryllium deliveries were made in 1945/46; (2) There was a March 1947 beryllium inventory; (3) There was a February 1948 request to the AEC for various beryllium compounds; (4) Beryllium fabrication was briefly mentioned in an April 1948 document; (5) There was an August 1949 request to the AEC for beryllium compounds; and (6) There was a March 1950 inventory of beryllium stocks. No information was found on beryllium beyond 1950 versus the date of 1961 mentioned above. In the 1986 DOE elimination report, beryllium concerns were not raised.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The fact that this facility is listed as an AWE facility between 1943 and 1986 and then is classified as a DOE facility indicates that work was being performed for the weapons production program during the entire time period.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Corp. of America-Hazelton
Hazelton, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cabot Corporation
Beryllium Corp.of America-Ashmore
Berylco
Kawecki-Berylco

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1957-1979

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) contracted with the facility for the production of beryllium metal, beryllium oxide, and beryllium powder. The AEC contracted with the facility for the refining and fabrication of beryllium. Later, the facility produced beryllium blanks for the Y-12 plant and Dow (Rocky Flats).

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Advocacy Group:
Very little information about this facility was found. There was one reference in March 1960 to this site’s specific activity at that time. It was stated that the operation included production of high grade metal and oxide from beryl ore, and the metal was used for vacuum cast billets and sintered compacts. Also, final machining of the metal was performed there. Two references were found (June 1961;1970) that worker exposures to beryllium were extremely high and a serious problem. No information is presented regarding decontamination efforts after the MED/AEC contract period, nor is there any documentation that this work was conducted in areas separate from work for other customers.

Summary of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company (Parent company is Kawecki-Berylco) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
### Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

| FACILITY NAME: | Beryllium Corp. of America-Reading  
Reading, Pennsylvania |
|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ALSO KNOWN AS: | Kawecki-Berylco  
Berylco  
NGK Metals Corp.  
Cabot Corporation  
Beryllium Corp. of America-Tuckerton |
| TIME PERIOD:  | Beryllium Vendor, 1943-1979 |

#### DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
In 1947, the Beryllium Corporation plant at Reading produced highly distilled and pure beryllium oxide on a small scale for the AEC. By 1960, the plant focused on alloy and oxide work. In 1961, the plant supplied beryllium parts to the Y-12 plant and produced beryllium powder for the AEC from government inventory beryllium ingots. Although all major Berylco Contracts (beyond 1961) and purchase orders reviewed to date show that the final product shipped from Hazelton, it has been clarified that but for the alloy and oxide work performed in Reading, the contracts and purchase orders fulfilled for the AEC by Hazelton could not have been completed.

**Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Advocacy Group:**
Very little information regarding this facility was found. There was one reference in March 1960 to this site’s specific activity at that time. It was stated that the operation included alloying and oxide work. Two references were found (June 1961; 1970) indicating that worker exposures to beryllium were extremely high and a serious problem. There was no indication that the MED/AEC contract work was conducted in an area separate from beryllium production for other customers and there was no information about decontamination activities after the contact periods.

**Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:**
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company (Parent company is Kawecki-Berylco; also NGK Metals is still located in Reading) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities
**Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities**

| FACILITY NAME: | Beryllium Metals and Chemical Corp.  
|               | Bessemer City, North Carolina |
| ALSO KNOWN AS: | BERMET |
| TIME PERIOD:   | Beryllium Vendor, 1963-1969 |

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
Purchase orders from Y-12 indicate that Beryllium Metals and Chemical Corp. (BERMET) did some beryllium work for Y-12, beginning in 1963 and continuing at least through 1965. Beyond that, records indicate BERMET was responsive to an invitation to submit 100 pounds of beryllium metal to the AEC in 1968 for purposes of qualifying for further work, as part of the AEC's beryllium metal study group. According to a May, 1969 memo, BERMET chose not to participate beyond this initial 100 pound qualifying round.

**Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Advocacy Group:**
It appears that the specific time frame for BERMET’s involvement in the beryllium metal study group was March 1968. Between July 1964 and April 1965, BERMET bought about 4,000 pounds of beryllium scrap from the AEC. The information about the work for Y-12 could not be confirmed.

**Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:**
It is not clear that this site actually processed beryllium for the AEC but rather just bought scrap metal from the AEC and were considering supplying beryllium metal to the AEC. The fact that they ever were actually ever an AEC/DOE contractor is not at all clear. This company could not be located in the yellow pages on the internet.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Beryllium Production Plant-Brush Luckey Plant
Luckey, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Beryllium
Luckey Site

1992-present (remediation)

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
From 1942 through 1945, National Lead operated a magnesium processing facility on the
Luckey site for the U.S. Government. In 1949, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) built a
beryllium production facility at the site. The government built the plant to replace the
production that was lost when the Brush Beryllium Loraine plant was destroyed by fire. The
Brush Beryllium Company (now Brush Wellman,) under contract to the AEC, produced
beryllium pebbles at this site until 1958. Records indicate that the facility produced between
40,000 and 144,000 pounds of beryllium. In 1959, the AEC contracted with Brush to close
down the facility. The site was sold to the Vulcan Materials Company in 1961.
In 1951, AEC sent approximately 1,000 tons of radioactively contaminated scrap metal to the
Luckey site. This material was to be used by the Diamond Magnesium Company to resume
magnesium processing at the idle facility. Former Brush Wellman employees report that the
magnesium facility never resumed operations; however, some records indicate that the facility
operated in the 1950s under contract by the General Services Administration (GSA). The
radioactively contaminated scrap metal remained stored at the site.

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
In 1951, there is a reference to the fact that there were high worker exposures at this site and
several documented cases of beryllium disease. The 1991/1992 FUSRAP report does not
mention anything about beryllium decontamination efforts.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The fact that this facility is listed as a DOE facility between 1949 and the present indicates that
work was being performed for the weapons production program during the entire time period.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.-Cleveland  
Cleveland, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Wellman Co.  
Motor Wheel Corp.  
Magnesium Reduction


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Brush Cleveland facility conducted research on a process for producing uranium metal (1942-1943) through magnesium reduction of molten green salt (uranium tetrafluoride). The facility later conducted research and development with uranium (1949-1953) and extruded thorium billets into slugs which were placed in Hanford production reactors (1952-1953). The Brush Cleveland facility also produced beryllium metal and beryllium oxide for the MED (1943-1946) and later for the AEC (1947-1965?).

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
There was not a lot of additional information in the Beryllium Vendor files. References were made to high levels of worker exposures to beryllium. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the MED/AEC work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the MED/AEC contracts were terminated. However, in the AWE files, there is a report dated December 2000 that states that a 1987 evaluation of the site indicated there was little likelihood of contamination, but it does not specifically discuss beryllium.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
In regard to the periods in which weapons-related production occurred (1943-1967) for the site as a Beryllium Vendor, the documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company (Brush Wellman is current company name) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.-Elmore
Elmore, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1957-2001

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Brush Beryllium plant in Elmore, Ohio was built in 1953. It began producing beryllium for the AEC in 1957 after operations at the Brush Luckey, Ohio, facility ended. (Prior to 1957 it produced beryllium for the commercial market only.) The plant supplied beryllium to the Y-12 plant in 1990 and Brush purchase orders show that shipments from its Elmore location continued to Los Alamos and Sandia through April 2001.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Very little additional information was available in the Beryllium Vendor files. References were made to high levels of worker exposures to beryllium. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the AEC/DOE work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention in the Beryllium Vendor files of decontamination activities after the DOE contracts were terminated, if in fact there is no longer DOE work there (i.e., beyond 2001). However, in the AWE files, there is a report dated December 2000 that states a 1987 evaluation of the site indicated there was little likelihood of contamination.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The listed period could well go through the present, rather than just 2001, if there are still DOE contracts, and because the documentation reviewed does not indicate any beryllium decontamination efforts in 2001. If in fact, DOE work was terminated in 2001, it might be possible to determine current residual contamination levels by site visits and review of current records. Since this company (Brush Wellman is the current company name) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities
FACILITY NAME: Brush Beryllium Co.- Loraine
Loraine, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1943-1948

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Loraine plant produced beryllium metal and beryllium oxide for the MED and the AEC. The plant was destroyed by fire in 1948.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Little information is available in the Beryllium Vendor files. However, in the AWE files, there is a report dated December 2000 that states that a 1987 evaluation of the site indicated there was little likelihood of contamination. It is not clear what was evaluated since the facility was destroyed in 1948.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The listed period should remain the same, unless there is some information forthcoming that would allow firefighters and cleanup workers to be included because of beryllium exposures during these activities. The parent company (Brush Wellman) still exists for possible record review if needed.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is little potential for significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
FACILITY NAME: Burns & Roe, Inc.
Maspeth, New York

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1949

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Documentation indicates that Burns & Roe did at least one test run with beryl in the ore chlorination process and during this run, the New York Operations Office Health and Safety Laboratory closely monitored air samples.

Information Obtained From Files Of DOE Advocacy Group:
The contract for the pilot effort was signed in 1948. Nothing was found indicating that additional work was given to the company after the test run. The air samples that were taken during the test run were very low, well below whatever evaluation criteria they were using at that time. No additional documentation was found in either the Beryllium Vendor or AWE files. Nothing was mentioned about decontamination activities or where the AEC work was conducted in relation to activities for other customers.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The time frame for the beryllium work probably should be 1948-1949, rather than just 1949. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. No listing for this facility could be found in the yellow pages on the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1948 - 1949
Appendix B-3 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: BWX Technologies, Inc.- Virginia
Lynchburg, Virginia

ALSO KNOWN AS: Tubular Products Div., Lone Star Tech
Babcock & Wilcox-Virginia
BWXT

Beryllium Vendor, 1995-2001

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Babcock and Wilcox Company's Nuclear Facilities Plant in Lynchburg, VA, performed work for a variety of AEC and DOE projects. Babcock and Wilcox Company's Nuclear Facilities Plant in Lynchburg, VA, participated in the AEC's Oxide Pellet Fabrication Program, which was managed by the New York Operations Office. Records indicate that shipments of enriched uranium were made to and from the Fernald facility during the years 1968-1972. The company also recovered highly enriched uranium from weapons scrap received from the DOE's Oak Ridge facility between 1985 and 1996. In 1997 the Babcock & Wilcox Company facility in Lynchburg, VA became the BWX Technologies facility. From 1998 to 2000, the company fulfilled a contract for the recovery of enriched uranium from scrap materials containing beryllium. The Lynchburg plant also participated in a DOE-sponsored program called Project Sapphire, under which the plant had responsibility from 1995 to 2001 for downblending enriched uranium obtained from the government of Kazakhstan.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: C.L. Hann Industries
San Jose, California


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
C. L. Hann Industries provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. This work involved beryllium materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required
FACILITY NAME: Ceradyne, Inc.
Santa Ana, California


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website: Ceradyne provided beryllium parts, and possibly powder, to the Y-12 plant.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There essentially was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. There was one reference to the listed time period and it was just a note jotted on a piece of paper. Also, there were three purchase/delivery orders for this time. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The time period for the contracts (1977-1988) is not well documented. Otherwise, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Ceradyne, Inc.
Costa Mesa, California

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1990-1996

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Ceradyne sold beryllium-graphite composite materials to the Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge between 1990 and 1996.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: City Tool & Die Manufacturing  
Santa Clara, California
TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1985-2001

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
City Tool is a precision machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. The work involved machining beryllium-copper materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. The correct name of the company is City Tool Die & Manufacturing, Inc. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Clifton Products Co.
Painesville, Ohio

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1940-1952

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
In the 1940s, Clifton had at least six large contracts with the AEC to supply beryllium products. By 1949, at least eight beryllium-related deaths had occurred at Clifton.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There is a well documented file on this facility in regard to the production and process operations that were ongoing during the MED/AEC contract periods. (This site was one of the major producers for MED/AEC.) This includes information on workplace conditions and worker exposures to beryllium. It apparently was a very hazardous place to work in regard to beryllium exposures because of high exposure levels and documented cases of beryllium disease and fatalities. The contracts did cease in 1952; however, a specific start date was not found, except that work was in progress in 1942. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. In 1952, after the contracts were terminated, a beryllium survey was conducted. Exposure levels were significantly lower than during production operations, but beryllium contamination was detected. It was mentioned that beryllium contaminated equipment was being removed from the site. As reported in the AWE files, when DOE conducted an evaluation for this site in 1987, there was no mention of a specific site visit and there is no specific information about decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The time frame for beryllium work listed on the Website (1940-1952) may be correct based on these files. However, the documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing in the yellow pages on the internet for a company with this name.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory-CANEL
Middletown, Connecticut

**ALSO KNOWN AS:**
Pratt and Whitney Corp.
Connecticut Advanced Nuclear Engineering Lab.
United Aircraft Corp.

**TIME PERIOD:** Beryllium Vendor; Department of Energy, 1958-1965

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
The Connecticut Aircraft Nuclear Engine Laboratory (CANEL) worked on an AEC program to develop a nuclear reactor with which to propel aircraft. Specifically, CANEL worked on developing high temperature materials, fuel elements, and liquid metal components and coolants. CANEL consisted of a hot laboratory facility, a nuclear physics laboratory, a fuel element laboratory, a nuclear materials research and development laboratory, and other buildings. The AEC Annual report for 1959 indicates that approximately $4 million in AEC equipment was at CANEL. Plutonium, mixed fission products, and probably uranium were handled at CANEL. A former ORNL employee who had worked at CANEL stated that beryllium metal and oxide in a powdered form were also handled at CANEL. Although President Kennedy canceled the aircraft nuclear propulsion program in 1961, AEC work apparently continued at CANEL until 1965.

**Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:**
No information was located in the Beryllium Vendor files. The only mention of beryllium was found in the AWE files and it just pertained to the above mentioned comment by a former ORNL employee.

**Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:**
The periods in which weapons-related production occurred on the Website of 1958-1965 are apparently appropriate for the site as a DOE contractor. No information was found on whether or not beryllium should be included in these listed dates. Therefore, more information is needed in regard to the periods in which weapons-related production occurred for the site as a Beryllium Vendor. Since this facility (Pratt & Whitney) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.
FACILITY NAME: Coors Porcelain  
Golden, Colorado  
ALSO KNOWN AS: Coors Ceramic  
TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1947-1975  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Coors Porcelain performed beryllium work for the Atomic Energy Commission. An early AEC document makes reference to Coors Porcelain’s involvement in beryllium work during the period from 1947-1948. Coors Porcelain had an earlier contract with the Clinton Engineer Works but it is unclear whether beryllium was involved.

From 1957 through 1964, the company worked with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on Project Pluto, a project undertaken to determine the feasibility of using heat from reactors as the energy source for ramjet engines. Coors developed fuel elements from beryllium ceramics for the project, which began in 1957 and ended in 1964.

Coors Porcelain performed other beryllium work for DOE after the completion of Project Pluto. A 1993 health study of Coors workers indicated that the company produced beryllia ceramics though 1975, presumably for the AEC/DOE.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
There was no information found in the Beryllium Vendor files; all available information is located in the AWE files. The Website information provides an accurate summary of the AWE files. Of note is the fact that the files show a break in AEC/DOE work between 1948 and 1958, but the period in which weapons-related production occurred is shown as all inclusive. Air samples for beryllium were taken in 1961 and the levels were low at that time. In the 1987 DOE evaluation of this site, including a site visit, no mention is made of beryllium contamination. It is important to note that the health study mentioned above does show that workers from this facility had chronic beryllium disease. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The documentation does not support the period in which weapons-related production occurred (1947-1975) if in fact there was a break in the AEC/DOE work at the site. Regardless, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support the end date on the Website since no
record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the Coors Company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:   Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
                 Quapaw, Oklahoma

TIME PERIOD:    Beryllium Vendor, 1988-1996

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Eagle-Picher's Quapaw, Oklahoma plant machined beryllium-alloy parts for the Department of
Energy's Y-12 facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, during the 1980s and the 1990s.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be
determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of
the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of
decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of
beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record
reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual
contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: EDM Exotics
Hayward, California

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1990-1997

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
EDM Exotics provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California, working with beryllium-copper materials using an electrical discharging process.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Electrofusion Corporation
Fremont, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Brush Wellman Electrofusion Products

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1986-2002

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Electrofusion Corporation provided beryllium products to Sandia National Laboratory, California. Electrofusion was acquired by Brush Wellman in 1990 and is currently part of the Brush Wellman Engineered Products Division.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined if contract work continues beyond 2002. Either way, there is no specific mention of decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found; it is possible that this site still is a DOE contractor. Since this company (Brush Wellman) still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.
FACILITY NAME: Ethyl Corporation
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1967-1971

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory purchased beryllium from the Ethyl Corporation, Baton Rouge, LA. The beryllium was used in laboratory research work.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing for this location in the yellow pages on the internet, but since the Ethyl Corporation still exists, record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Fairchild Hiller Corporation
               Farmingdale, Long Island, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Republic Aviation Division
                Fairchild Industries


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Republic Aviation Division of the Fairchild Hiller Corporation produced beryllium products

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be
determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of
the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of
decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of
beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing for this location in the yellow
pages on the internet, but since the Fairchild Hiller Corporation still exists, record reviews could
be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual
contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.  
North Chicago, Illinois  
TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1944; 1950  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. performed beryllium work for the Manhattan Engineer District under Contract No. W-7425 eng-27 for the fabrication of beryllium into sintered shapes and for the manufacture of 600 bricks for delivery to Los Alamos. Fansteel also worked with "approximately 150 pounds of nominal grade beryllium carbide powder" for use in the Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft (NEPA) project. This work is reported to have occurred between April and June of 1950.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
No information was located in the Beryllium Vendor files. In the AWE files, a report was filed in December 2000 describing that an evaluation of the site (without a site visit) had been conducted in 1987 and contamination (undefined) was not listed as a problem. A more specific description of the site and its operations also was documented in these files. The site was under contract with the University of Chicago from June 1944 through June 1945. The facility conducted studies and experimental investigations and developed processes for making chemicals and fabricating metal powder. They were the sole source of columbium metal for MED/AEC. Tantalum, tungsten and beryllium products were also purchased. No information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility, away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The period in which weapons-related production occurred looks like it should be 1944-1945, rather than just 1944 as listed on the Website. Regardless, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is a company in the Chicago area that has a similar name. If this company is relevant, then record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Foote Mineral Co.
East Whitehead Twp., Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Exton Cyrus Foote Mineral Co.
Formil
Shieldalloy Metallurgical
Cyprus Foote Mineral Company

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer, 1940s-1991; Beryllium Vendor, 1947-uncertain

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
This Foote Mineral facility produced monazite sands on a pilot plant scale, produced zirconium metal, separated hafnium from zirconium, produced lithium chemical, processed lithium metal and other ores, developed inorganic fluxes for the metal industry, and crushed and sized minerals. When the facility closed in 1991, the site included more than 50 buildings and process areas.

The facility may have rolled some uranium metal during the mid 1940s.

Foote Mineral Company was also a major importer of beryl ore from Brazil. Under contract to the Atomic Energy Commission, Foote Mineral Company procured 500 tons of beryl ore in 1947.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Little additional information was available in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It is not clear that this facility closed in 1991. It appears that is when the DOE contracts ended since there are documents stating the site was still in operation through 1998. The only reference to beryllium is the purchase of beryl ore by the AEC in 1947. The DOE elimination report of 1987 indicates there would have been little likelihood of contamination at that time. No documentation is provided about decontamination efforts after the AEC/DOE contracts, nor is information provided regarding where the AEC/DOE work was conducted in relation to work for other customers.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
It appears the periods in which weapons-related production occurred on the Website (i.e., 1940s-1991) would encompass the radiation and beryllium contract time frames. However, it is not really clear that this facility should be considered a Beryllium Vendor in the sense that other sites are, since it just purchased beryl ore for the AEC. If it is considered a Beryllium Vendor,
there is no indication that the beryllium time frame should go beyond the one year of 1947. Therefore, there is confusion about the listed dates for beryllium work; more information is needed to determine the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. Additional records may be available from the parent company, Cyprus Foote Mineral Company.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Franklin Institute
                 Boston, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD:    Beryllium Vendor, 1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Franklin Institute conducted a study for the Division of Reactor Development in 1962. No
information has been located on this facility to date.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Nothing was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. In the AWE files, there are several documents
relating to contracts with the AEC in the 1950s and 1960s dealing with reactor and rotor
bearings. No mention is made of beryllium or work that would have involved radiation
exposures.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
It is not clear whether this facility should be on either the AWE or Beryllium Vendor list. More
information is needed to determine the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
Since the Institute still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: General Astrometals
Yonkers, New York

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1963-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
General Astrometals supplied beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant and to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. It also purchased beryllium chips and contaminated powder from Oak Ridge.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
In a September 1965 trip report, the AEC was considering further production work for this company; however, it never came to pass. In the trip report it is mentioned that this company was being supported by Anaconda and was also doing other beryllium work with NASA, Franklin Institute, Watertown Arsenal and Pratt and Whitney. It also is stated the facility was crowded and limited in terms of production. No specific information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. However, it appears that all beryllium work might have been done in one area because of the crowding. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing of the General Astrometals Company in the yellow pages on the internet; however, maybe records would be available from Anaconda.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: General Atomics  
La Jolla, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: GA  
Division of General Dynamics  
John Jay Hopkins Laboratory for Pure and Applied Science


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
General Atomics was one of a number of private contractors that processed unirradiated scrap for the Atomic Energy Commission in the 1960s. In addition, the Hot Cell Facility was used for numerous post-irradiation examinations of Department fuels, structural materials, reactor dosimetry materials, and instrumentation. The Department-sponsored activities at the General Atomics Hot Cell Facility primarily supported the High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor and the Reduced-Enrichment Research Test Reactor programs. In December 1994, General Atomics notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of California Department of Health Services of its intent to cease operations in the Hot Cell Facility.

General Atomics was also the operating contractor for the AEC's Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR). General Atomics manufactured EBOR fuel elements (UO2-BeO) on site and examined them in the site's hot cell.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
These files substantiated most of the information on the Website regarding beryllium work and potential exposures. It appears that the research effort regarding EBOR can be better defined. Initial planning started in late 1950s, active work was ongoing in 1964, and the project was terminated in the Fall/Winter of 1966. No information was found regarding whether the EBOR work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from other activities. There is a considerable amount of discussion about decontamination activities for radiation, but little about beryllium.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. Not considering the beryllium residual contamination issue, it appears that the periods in which weapons-related production occurred for the facility as a Beryllium Vendor should go from the late 1950s to 1966. However, since no evidence of decontamination could be found, the potential for significant residual contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred, specifically between 1969 and 1996. Another issue is that
it is not clear what the total periods in which weapons-related production occurred should be because of the break in AEC/DOE work between the contracts and the remediation activities. There is no listing of the General Atomics Company in the yellow pages of the internet; however, additional records probably could be obtained from General Dynamics.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1959 - 1999
FACILITY NAME: General Electric Company-Ohio
Cincinnati/Evendale, Ohio

ALSO KNOWN AS: GE Evendale
GE Cincinnati
GE Lockland
Air Force Plant 36

Beryllium Vendor, 1951-1970

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Evendale Plant's major mission is to build aircraft engines. The AEC used this facility to
work with a variety of radioactive materials, including uranium and thorium. This facility was
also involved in the refining or fabrication of beryllium or beryllium oxide.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
This was a facility that was operated by the AEC and the Air Force. The period in which
weapons-related production occurred probably should be 1951-1970. Very little information on
beryllium was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. In the AWE files, it was stated that the
facility was involved in the refining or fabrication of beryllium or beryllium oxide, but no details
were given. In 1970, the facility was turned over to the Air Force, since the AEC work
terminated. It was mentioned that the facility was still contaminated with radioactive material at
this time, but that the AEC would not conduct any decontamination activities. The Air Force
was to take charge of the facility under a AEC-DMC license. Beryllium contamination was not
mentioned at this time.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
It is not at all clear what beryllium work was conducted at this facility. Therefore, more
information is needed to determine the listed dates for the site as a Beryllium Vendor.
Additional records need to be obtained from the Air Force and General Electric. Listing this site
as a General Electric facility seems to be a misnomer. The proper designation of this facility
probably should be Air Force Plant 36. Additional records could be obtained from the Air Force
and GE.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.
FACILITY NAME: Gerity-Michigan Corp.  
           Adrian, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Successor to Canton Drop Forging and Manufacturing

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1949-1950s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Gerity-Michigan operated a 2200/550 ton tube and rod extrusion press and performed the first  
extrusion of beryllium there on May 11, 1949 for the AEC. Documentation, specifically  
accountability reports, indicates that work continued there through the 1950s.  

Gerity-Michigan was also under contract to the AEC to put extrusion presses into operating  
condition at the Adrian, Michigan facility.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
Information was found for a contract with AEC to conduct extrusion of beryllium and other  
reactor materials for April 11, 1949-November 30, 1949. No other contract information was  
found for later dates, but there was an inventory for beryllium dated June 30, 1950. It is not  
clear whether this inventory pertained to this facility or to work being done at MIT. No specific  
information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were  
conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. Concerns about  
national security were mentioned in one document regarding how and where the beryllium work  
should be done. There is no specific mention of any decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
It is not clear that the listing on the Website for the period in which weapons-related production  
ocurred should go to the “1950s” since the latest document that was found was only dated June  
1950. The documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date since no record of  
beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing of the Gerity-Michigan Company  
in the yellow pages on the internet; however, information may be available from MIT, since  
there seemed to be a connection between the two groups at that time.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Hafer Tool  
Oakland, California

**TIME PERIOD:** Beryllium Vendor, 1965-1985

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Hafer Tool is a machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. Some of this work involved the use of beryllium materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**  
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Hexcel Products, Inc. Berkeley, California

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1964-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Hexcel produced a small number of corrugated beryllium sheet panels for the AEC in the mid-1960s. The finishing process involved vapor blasting and scrubbing of the beryllium panels with steel wool and cleansing powder. At the termination of the experimental project in 1965, the company sent the sheet panels and all related equipment to the AEC's Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing of Hexcel Products, Inc. in Berkeley, California in the yellow pages of the internet; however, there is a listing for this company in other cites in California.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Jerry Carroll Machining, Inc.
               San Carlos, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Electrocut Pacific


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Jerry Carroll Machining provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory,
California, including the machining of beryllium-copper materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be
determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of
the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of
decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of
beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record
reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual
contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:**  Kettering Laboratory, University of Cincinnati  
             Cincinnati, Ohio

**TIME PERIOD:**  Beryllium Vendor, 1947-1950

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

*Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:*  
The AEC funded a Kettering Laboratory researcher's investigation of the biological effects of beryllium and its compounds. Kettering was also working on analytical methodology for beryllium for the AEC.

*Information Obtained from Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:*  
No additional information could be found.

*Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:*  
The analytical chemistry and biological research probably was being conducted in laboratories where other similar research was under way. Therefore, residual contamination probably would be difficult to evaluate. The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Records may be available from the University.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**  
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Ladish Co.  
Cudahy, Wisconsin

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1959-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website: 
Ladish supplied beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant.

Information Obtained from Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group: 
No specific information about the exact work that was done, contract dates, facility description, or decontamination efforts was found. However, there is a brochure in the files about the company which is dated 2001. Based on this brochure, the company has been in business since 1905 and has conducted extensive work in metal working.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates: 
More information is needed to determine the specific period in which weapons-related production occurred. Regardless, the documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the company still exists, records might be available to help in this regard.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES: 
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS: 
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION 
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Lebow
Goleta, California

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1977-2002

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Lebow Company produces ultra-thin metal foils for Sandia National Laboratory, California, some of which contain beryllium.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined if contract work continues beyond 2002. Either way, there is no specific mention of decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found; it is possible that this site still is a DOE contractor. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.
FACILITY NAME: Machlett Laboratories  
Springdale, Connecticut  

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium, Vendor, 1952  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Beginning in the 1940s, Machlett Laboratories worked with beryllium in its commercial business as a supplier of x-ray and electron vacuum tubes. Machlett produced a handful of brazed beryllium window assemblies in 1952 under an AEC contract.  

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.  

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. There is no listing for this company in the yellow pages of the internet.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.  

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Manufacturing Sciences Corporation
Oak Ridge, Tennessee

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1992-1994

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Manufacturing Sciences Corporation performed beryllium work for Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3    Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:    Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS:    MIT, Hood Building

TIME PERIOD:    Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1942-1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was one of the institutions that contributed to early nuclear physics research in the United States. In addition to their research efforts, they also sent scientists to work at Los Alamos. For example, in 1942, MIT experimented on the process of melting and casting uranium metal, extracted uranium from low grade ores, studied the element beryllium, and experimented with nuclear propulsion systems. MIT also explored the coordination and the quality control of these processes. The building in which the research was done, was demolished in 1963.

Records indicate that workers at MIT suffered from beryllium-related illnesses as early as 1947.

Information Obtained from Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
There were no documents found in the Beryllium Vendor files. They were all found in the AWE files. The elimination report filed by DOE in December, 2000, based on the DOE evaluation in 1986, indicates that the MED/AEC period is 1942-1958. This report also indicates there was no contamination in 1986. A more detailed description of beryllium activities was found in a May 1947 document. It indicates that MIT was studying the characteristics of beryllium metal and attempting to make a satisfactory beryllium-uranium alloy. In addition beryllium oxide crucibles were made for use in the MIT activities. There were apparently over-exposures to beryllium because a good deal of the AWE files dealt with worker claims for beryllium disease. These cases supposedly were the result of the fact that the work had been conducted in buildings scattered throughout MIT. The operations were consolidated into one building (Hood Building?) in the Fall of 1946 that had been “carefully ventilated.” Other documents corroborate the fact that the last MED/AEC work was completed in 1958, and the contractor moved out at that point with the building remaining vacant until it was demolished in 1963. There is no mention of any decontamination activities in the other areas of MIT where beryllium work was being conducted or in 1958 at the Hood Building.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine what the listed dates should be for this site as a Beryllium Vendor. Regardless of the beryllium residual contamination issue, there is confusion about dates and locations of the beryllium work. The end date for the Hood Building could be
1958 when the contracts were terminated or 1963 when the building was demolished. An argument could be made for 1963 since people probably were in and out of the building between 1958 and 1963, and there were demolition workers there in 1963. The start date for the Hood Building could be 1946, while the encompassing dates for the other areas of MIT where beryllium work was conducted could be 1942-1946. Records may be available from the Institute.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: McDanel Refractory Co.
Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania

ALSO KNOWN AS: Vesuvius McDanel
Vesuvius Division of Cookson Group

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1940s

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Manhattan District History indicates that the McDanel Refractory was used to fabricate
oddly shaped beryllium crucibles or beryllium crucible stopper rods for the Manhattan Project,
but was not used on a large-scale production basis.

Information Obtained from Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
No additional specific information about the exact work that was done, facility description or
decontamination efforts was found. It does appear that the contracts for this site were from the
mid-1940s.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date since no record of
beryllium decontamination could be found. The correct name for this site is McDaniel and not
McDanel. No listing for this facility was found in the yellow pages of the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual
contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Metallurgical Laboratory  
Chicago, Illinois

ALSO KNOWN AS: Eckhardt Hall  
West Stands  
New Chem. Lab and Annex  
Ryerson Physical Lab  
Kent Chem. Lab


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The University of Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory was involved in early uranium metallurgical work in 1942-1943. The first self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction was achieved at the university in a "pile" called the Chicago Pile 1, built by Enrico Fermi and his Met Lab colleagues.

The University of Chicago continued to perform research and metallurgical work for Atomic Energy Commission until the early 1950s. The University of Chicago site includes seven buildings that were associated with Manhattan Engineer District/Atomic Energy Commission nuclear research and development between 1942 and 1952. These include the new Chemistry Laboratory and Annex, West Stands, Ryerson Physical Laboratory, Eckhart Hall, Kent Chemical Laboratory, Jones Chemical Laboratory, and Ricketts Laboratory. Cleanup of the sites where this work was performed was completed in 1987.

Beryllium use at the Metallurgical Laboratory is linked with experimental studies in determining whether to use graphite, heavy water or beryllium as a pile moderator. Graphite was the ultimate choice for Fermi's pile.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
These files confirmed the general research and development work that is presented on the Website. There is no mention that the work was performed in separate areas from other research and development. It was also mentioned that there was beryllium disease and deaths in workers at this site in the 1940s/1950s. The final FUSRAP report, dated 1989, does not mention beryllium decontamination. These files indicate the DOE remediation took place from 1982-1987, not 1984-1987.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Records might be available from the University of Chicago.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
1942 - 1987
FACILITY NAME: National Beryllia
Haskell, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: Cercom Quality Products
General Ceramics


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
National Beryllia performed a demonstration of its capabilities for production of parts for Y-12 beginning in late 1968, with delivery in March 1969. Additionally, National Beryllia delivered some parts to Union Carbide (Y-12), though the records indicate that there was only partial performance for this purchase order, which was terminated in April of 1973.

Between 1984-1986 the National Beryllia division of General Ceramics had a series of purchase orders through Martin Marietta, which was operating Y-12 at the time. These contracts involved the shipment of beryllium from BrushWellman to National Beryllia with Y-12 being the ultimate customer.

Information Obtained from Files Of DOE Worker Advocacy Group:
The documents in the Beryllium Vendor files indicated that an AEC contract to produce beryllium parts was let in April 1969 after a successful demonstration project. This contract was in place until Fall 1973, rather than the April 1973 date listed on the Website. In terminating the contract, AEC agreed in a “SETTLEMENT” to pay for beryllium decontamination to meet EPA standards and facility restructuring (i.e., to get the facility back to where it was before the AEC security requirements). THIS IS THE ONLY SITE WHERE WRITTEN INFORMATION WAS FOUND THAT DEALS WITH BERYLLIUM DECONTAMINATION AND SPECIALIZED WORK AREAS.

Summary Of Information about Listed Dates:
The listed dates on the Website (1968-1873) were confirmed in the files that were reviewed. If the company actually used the AEC funds to decontaminate and restructure the facility, then the listed dates should not be extended. However, there is no documentation that these activities or subsequent monitoring for exposures took place. Therefore, at this time the end date listed on the Website is not supported. No listing for this company was found in the yellow pages on the internet.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
FACILITY NAME: Northwest Machining and Manufacturing
Meridian, Idaho

ALSO KNOWN AS: Santa Clara Machining

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1996-2000

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Northwest Machining provided machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. This work involved beryllium materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Norton Co.
Worcester, Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1943-1961

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website
Norton manufactured refractory products from boron, beryllium uranium and thorium for the MED and the AEC. Work was done both at the Worcester facility and at a facility in Canada. As early as 1943, Norton was providing boron to the SAM Laboratory. In late 1945, Norton was subcontracted by Brush Beryllium to fuse beryllium oxide. Norton developed methods for shaping beryllium powder into rods and hexagonal rings using molds. It also used the process to produce beryllium oxide-uranium oxide hexagonal rings. By 1949, at least one death from beryllium poisoning had been recorded at Norton. Norton also provided thorium and uranium products to the MED/AEC. The company produced uranium crucibles for Argonne and fused thoria slugs that were irradiated in Hanford reactors. Contracts indicate work Norton continued to produce refractory materials for the AEC until 1961.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
The AWE files documented the fact that the DOE elimination report of 1987 showed little chance of contamination at that time. All documentation indicated that the end date of MED/AEC contracts for this site was 1954, with a possibility that there was an AEC license issued through 1957. There was a considerable amount of information about over exposures to beryllium and potential beryllium disease. No specific information was found regarding whether the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away, from work for other customers, nor was there any mention of any decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
It is not clear that the period in which weapons-related production occurred is correct since the documentation only mentions contract work through 1954. Otherwise, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC)-Apollo
Apollo, Pennsylvania

**ALSO KNOWN AS:** Babcock & Wilcox
Atlantic Richfield Corp. (ARCO)

**TIME PERIOD:** Atomic Weapons Employer, 1957-1983; Beryllium Vendor, 1960-1968

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
The Nuclear Material and Equipment Company (NUMEC) began operations at the Apollo and
Parks Township facilities in the late 1950s. The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) purchased
the stock of NUMEC in 1967. In 1971, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) purchased NUMEC and is
the current owner of the Apollo and Parks Township facilities.

NUMEC processed unirradiated uranium scrap for the AEC in the 1960s. This facility also
provided enriched uranium to the naval reactors program and included a plutonium plant,
plutonium plant storage area, highly enriched uranium fuel facility, metals and hafnium complex
and a uranium hexafluoride storage area. The facility also fabricated plutonium-beryllium
neutron sources.

The B&W Apollo facility ceased manufacturing nuclear fuel in 1983.

**Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:**
There was no information presented in the Beryllium Vendor files; all of the documentation was
in the AWE files. The specific start date for the AEC contracts appears to be 1957. The end
date is the same as that listed on the Website; however, there is mention that D&D was
completed in 1995. This information indicated that there were two different facilities, Apollo
and Parks Township. The Website doesn’t make this clear. No information was found about the
fabrication of plutonium-beryllium sources. Instead, there was documentation about conducting
research (and production?) on using beryllium (and other metals) to coat uranium oxide spheres.
Information also was presented about beryllium powder metallurgy. There was no mention of
decontamination efforts after the AEC contract periods, nor was there any indication that the
AEC work was being conducted in separate areas of the facilities away work for other
customers. A 1960 document indicated that they were doing beryllium work at that time in a
restricted area because of concerns for worker safety.

**Summary of information About Listed Dates:**
It appears the start date can be specified as 1957, rather than just the 1950s. The documentation
reviewed does not necessarily support the end date on the Website for this facility as a Beryllium
Vendor since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Babcock and Wilcox (or a successor) might have records. It might be useful to correct and/or clarify the overall Website information about this site.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Nuclear Metals, Inc.
West Concord, Massachusetts

ALSO KNOWN AS: NMI
Starmet, Inc.
MIT Met Lab
Whittaker Corp., Nuclear Metals Division


DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Nuclear Metals, Inc. was incorporated in 1954. It's work evolved out of the MIT Metallurgical Laboratory. In 1958, the company moved from Cambridge (where the MIT lab had been) to Concord. The company's current name is Starmet.

In 1958, Nuclear Metals began operating as a facility that produced depleted uranium products, primarily as penetrators for armor-piercing ammunition. It also supplied copper-plated uranium billets that were used to fuel Savannah River's production reactors. Other work at this facility included the manufacture of metal powders for medical applications, photocopiers and other applications. Thorium and thorium oxide were also handled at the site under license to the NRC. During the period from 1962-1986, Nuclear Metals was the sole source supplier for beryllium alloy end closure fuel element rings used in the “N” Reactor in Richland. Records also indicate beryllium work for the AEC at various times during the 1940s and 1950s.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
No information was found in the Beryllium Vendor files; it was all located in the AWE files. This documentation does not help with substantiating the activities at this site or defining the period in which weapons-related production occurred. For the purposes of this effort, several points are of note. The location of the facility seems to be in Concord, not West Concord. There was and is work going on at this site for DOD and other groups. There was no indication that the AEC work was conducted in separate areas, nor that any decontamination took place. Certain documents indicate AWE dates of 1955-1958; others state 1954-1963. There are several recent documents from material suppliers that question the listed dates on the Website and indicate this company is currently doing work for DOE. It also is of note that this site is an EPA Superfund Site.

Summary of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the period in which weapons-related production occurred. The description of the facility and its operations are not properly summarized in the
Website information. It appears the period in which weapons-related production occurred should go beyond 1986; probably to the present. However, it is hard to tell if there should be any breaks in the time periods. Since Starmet, which is still doing business with DOE, still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

**PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION**
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Philco-Ford Corporation
Newport beach, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Ford Aeronutronic

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1967-1972

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Aeronutronic Division of the Philco-Ford Corporation engaged in research on beryllium manufacturing techniques for the AEC between 1967 and 1972. The overriding goal of the program was to demonstrate the feasibility of shear spinning technology for beryllium production. The production process involved drilling and grinding of beryllium cones.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. No listing for this facility could be located in the yellow pages on the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Pleasanton Tool and Manufacturing
Pleasanton, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: Thomas Tool & Die

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1989-2002

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Pleasanton Tool provides machine shop services to Sandia National Laboratory, California.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. It could not be determined if contract work continues beyond 2002. Either way, there is no specific mention of decontamination activities.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found; it is possible that this site still is a DOE contractor. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
There was insufficient information to make a determination.


Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Poltech Precision  
Fremont, California

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium, Vendor, 1999

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Poltech Precision did machining work for Sandia National Laboratory, California.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. No listing for this facility could be located in the yellow pages on the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Radium Chemical Co.
New York, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Joseph J. Kelly

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1943-1950

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Beginning in 1943, the Radium Chemical Co. supplied most of the radium required for the Manhattan Engineer District. Combinations of material supplied and/or mixed by the Radium Chemical Company included radium bromide and radium bromide mixed with powdered beryllium. Brass was also used.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
A site disposition report dated 12/15/00 made no mention of beryllium. Otherwise, there was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. No listing for this facility could be located in the yellow pages on the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME:  Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute  
Troy, New York

TIME PERIOD:  Beryllium Vendor, 1951-1952; 1963

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Under an AEC contract in the early 1950s, researchers at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute investigated methods for improving the ductility of beryllium by coating the material with copper. The Brush Beryllium Company supplied the beryllium powder for the project. RPI also borrowed 400 lbs. of beryllium for AEC-sponsored research from Oak Ridge National Laborotory in 1963.

Scientists at RPI conducted a number of AEC-sponsored research studies in the 1950s and 1960s using enriched uranium obtained from commercial sources. Available records provide no evidence of a link between RPI research and the AEC weapons program.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
A site disposition report dated 01/00 made no mention of beryllium. Otherwise, there was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since the Institute still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3 Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

**FACILITY NAME:** Revere Copper and Brass  
Detroit, Michigan

**TIME PERIOD:** Atomic Weapons Employer, 1943-1950s;  
Beryllium Vendor, 1946-1950

**DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:**

**Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:**
Between 1943 and 1946, Revere Copper and Brass extruded uranium rods in its Detroit plant. During the late 1940s and early 1950s Revere rolled or extruded uranium rods. Revere also extruded beryllium ingots and billets into rods at its Detroit plant between 1946 and 1950. Revere had a contract with the AEC for beryllium work, but not with the MED. Revere also worked with beryllium alloys. Some of the beryllium work was done on parts or components for the Materials Testing reactor.

**Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:**
The only information in the AWE files was a repeat of the information on the Website, except that the AEC contracts went through 1954, which ties down better the end of the listed date. Also, there was a DOE elimination report completed in 1990 and it indicated there was no radioactive contamination (no mention was made of beryllium). In the Beryllium Vendor files, there is a document that indicates the beryllium contract work extended into 1951, not 1950. Also, there are numerous documents dealing with the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers had contracts with this company in 1944. There is no documentation about any decontamination work in 1950/1951, after the beryllium contracts ended, nor after 1954 when the AWE work ended. Also, there is no indication that the AEC work was conducted in separate areas of the facility.

**Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:**
The end date of the AEC contracts is probably 1954, with the beryllium work ending in 1950 or 1951. The documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date for the site as a Beryllium Vendor since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. No listing for this facility could be located in Michigan in the yellow pages on the internet, but there is a company in Massachusetts with the same name.

**INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:**
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

**EVALUATION FINDINGS:**
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Robin Materials  
Mountain View, California  
TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1985-1997

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Robin Materials provided metal materials to Sandia National Laboratory, California. This material included beryllium-copper.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION  
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Ron Witherspoon, Inc.
Campbell, California

ALSO KNOWN AS: RWI

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1990-1995

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Ron Witherspoon, Inc. produced beryllium springs for Sandia National Laboratory, California.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be
determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of
the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of
decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of
beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record
reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE
Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy
group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual
contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Speedring Systems, Inc.
Detroit, Michigan

ALSO KNOWN AS: Axsys Technologies
Speedring Systems Inc.

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1963: 1968

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
In the spring of 1963 Speedring performed some beryllium work for Rocky Flats. In 1968, Speedring of Detroit machined some beryllium parts which Brush Beryllium was under contract to supply to Y-12.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Nothing of significance was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. There was a brief mention of the 1968 AEC work in the AWE files; however, nothing was found about the 1963 date. There was no DOE elimination report and no documentation about decontamination activities or where in the facility the beryllium work for the AEC was conducted.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the specific period in which weapons-related production occurred. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Speedring, Inc.  
                     Culman, Alabama  
ALSO KNOWN AS: Axxsys Technologies  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
Brush Beryllium sublet some jobs for Dow/Rocky Flats to Speedring.  More recently, Speedring performed work for Sandia National Laboratory.  Speedring's beryllium dust and sampling practices are documented in Battelle's Defense Metals Information Center publication on "Some Notes on Safe Handling Practices for Beryllium."  Speedring was part of the U.S. commercial beryllium industry in 1961 and receiving beryllium at this time, but records indicate that this beryllium was for use under another government contract, possibly for the Department of Defense.  There is another Speedring facility in Detroit, Michigan.  

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
Nothing of significance was found in either the Beryllium Vendor or AWE files.  It is not evident where the listed dates came from that are on the Website.  However, it is known that this facility has a history of worker exposures and beryllium disease.  For example, OSHA has measured beryllium exposures in this facility sometime between May 1979 and December 1999 and there was a manuscript in the AWE files relating to chronic beryllium disease in workers from this facility.  No mention is made about decontamination activities after the DOE contract work, nor is there mention that the beryllium production activities for DOE took place in areas separate from other customers.  

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
Nothing was found to substantiate the listed dates on the Website (1971-1998); more information is needed.  Otherwise, the documentation reviewed does not necessarily support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found.  The correct spelling of the city location is Cullman, not Culman.  Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME: Stevens Institute of Technology
Hoboken, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1959-1960

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Stevens Institute of Technology performed beryllium research and development for the AEC. Researchers at the school's Powder Metallurgy Laboratory experimented with slip casting production techniques as a replacement for the conventional vacuum-hot-pressed block process. Beryllium powder was the primary ingredient in the production process. The laboratory's working inventory during the course of the contract included approximately 50 pounds of beryllium metal powder produced by the Brush Beryllium Company.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this Institute still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Laboratories
Bayside, New York

ALSO KNOWN AS: Sylvania Corning Nuclear Corp.-Bayside Laboratories;
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc.; Metallurgical Laboratory;
Sylvania Electric Company, Atomic Energy Division;
Sylvania Bayside Laboratories; Sylcor

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1947-1962

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The Metallurgical Laboratory of the Sylvania Electric Company investigated uranium and thorium powder metallurgy. It also produced powdered metal slugs, developed bonding techniques, and plated uranium slugs with nickel. The work with slugs included the conversion of uranium metal to uranium hydride using hydrogen. A February 1948 AEC Monthly Summary of Activities indicates that the Lab's “initial program will involve determining the physical properties and the health hazards of beryllium and uranium powders and the applications of powder metallurgy to these metals and their alloys.” In 1948, the work required 315 pounds of raw beryllium metal. Beryllium was handled first in the regular metallurgical building and then, after the objections of the AEC medical division, in a special AEC metallurgical development laboratory.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Most of the useful documentation for this site was found in the AWE files. There is a conflict between the discussion of period in which weapons-related production occurred in various documents. It looks like the period in which weapons-related production occurred could go through 1965, instead of 1962. At some point (no date was given), the beryllium work was isolated in a “metallurgical building.” There is no mention of decontamination at the point when the AEC contracts were terminated, nor are there documents that provide insight as to whether the AEC work was isolated from that of other customers. The site was declared decontaminated by the State of New York in 1985; nothing is mentioned about beryllium, just radioactivity. All original buildings have been destroyed and condos have been built on the site.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
It appears the period in which weapons-related production occurred should go through 1965, rather than 1962 as listed on the Website. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date for this site as a Beryllium Vendor since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Perhaps records can be obtained from Sylvania.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Tapemation
Scotts Valley, California
TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1990-1995

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Tapemation is a machine shop that provided services to Sandia National Laboratory, California. Several small jobs involved the precision machining of beryllium-copper materials.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
There was no additional information in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files. It could not be determined if the beryllium activities for the contract work were conducted in separate parts of the facility away from work for other customers. There is no specific mention of decontamination activities after the contracts were terminated.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Since this company still exists, site visits and record reviews could be conducted.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
Appendix B-3  Residual Beryllium Evaluations for Individual Facilities

FACILITY NAME:  Trudeau Foundation
                Saranac Lake, New York

TIME PERIOD:  Beryllium Vendor, 1950-1957

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine supported beryllium research studies at the Trudeau Foundation.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Information was found in the AWE and Beryllium Vendor files. The specific research that was conducted dealt with Experimental and Clinical Studies Involving Beryllium and Berylliosis (1950-1954), Biochemical Aspects of Pulmonary Granulomatosis (1955-1957), and Studies on the Experimental Pathology and Biochemistry of Pulmonary Granulomatosis of Beryllium Workers (1954-1957). There was no documentation about decontamination activities after the research was ended or if the research was conducted in areas separate from research.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. It is not clear if the Trudeau Foundation still exists. There is currently a Trudeau Institute in Saranac Lake.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: U.S. Pipe and Foundry
Burlington, New Jersey

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1943

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
A small amount of beryllium mesh (15 pounds) was sent to U.S. Pipe and Foundry by the MED. Some work was done, but it is unclear whether a satisfactory technique was ever developed beyond this initial attempt to manufacture beryllium tubes.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Very few documents were located. It appears the site was dealing with 75 pounds of beryllium mesh and not 15 pounds as listed on the Website. The specific dates of MED/AEC involvement were listed as 1943-1944. These dates seem more appropriate than the Website’s date because they were still conducting the research at the end of 1943 and the MED/AEC contact was giving them a few more months to look into the technique they were evaluating. No information was located on decontamination of the site after the MED/AEC work, or whether this work was conducted in areas separate from activities for other customers.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The period in which weapons-related production occurred probably could be 1943-1944, rather than just 1943. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. The company is still in business therefore, additional records may be available.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: United Lead Co.
Middlesex, New Jersey

ALSO KNOWN AS: United Lead Co.

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1950-1967

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
From 1950 to 1955, United Lead, a subsidiary of National Lead Company, was the AEC's operating contractor for the Middlesex Sampling Plant. The Middlesex Sampling Plant sampled, assayed, stored, and shipped uranium, thorium, and beryllium ores. The plant discontinued uranium and beryllium assaying and sampling activities in 1955. Until 1967, the site was used as a thorium storage and sampling site.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
It appears that this listing and the DOE site listed as Middlesex Sampling Plant (MSP) are one in the same and should be combined into one file. The only documentation that was found and is not stated in the Website summary is that: (1) the Department of the Navy was given the site by GSA in 1967 and there were ongoing Navy/Marine activities there until 1978 when DOE became the custodian of the property; and (2) remedial activities started in 1981, versus the 1980 date listed on the MSP Website listing. No decontamination activities are mentioned for the time period of the Navy activity (1967-1978).

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the specific period in which weapons-related production occurred. A considerable amount of work needs to be completed to this listing together with the one for MSP so they make sense. The listed dates look like they should be 1943-1967 and then 1980 or 1981-1998 (when the remediation work ended at MSP). Of special interest is the fact that if there were no decontamination activities at the 1967 date, there would be individuals from the Department of the Navy, et al. who probably would have been affected by residual contamination. The 1998 end date for the beryllium residual issue also is not supported, because there is no mention of decontamination. In the heading for this site on the Website, the secondary listing probably should be National Lead, instead of repeating “United Lead.” Also, another name for this site that was used frequently in the past is Perry Warehouse, yet the Website does not include it. No listing for this facility could be located in the yellow pages on the internet.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.
EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: University of Denver Research Institute
Denver, Colorado

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1963-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The University of Denver Research Institute is listed as a processor of radioactive materials for National Lead of Ohio (Fernald). It appears that the University of Denver handled test quantities of radioactive metal in February 1965.

In 1963, a University of Denver Research Institute researcher (F. Perkins) held an AEC contract for work on intermediate-temperature oxidation of beryllides.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Nothing additional could be found in the AWE or Beryllium Vendor Files. There is a July 1986 document that indicates that DOE was concerned at that date there might still be radioactive contamination. There is no documentation about the AEC beryllides contract other than a bibliographical citation.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the period in which weapons-related production occurred since the documentation has very little information about activities at the site. Perhaps additional records can be obtained from the University.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

TIME PERIOD: Beryllium Vendor, 1949-1954

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine supported beryllium research at the University of North Carolina.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
The specific research was a Radioautographic Study of Distribution and Retention of Be in the Rat. No documentation was found regarding decontamination activities subsequent to the AEC contracts, nor was information presented about where the research was conducted.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
The documentation reviewed does not support the end date on the Website since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Perhaps records can be obtained from the University.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME: Vitro Corporation of America (Tennessee)
Chattanooga, Tennessee

ALSO KNOWN AS: Chattanooga Site now owned by W.R. Grace
Vitro Chemical is Subsidiary of Vitro Corp.
Heavy Minerals Co.

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer, 1957-uncertain; Beryllium Vendor, uncertain

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Records indicate that "Vitro Corporation" of Chattanooga, Tennessee performed some beryllium work for Y-12. A 1962 document also mentions that the AEC met with members of the beryllium industry, including representatives from "Vitro Chemical" (no address), but does not mention whether any contracts were involved in these discussions. The original owner of this site was Heavy Metals Inc. and possessed an AEC license to process uranium and thorium products beginning as early as 1957. Documentation indicates that the company provided price quotes to the AEC for thorium products as early as 1954, but there is no indication that it received a contract for that work. Vitro Chemical of Chattanooga, Tennessee, a subsidiary of Vitro Corporation, took over the site at the end of 1959 and was under contract to the AEC to produce thorium metal, thorium fluoride, and thorium oxide. This site is now owned by W.R. Grace.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Nothing was found in either the AWE or Beryllium Vendor files that changes the information on the Website. However, it should be noted that the Beryllium Vendor files for “Vitro” contain information on both this site and the Vitro Laboratories Site in New Jersey. The only information about beryllium is secondary and is abstracted from other source documents. It is not at all clear one way or another if this is truly a Beryllium Vendor. Regardless, there is no information on decontamination activities or work locations within the facility.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
More information is needed to determine the period in which weapons-related production occurred for this site as a Beryllium Vendor. The documents that were reviewed are contradictory. The period in which weapons-related production occurred probably should start at 1954, rather than 1957 as listed on the Website. No listing for this facility could be located in the yellow pages on the internet.
INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
The information evaluated was insufficient to make a determination concerning this site.
FACILITY NAME: Wolverine Tube Division  
Detroit, Michigan  

ALSO KNOWN AS: Div. Of Calumet Hecia Consolidated Copper Co.  
Hermes Automotive  
Mamif Corp.  

TIME PERIOD: Atomic Weapons Employer; Beryllium Vendor, 1943-1946  

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:  
Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:  
In 1943, the University of Chicago subcontracted to Wolverine Tube of Detroit, Michigan, for help in extrusion of metals that were needed as part of the Manhattan Project. Wolverine Tube performed research on the fabrication of aluminum slugs and the process of aluminum canning and also experimented with thorium and beryllium. This contract ended in 1946. Wolverine Tube received other AEC contracts because of its extrusion expertise.  

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:  
Nothing was found in the Beryllium Vendor files. In the AWE files, the 1990 elimination report mentions no contamination, but does not clarify if this includes beryllium. It is mentioned that the facility where the AEC work was conducted is now a warehouse owned by the Hermes Automotive Manufacturing Corp. which is still in existence today. Of specific importance is the notation that the subcontracting with the University of Chicago did end in 1946, but probably this company continued work in the extrusion area through 1955 as a sub-sub contractor with DuPont (Savannah River). No documentation is provided about decontamination activities subsequent to the end of the AEC work, nor is any mention made of whether or not this work was conducted in areas separate from work for other customers.  

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:  
It is not clear why the listed dates on the Website do not go through 1955, instead of stopping at 1946. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date for the site as a Beryllium Vendor since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Additional records may be available from Hermes Automotive Manufacturing Corp.  

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:  
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.  

EVALUATION FINDINGS:  
The documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.
PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Additional information is required.
FACILITY NAME:         Wyman-Gordon Inc.  
Grafton, North Grafton Massachusetts

TIME PERIOD:            Beryllium Vendor, 1959-1965

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITIES:

Information As Printed On DOE Worker Advocacy Website:
Wyman-Gordon supplied beryllium powder forgings and beryllium blanks to the Rocky Flats plant and beryllium metal and parts to the Y-12 plant.

Information Obtained From Files Of Worker Advocacy Group:
Nothing substantial could be found in either the Beryllium Vendor or AWE files. A 1961 document states that approximately 50% of the beryllium work at this site is for the AEC, while the remainder is for DOD. One document indicated the end date of the contracts to be 1966 and not 1965 as listed on the Website. No information is provided about decontamination activities after the AEC contracts, nor is there any mention of the AEC work being conducted in work area separate from work for other customers.

Summary Of Information About Listed Dates:
An end date of AEC contract work may be 1966, rather than 1965. The documentation reviewed does not support an end date since no record of beryllium decontamination could be found. Additional records might be available since the company is still in existence.

INFORMATIONAL SOURCES:
Sources of information reviewed during this evaluation, as shown above, included the DOE Worker Advocacy Website, along with documentation provided by the DOE Worker Advocacy group consisting of written communiques by or for the DOE.

EVALUATION FINDINGS:
Documentation reviewed indicates that there is a potential for significant beryllium residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-related production occurred.

PERIOD OF POTENTIAL RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION
Residual contamination from AEC/DOE Activities is indistinguishable from non AEC/DOE activities.